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Vlll Foreword 
The Single Market -A  new commitment 
Mario Monti, European Commissioner responsible for 
the Single Market 
The Single Market is at the core of  the European Union. Its creation was 
one of the main objectives of  the original Rome Treaty. The eight-year 
programme to complete it between 1985 and 1992 was the m9st ambi-
tious target that the European Community ever set itsel£ The tact that 
the target was  in a large measure reached is  one of the Community's 
enduring successes. 
The Single Market remains at the centre of the European Union's 
concerns today.  Opening up fifteen  national markets into one Single 
Market, ensuring open competition and preparing for its enlargement 
to many other countries may well  be  regarded as  the greatest 'supply 
side' exercise ever in world economics - a huge exercise to stimulate pro-
duction, increase competition, reduce prices and thus increase demand. 
The completion of  the Single Market and its good state of  health will be 
a major contributor to the  achievement of the  Union's  current and 
future political objectives. 
First and foremost, there is increasing recognition on the part of  gov-
ernments, business and employees of the important link between the 
Single Market, economic growth and fuller employment. Only a prop-
erly working market, through full international economic integration, 
will stimulate the competition, restructuring and innovation which can 
provide lasting employment in Europe. 
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Second, cohesion between regions is increasing as the Single Market 
provides opportunities in the form of  increased trade and investment for 
the development of  new skills and technologies in all parts of  the Union. 
The countries which are  'catching up' benefit from new levels of effi-
ciency and productivity. The countries which did not have so far to go 
also benefit from better trade and investment opportunities with other 
Member States. 
Third, in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union, an effective 
Single Market is  able to guarantee the economic stability necessary to 
underpin the move to a Single Currency. The Single Currency will also 
reduce the cost to business and consumers of managing different cur-
rencies and help markets to work more efficiently by revealing price dif-
ferences right across the Union. 
Fourth, the enlargement of  the Union and the successful preparation 
of associated countries for their participation in the Single Market pre-
sents a major challenge, but meeting it will determine the conditions 
under which enlargement takes  place.  The Single  Market also  helps 
associated countries with the difficult task of  approximating their laws 
and getting into step with the practical application of  the rules. 
At the end of the eight-year legislative programme which preceded 
the entry into force of  the Single Market in December 1992, the Coun-
cil of  Ministers asked the Commission to present in the course of 1996, 
an analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the legislation which had 
been put into place. 
The Commission began work on this task over two years ago. Exten-
sive background research was  organized, comprising thirty-eight inde-
pendent studies of  various sections of the economy, areas of legislation 
or economic variables,  together with a large scale survey of EU busi-
nesses.  I have been privileged to lead this major research programme, 
with the help of  my colleagues, and to steer it to its conclusions. Indeed, 
the results of this work formed the basis of  a political report presented 
by the Commission in November 1996.' 
For the first time in the short life of  the Single Market, we now have 
empirically derived evidence of  how we are doing. Now we can see; we 
can begin to walk by sight, rather than only by faith. This means that 
we  can use  this valuable information to start to 'fine tune' the Single 
Market in terms of  what needs to be done, and who needs to do it. 
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All  of the background research,  about 10,000 pages  in all,  will  be 
published by the Commission and will, no doubt, attract attention from 
the specialists most directly concerned. But I felt that it was  necessary 
that the Commission try to reach a wider audience on a subject which 
is of  direct relevance to businesses and to individual citizens. Hence the 
decision to produce this book, which is intended to tell die story of  the 
successes of the Single Market so far,  to those who are directly affected 
by it. It also aims to highlight areas where we need to do more, for exam-
ple, to complete the work on the free  movement of persons, company 
law and taxation, and to address future challenges such as the Informa-
tion Society. 
What follows  is a colourful but accurate account of  what the Com-
munity has been trying to achieve, how far it has succeeded and (occa-
sionally)  failed  and,  above  all,  what difference  the Single  Market  is 
making in terms of  presenting new opportunities for prosperity to our 
businesses and citizens. 
Clearly, the story does not end here. The Single Market is not an iso-
lated event which happened in January 1993 but a continual process. It 
is  not so  much a  leg~ framework as  an attitude of mind. We cannot 
afford to be complacent. There is still plenty of  work to be done before 
we have reached our ultimate goal, which is to make the Single Market 
operate with full efficiency. 
In its  Report, the Commission set out its  priorities for  the Single 
Market agenda. Its message is simple: the Single Market is already yield-
ing significant benefit~ but it will yield more if  we can successfully over-
come remaining problems. 
In the' first place, Member States must renew their commitment to 
the Single Market. They must start by delivering on their existing com-
mitments,  in  particular  by  implementing  and  vigorously  enforcing 
Community legislation and Treaty principles. Second, we  must attack 
the tendency to over-regulate and impose unnecessary burdens on busi-
nesses and our economy, at both Community and national level. Third, 
we  must have the political courage  to take the decisions necessary to 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
'Impact and effectiveness of  the Single Market', COM (96) 520 final of30 October 1996 (Cat. 
No. CB-C0-96-558-EN-C), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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remove the remaining obstacles to an effective Single Market, even if 
this appears to touch on such sensitive areas as taxation or border con-
trols on people. Finally, we must use all the instruments available under 
other Community policies to help the Single Market work better. 
I have one last message which also is echoed in this book. It is that in 
the final analysis markets are made by businesses and their customers, 
not by governments. The Community has come a long way since 1985 
and has, by and large, delivered a single legal framework in which busi-
nesses can operate freely,  and customers can choose freely,  across fron-
tiers. But the Single Market is much more than an economic enterprise. 
Together with other Community policies it has  contributed tangible 
benefits  to  citizens  of the  Union:  lower  prices  and  more  consumer 
choice, the extension of  personal freedom and rights, higher living stan-
dards, better health and safety at work, product safety and reliability, 
and a safer  environment. We  can and should do  more.  But further 
refinement of Community Single Market legislation cannot substitute 
for the energy and dynamism of  entrepreneurs to compete for business 
in new markets. It is  on this that our future prosperity depends. The 
other  important  market  players  are  the  customers.  Individual  con-
sumers, as well as companies, need to be better informed about the pos-
sibilities  now open  to  them so  that they  can  stimulate  ever-higher 
standards of  economic performance. I hope that this book will go some 
way towards helping to achieve that aim. 
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A Flying Start 
The European Union's single market is in a state of constant evolution 
and extension. Created to open up national economies, thereby increas-
ing growth, competitiveness and living standards in Europe, the single 
market has become the largest and most complete free trade area in the 
world, inhabited by 370m people who between them generate output of 
Ecus 6,441 bn. 
It now extends beyond the EU's  15  members, to embrace Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein, and early in the next century it will stretch 
into eastern Europe as countries there join the EU. It is also subject to 
adaptation as EU decision-makers, national governments and business 
respond to economic, technological and social change inside this enor-
mous marketplace by amending, refining and simplifying old rules and 
coming up with  new ones.  The single  market programme has  thus 
become a process of  dynamic change, rather than something static and 
set in concrete. 
But the main legislative architecture of  the single market was built in 
the late 1980s and the first half of  the 1990s, as most of  the 282 Direc-
tives and proposals set out in the European Commission's '1992' blue-
print were laid, stone by stone, in place.  Between  1985 and 1992, an 
unprecedented volume of  legislation was adopted. The change to qual-
ified majority voting and the willingness of  Member States to compro-
mise meant that nearly all  the key measures were  adopted before the 
target date of  31 December 1992. Many of  the cracks were filled in with 
scores more pieces of implementing legislation. Some of  the legislation 
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derogations for certain member states. But it is  now possible to take a 
general look at whether the hopes and fears aroused by the single market 
programme are beginning to happen. 
That is the aim of  this book. It is based on a big new research effort. 
To help find out what has happened and to plan for the single market's 
future,  the  European  Commission  asked  independent  experts  from 
around the Union to conduct a series of 38 in-depth studies and itself 
coordinated a business survey (see Appendix A). Some of these studies 
take an across the board look at such features as trade, investment and 
competition patterns. Others delve deep into sectors like cars and phar-
maceuticals. In volume terms, this is twice the amount of  research that 
went into the famous Cecchini Report of 1988 - The single market's 
potential. Rightly so. For the task of  establishing what has happened, as 
distinct from  what should happen,  is  doubly difficult.  It requires  an 
effort to winnow out all  the other factors  affecting Europe in recent 
years -like globalisation of  the world economy, technology shifts, Ger-
many's reunification in 1990, the 1992-93 disruptions among European 
currencies, and an attempt to isolate the 'single market effect'  on the 
EU's economy. 
The research shows that, so far, the single market programme appears, 
among other things, to have: 
•  increased output in the EU by more than 1 per cent, with more pos-
itive results to come; 
•  raised the level of employment by between 300,000 and 900,000 
more jobs than there would otherwise have been; 
•  produced inflation rates 1.0 to 1.5 per cent lower than they would 
be without the single market; 
•  stimulated investment in the EU by an additional2.7 per cent; 
•  attracted extra foreign  direct investment to the European Union 
(44 per cent of  world FDI inflows in the early 1990s, compared to 
28.2 per cent between 1982 and 1987); 
•  allowed poorer EU states to grow faster than the richer ones; 
•  intensified intra-EU trade, with the share of manufactured goods 
and services which EU states export to each other increasing by, 
respectively, 14 and 7.6 percentage points over the past decade; 
•  almost  doubled the share of public sector purchases  from  other 
member states from 6 to 10 per cent; 
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•  knocked more than Ecus 5bn a year off  the costs of  Europe's traders 
and road hauliers because they no longer have to stop at internal EU 
borders for routine customs and fiscal checks; 
•  accelerated price reductions in telecommunications equipment by 
7 per cent, saving buyers up to Ecus 1.5-2bn a year; 
•  kept air transport traffic 20 per cent higher than it otherwise would 
have been during the early 1990s recession. 
But the single market programme has proved disappointing in that: 
•  it has so far benefited small and medium-sized companies less than 
larger groups which had the structures to exploit the new market 
better; 
•  it has taken longer to implement than originally anticipated and the 
full effects in terms of  competitiveness for European business have 
yet to be realised. 
These are,  however,  just the starker shades emerging from a complex 
picture. It is clear that neither the best hopes nor worst fears surround-
ing the single market programme have been realised. There were strong 
hopes that the programme would set Europe on a higher, and possibly 
permanently higher,  growth  path.  Removal  of trade  barriers  would 
create more competition, drive down prices and costs, thereby stimulat-
ing demand from consumers and encouraging companies to make fur-
ther efficiency-related investments to gain economies of scale - and so 
on in a beneficial chain reaction. The world-wide economic recession of 
the early 1990s put paid to early realisation of  that hope, and with it the 
prospect of  a big increase in job creation. 
Yet, the EU did pick itself up and perform better in the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s than either the US or Japan in relation to their respec-
tive growth trends of  previous years. The single market programme has 
gradually delivered more competition. This did not prevent unemploy-
ment  rates  from  rising  in  Europe.  The  single  market  programme 
undoubtedly speeded up restructuring in some sectors, which had hith-
erto  been  shielded  by  multiple  barriers.  But liberalisation  benefited 
other sectors like telecom and information services, which are proving 
to be major net providers of  the jobs of  the future. 
The single  market  also  provoked  trepidation  among  poorer  EU 
member states that they might suffer in a more competitive market and 
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lose ground to the industries of richer member states. The evidence is 
that neither happened, except perhaps in the case of  Greece. Spain, Por-
tugal and Ireland grew faster than the EU average. Much of  this was, of 
course, due to increased EU structural funding which these countries 
received and which they spent mainly on infrastructure. But if  the single 
market did bring with it some increased specialisation-and it did-this 
did not lead to poorer member states being generally shut out of  newer, 
higher technology industries into which they had begun to venture. 
'Fortress Europe' has proved a myth, too. At the outset of the single 
market programme, many in Washington and Tokyo accused the EU of 
trying to shut them out of the emerging single market. In support of 
their case, they cited EU provisions for reciprocity in financial services, 
limits on Japanese car shipments and a non-binding quota aimed at US 
films. As it has turned out, the EU has never used the reciprocity provi-
sion in financial services; Japanese firms are now largely supplying the 
EU with cars made in Europe rather than shipped from Japan; and Hol-
lywood has found a non-binding quota no bar to its exports to Europe. 
Imports from major competitors like the US and Japan did increase, but 
less  than the job-creating investment coming in from those two coun-
tries. And, from the European viewpoint, such import competition has 
provided a useful downward pressure on prices, which otherwise proved 
rather impervious to the effects of  the single market. The single market 
programme coincided with the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade 
negotiations, and in some ways, set the agenda for those negotiations. 
The EU thereby proved itself a building block, and not a stumbling 
block, for an open international trading order. 
The single market programme gave rise,  too, to voices prophesying 
that, despite the lighter approach towards harmonisation, there would 
be an increasingly bland uniformity of products on offer to Europe's 
consumers, as Europe's companies took advantage of  the disappearance 
of  customs, technical and regulatory barriers to develop 'single products 
for  the single  market'.  In fact,  far  from  being suppressed,  consumer 
choice  has  increased  hugely.  This  phenomenon  is  partly  related  to 
information technology allowing manufacturers to make multiple vari-
ants of their products and to the logistics  revolution - itself a direct 
result of  removing border controls and liberalising road transport- per-
mitting speedy dispatch of  these products to Europe's varied markets. 
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Access  to those markets is  now far easier. The market for industrial 
goods is now highly integrated within the EU, due to single market leg-
islation  that  built  on earlier  achievements.  The single  market  pro-
gramme's assault on barriers to the provision of cross-border services 
was, by contrast, far more radical because of  the many national rules and 
regulations  surrounding services.  Progress  in  creating  pan-European 
markets for services is thus inevitably slower, but it has produced greater 
competition in services with consumers seeing the benefit in terms of 
wider choice. 
In general, however, examples of  where the single market programme 
is  clearly seen as  the driving force for change in a particular sector are 
comparatively rare.  The predominant picture that emerges  from  the 
independent studies and from the 13,500 companies which responded 
to a Eurostat survey (see Appendix B) is that the EU measures have been 
as much an enabler, as a driver, of  change. 
That is to say, the single market has helped to create an environment 
where businesses are more likely to pursue pan-European strategies and 
to enter another market in the EU, even though managers may not see 
it as the main reason for the strategic decisions they have taken. The EU 
seems  to have  performed this  enabling role  in air transport, satellite 
broadcasting, corporate banking, car manufacture, telecommunications 
and mobile telephony. In all these areas, market access has become freer, 
and  the  level  of cross-border  competition,  sales  and  mergers  has 
increased. 
By contrast, much of  Europe's retail banking and insurance, pharma-
ceutical and energy industries remain structured along national lines. 
This reflects  the fact  that initial competition from outside prompted 
them to target their domestic market. This may be a 'stepping stone' to 
gearing up for competitive cross-border activity. There is also the pref-
erence  that most individual Europeans still have  for  financial  service 
companies of their own nationality or at least based within their own 
country, and the control that national governments have exercised,  in 
the name of medical safety and energy security,  over their drugs and 
energy industries. 
The existence of these controls, and the possibility of relaxing some 
of  them, means that there are still big potential gains to be squeezed out 
of the single market. To try to gauge the size of these gains, the Com-
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mission asked independent experts to examine the effect of  further lib-
eralisation in three areas  - energy,  telecoms/information services  and 
transport. Chapter 10 contains the full  results, but the bottom line of 
the studies is that: 
•  electricity liberalisation, to the extent agreed in summer 1996, will 
produce savings of  Ecus 4-6bn a year for electricity users by 2005; 
•  full  liberalisation of telecommunications, which is  already under-
way,  combined  with  diffusion  of information  technology  and 
unchecked expansion of information services, would produce an 
accumulating increase in overall output amounting to more than 1 
per cent of  GOP by 2005; 
•  completion  of the  Trans-European  transport  Networks  (TENs) 
already  proposed  by  the  Commission,  combined  with  major 
improvements to railways and pricing changes affecting all forms of 
transport, could yield total potential savings to Europe's transport 
users  of more than Ecus  130bn a year,  or 1-1.5  per cent of the 
Union's GOP, by 2005. 
Prizes of  this magnitude are clearly worth aiming at. 
6 Chapter 2 
Putting the Machine in 
Motion 
The single market is  not only a mass  market, but creating it has also 
become a mass endeavour. What might have seemed an elitist blueprint 
at the outset is steadily involving more people - not only the European 
Commission, governments of  the member states and the European Par-
liament,  but also  national  parliamentarians,  trade  associations,  stan-
dard-setters,  companies,  judges,  consumers  and  citizens.  Their 
involvement is  vital  if the rights  and freedoms  offered by the single 
market are to be taken up and used. 
The origin of the single market programme is  well  known.  By the 
mid-1980s it began to dawn on many that, after nearly 30 years,  the 
European Community still had no real common market, that many of 
the freedoms prescribed in the Treaty of Rome for capital, goods, ser-
vices  and people remained a dead letter, and that removing this eco-
nomic fragmentation and these legal failings might pull Europe out of 
its doldrums and help it compete better with North Americans and East 
Asians. So the Commission produced its 1985 White Paper of282 pro-
posals to give the Treaty freedoms some real meaning at last. 
Within the year, the member states made their major contribution by 
calling their first inter-governmental conference since 1957 and by sign-
ing the Single  European Act.  The key  feature  of this was  to extend 
majority voting to almost every issue at stake in the single market, with 
the important exception of tax where the rule of unanimity still holds. 
The result was  a burst of European legislation, with the Commission 
churning out the White Paper proposals in the form of Directives and 
regulations, for debate and approval by the Council of  Ministers and the 
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European Parliament. The Commission set a date, 1 January 1993, for 
'completion' of  its single market programme. This date was intended as 
a spur to EU legislators, certainly not as marking an end to their efforts. 
In fact, it roughly marked the point where most of  the legislation needed 
for the single market had been passed.  By 1995, the Commission was 
producing one third ofits level of  draft legislation five years earlier (19 
draft proposals compared to 61  in 1990). 
But the story does not end there. As the spate of  new laws has slack-
ened, so the task of  ensuring they are obeyed becomes more important. 
A few dozen of  the original White Paper proposals took the form of  reg-
ulations, which once passed by the Council of  Ministers in Brussels and 
the European Parliament in Strasbourg enter directly and automatically 
into force in member states. Most of  the measures - no less than 221 -
took the form of Directives, which needed to be converted, or 'trans-
posed' in the EU jargon, into national law by national parliaments. Not 
all have been. By October 1996, an average of  91  per cent of  all of the 
internal market Directives, including the implementing legislation, was 
on member states' statute books, with Denmark holding the best record 
of97.8 per cent, and the newest member states of  Sweden, Austria and 
Finland bringing up the rear with transposition rates of  less than 88 per 
cent. The spotlight has  tended to focus  on the fate  of the legislation 
stemming from the original White Paper.  But there is  a mass  of sec-
ondary, implementing legislation - some of  it in the form of  Directives 
- that also requires action by national parliaments and civil services. 
Governments drag their feet for various reasons.  Sometimes, a new 
government is  reluctant to put into law an EU measure which its pre-
decessor agreed or was prepared to accept. More often, it succumbs to 
pressures from domestic industries who urge it to delay the transposition 
of  EU legislation in order to keep their sectors protected for just a little 
bit longer. 
A particular instance of  this lies in insurance in Germany, where spe-
cialised health insurance companies continue to be protected from rivals 
offering several types of  insurance, despite a specific requirement in the 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive that all insurance companies must 
be allowed to offer health cover. A general example occurs in public pro-
quement. Several governments have been slow to put into their national 
law the new rules on opening up public contracts to competitive cross-
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border bidding (see Chapter 3). In fact, only three member states have 
fulfilled  their obligation to transpose the eleven  public procurement 
Directives effectively. The habit of  governments to reserve their juiciest 
contracts for domestic companies, 'the home team', is  proving hard to 
break. It is  a classic illustration of how governments, and companies, 
want to have their cake and eat it, happy to seize on opportunities in 
neighbouring markets but still keen to keep their own market off-limits 
to competitors. 
In some  instances,  the  necessary  legislation  ends  up on national 
statute  books,  but in a  different  form.  This is  because while  some 
member states faithfully copy EU-agreed language into their national 
law, others like to re-organise and re-phrase it. This carries the risk, even 
perhaps the aim, of  elaborating on the requirements in the EU measures 
in such a way as to discriminate against foreigners. 
The job of  chasing up member states which have failed to adopt EU 
directives, or adopt them correctly or to implement them fully,  falls  to 
the Commission. Its weapons are political pressure and/or legal action. 
This involves public reminders to member states of  their failure to live 
up in practice to their commitment to the single market, warning letters 
and eventually law suits  brought in the European Court of Justice. 
Single market legislation is  firmly grounded in the EU Treaty. A key 
doctrine  of the  single  market  programme  - the  requirement  that 
member states mutually recognise each other's industrial and commer-
cial rules and therefore accept each other's goods and services- actually 
stems from an earlier European Court ruling.  In addition, the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty allows  the European Court to fine  a member state 
that flouts one of  its rulings. 
As a result, just the threat of  European Court action is often sufficient 
to bring a member state into line. This was how the Commission man-
aged  to settle recent problems involving,  for  example,  pesticide and 
pharmaceutical imports into Germany, railway contracts, beer and food 
imports into Italy, sporting gun ammunition imports into France, and 
discriminatory regional schemes and fruit juice imports into Greece. 
The Commission makes public what it believes are infringements of 
the single market, not only to try to shame the offending member state 
into remedying the problem, but also to alert the public to its rights 
under EU law.  It encourages companies and individuals to take action 
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in national courts if they feel  they have  suffered  as  a result of single 
market rules not being applied. Community law is  directly applicable 
and, unlike the European Court, national courts can grant injunctions 
to suspend offending measures and award damages payments. 
Legal action is often too costly or time-consuming to be an option for 
a private individual or a small company. It also goes against the grain for 
companies to police their own customers - which, in the area of  public 
procurement, are governments themselves. Nevertheless, in a market of 
370m people, the Commission has to rely on its elected representatives 
in the European Parliament and on consumer and industry organisa-
tions  to  be  its  eyes  and ears  in  the member states  and to alert  it to 
infringements  of single  market  law.  Naturally,  this  presupposes  that 
companies,  consumers  and  citizens  know what  their  rights  are.  To 
improve such knowledge and to encourage 'grass roots' enforcement of 
single  market law,  the Commission is  planning a major information 
campaign, 'Citizens First'! 
In terms of shaping the single market rules,  there is an increasingly 
wide cast of  players involved. Prominent among them are the new Euro-
pean standards bodies. The·  EU has delegated to them the vital job of 
drawing up new European norms to replace the old national technical 
barriers,  removed  by single  market legislation.  Business,  too,  has  an 
important role to play in shaping new legislation. National employers' 
organisations and those such as  UNICE, the Union of Industrial and 
Employers' Confederations of Europe, have carried out their own sur-
veys and studies and come up with suggested improvements to the reg-
ulatory  process  and  possible  reductions  to  burdensome  and  costly 
over-regulation. 
Much of the original White Paper was relatively easy to draft. Some 
of  it was just amendments to fill in the holes in old legislation, for exam-
ple, in public procurement. But the EU is facing new and more complex 
issues  like  those  raised  by  advances  in  information  technology  and 
biotechnology. Regulation here requires even more careful preparation. 
To this end, the Commission is tending towards the publication of  pre-
liminary 'Green' papers for discussion with trade/industry associations 
before coming up with any legislative proposal. 
There is  economic as well as  political logic behind this effort to get 
the widest possible acceptance and enforcement of  single market rules. 
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(141 0 Directives in force) 
Breakdown of  Situation by Member State (24 October 1996) 
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Table 2.1  State of  Implementation of  Directives concerning the Internal 
Market 
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Companies need the assurance of  fair competition before they enter 
foreign markets. If  they feel the game there is rigged in favour of  a 'home 
team' which somehow plays under different rules or which can commit 
fouls without the referee noticing or imposing penalties, they will prefer 
to remain in their national league, rather than compete in the European 
Championship. 
Table 2.1  shows clearly which teams are in the 'First Division' and 
which are in the lower divisions when it comes to implementing single 
market legislation. 
12 Chapter 3 
The Broadest Barriers -
Breached, if  not Broken 
The broadest barriers have been, as one might expect, those maintained 
by governments themselves. And it is a tribute to the belated common 
sense of  European governments that they did allow a frontal assault on 
these economic barricades to be made, even if on the side they have 
sometimes tried since to guard their own national preserves, particularly, 
of  course, in public procurement. 
Within the Union, these barriers fall, or fell, into three categories: 
•  the multiple checks to which customs officials subjected all goods 
at internal EU borders. These controls were, of  course, not in order 
to exact tariffs; intra-EU trade had been free of  tariffs since the late 
1960s - but for the purpose of  administering Value Added Tax, of 
carrying out health,  veterinary and national  security checks  on 
goods crossing borders and of  collecting trade statistics; 
•  the technical barriers imposed by states on goods being sold in 
their territory.  Such barriers  caused  companies a  big headache, 
requiring the reconfiguring, relabelling and repackaging of prod-
ucts  for  different  national  markets,  the  registration  of certain 
goods like cars or pharmaceuticals with national authorities, and 
the constant retesting of  products to comply with local health and 
safety rules; 
•  the peculiar propensity of  governments not necessarily to seek out 
the best bargains regardless of  origin, but rather to reserve orders for 
their own companies for political reasons or as a short-sighted form 
of  industrial policy. 
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REMOVING CUSTOMS AND TAX CONTROlS AT 
BORDERS 
Travellers within the European Union may still occasionally experience 
some delay at the Union's internal borders,  if immigration officers or 
frontier police choose to examine their passports,  or customs officers 
make a spot check for drugs or some other controlled substance. 
But routine frontier controls on goods have gone. The chronic queues 
of trucks at internal EU border crossing points have disappeared since 
the start of  1993. Europe's traders and road hauliers now have a clear run 
through internal EU borders, saving them time and money. This has in 
turn produced new patterns of  pan-European distribution, run by a new 
breed of  logistics companies. This ability to move goods across internal 
EU frontiers without delay is now quite taken for granted. 
Before 1993, every truckload of  goods had to stop at internal EU bor-
ders for customs and tax clearance, and sometimes for inspection. Even 
where goods had already been cleared for export before arriving at the 
border, or were to be cleared for import beyond the frontier, documents 
had to be checked. Trucks carrying goods for simple transit across  the 
EU had to  have  their documents and seals  on their cargo  checked. 
Clearing customs at these  border points also  involved accounting for 
VAT and, in the case of alcohol, tobacco and fuel,  for excise. To  deal 
with all this, most traders engaged freight forwarders, who themselves 
often hired customs agents, though this work was slightly less onerous 
in some northern European countries which implemented simpler pro-
cedures. 
On 1 January 1993, customs checks at internal EU borders on goods 
for export, import and transit across the EU were simply abolished. This 
saved 60 million customs forms per year and some 85 per cent of 'red 
tape'  in  transit procedures.  Instead a  new system  was  introduced to 
account for taxes and to provide trade statistics. Back at their headquar-
ters, companies now use their regular VAT returns to account for VAT 
on the goods they have traded, though their national authorities peri-
odically verify this information by asking them for a list of  their suppli-
ers  and customers  in other EU states.  Trade  statistics  are  no longer 
collected at internal EU frontiers,  but are reported by companies to a 
new system called INTRASTAT. 
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Not surprisingly,  of all  the single  market programme's many mea-
sures, the abolition of  customs and fiscal frontier formalities within the 
EU is the most visible and the most widely acclaimed. Some 62 per cent 
of  the 13,500 companies responding to a Eurostat survey said they ben-
efited from the end to border delays. And this benefit is quantifiable. 
Abolition of  routine borders controls on goods has reduced costs for 
Europe's traders and road hauliers by more than Ecus 5bn a year. 
1 This 
saving is  the equivalent of about 0.7 per cent of the EU's total trade 
turnover. Before 1993, the cost of complying with all the customs red 
tape at internal frontiers is  estimated to have cost traders around Ecus 
7.5bn a year, based on 1992 travel levels but expressed in today's money, 
while the cost of  complying with the current system is put at Ecus 2.3bn 
a year according to the Customs &  frontiers  study.  A saving of two 
thirds of  one per cent may not seem large and something like total trade 
is  rather abstract to most people.  But if applied to a measure like net 
margin (profit before tax and interest) which has concrete meaning for 
businesses the saving becomes more significant. If, for example, a com-
pany achieves a net margin of 10 per cent of  its turnover, then a saving 
which  represents  0.66  per cent of its "turnover  would  boost  its  net 
margin by nearly 7 per cent. Considered this way, small figures begin to 
look interesting. 
But the new system of  VAT accounting and statistics collection still 
imposes a cost on companies of roughly Ecus 2.3bn a year. This figure 
does not include the costs of  carrying out transactions in member states 
where the trader is not established. Such transactions are estimated to be 
five  or six time more expensive to traders than domestic ones because 
they are obliged to use tax representatives. In addition, companies had 
to bear a one-off cost of  adapting to the new system in 1993. Generally, 
this involved companies and traders doing in-house what they had pre-
viously contracted out to agents. This brought managers face  to face 
with  administrative  inconveniences  of which  they  had  no  previous 
direct experience,  and with administrative costs  that had been  previ-
ously considered as transport charges and loaded on to the customer or 
absorbed in the cost of sales.  In many companies, overworked finance 
departments found themselves having to make INTRASTAT as well as 
VAT  reports, while shipping departments that had traditionally dealt 
with trade statistics were often disbanded or downsized. For most com-
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panies, the cost, in terms of hiring new staff or buying new computer 
software, did not exceed Ecus  15,000, but for about a third of traders 
the expense of adapting to the new regime seems to have been above 
Ecus 25,000. 
However, the savings are considerable, falling mostly into a band of 
Ecus  10-30 per consignment, but a substantial number of traders in 
Italy,  Spain, Germany and the Netherlands report savings of up to or 
over Ecus  100 per consignment. In the case of Italy and Spain, this is 
due to the high level of  customs agency fees that prevailed there before 
1993. In the case of  Germany and the Netherlands, the higher savings 
are  reported by those companies that before  1993 happened to have 
their own in-house customs departments which have now been reduced 
or disbanded.  German cross-border  trade  appears  to  have  benefited 
from  the highest aggregate  savings,  partly because  of the sheer high 
volume of  trade involved.  · 
In general terms, traders in Mediterranean countries have seen the 
biggest improvement, while the smallest improvement came in Den-
mark because of  the low cost and high efficiency of  its previous system. 
The biggest aggregate savings have come in those states with the largest 
intra-EU trade volume  and those with  the  highest  costs.  Thus,  the 
biggest beneficiaries appear to be Germany; at least in volume terms, 
Italy and Spain, and the smallest Denmark, Luxembourg and Ireland, 
with the remainder in between. 
The speed with which trading companies have recouped what they 
spent on switching to the new trade and tax reporting system has varied 
according to the amount of money they are saving from not having to 
pay agent fees  and from not having their trucks tied up at borders, as 
well  as  according to  the volume of their cross-border shipments. For 
some companies, particularly the big traders,  the payback was  quick. 
Companies representing about one third of  intra-EU trade (by number 
of individual consignments) report that they recouped the switch-over 
costs within the first  quarter of 1993. The proportion of companies 
claiming a payback rose to 50 per cent by the end of 1993. Four years 
later there are still20 per cent of  traders who claim not to have recouped 
the cost of the new system. Nonetheless, the ratio of  winners to losers 
appears to be somewhere between 6:1 and 7:1. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show 
the numbers of  winners and losers per country in relation to despatches 
16 The Broadest Barriers- Breached if  not Broken 
Numbers of winners and losers per country 
uK!I.-ii···i,.ii~~--~ 
p 
NL 
L 
IRL 
GR 
F 
E 
OK 
0, ....  ~~~~~~~ 
BI-~:::::==:::::=::::;::~--,----.------J 
-10  0  10  20  30  40  50 
Number of companies 
Ratio of winners to losers per country 
16 
r-
14 -
u; 
Cl  12  Q)  -
..: 
Q) 
(/) 
..Q  10 -
Q) 
0.. 
(!!  8 - r-
Q) 
s:::  s::: 
"§  6 -
0 
~  4 -
E 
:::::1  z  2 
0 
- n  n 
•  Losers 
[I] Winners 
r-
r-
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  EU  BE  DE  DK  ES  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  UK 
Figure 3.1  Winners and losers: despatches 
17 UK 
p 
NL 
L 
IRL 
GR 
F 
E 
DK 
D 
The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
Numbers of winners and losers per country 
•  Losers 
0  Winners 
B  ~-~==:::::::::::;::~-----.-----1 
-20  0  20  40  60 
Number of companies 
Ratio of winners to losers per country 
12 
u;  10 
Cl 
Q) 
...: 
Q)  8  f/)  r-
.Q 
Qi 
r- r-
a. 
!!!  6 -
Q) 
c: 
c: 
-~ 
0  4 
~ 
Qi 
J:l.  r-
E 
2  ::I  z 
0  n 
r-
I  EU  BE  DE  DK  ES  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  UK 
Figure 3.2 Winners and losers: acquisitions 
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and 'acquisitions' (or receipts)  of goods shipped between the member 
states. 
However, in spite of  the strong predominance of  winners over losers 
from the present system, most companies are not content with the cur-
rent transitional system for VAT. This requires complex arrangements so 
that goods can be exported zero-rated on VAT, without fraud, so that the 
tax is collected in the 'consuming' country. About half  ofEU companies, 
particularly in Germany- despite the global score of German cross-
border  trade,  individual  German  traders  did  not necessarily  benefit 
more than those in other member states-and the UK, evidently hanker 
after the relative simplicity of  the old pre-1993 system on VAT, though, 
broadly speaking, most firms in southern European countries as well as 
in France and Belgium are content with the new status quo. 
But, given the choice by their governments, over two-thirds of all 
companies say they are ready to move on to the even greater simplicity 
of  the definitive VAT system proposed by the Commission. Under this 
system VAT would be paid in the country where the goods in question 
were bought, just as  in domestic trade. There is a substantial majority 
for moving on to this system in France, Germany, Spain and Italy, with 
a similar majority in all other countries except for Luxembourg and Ire-
land where the sample size of companies interviewed was too small to 
draw general conclusions.  Figure  3.3 shows  the comparison between 
preferences between the pre-1993 arrangement and the present system 
(the upper box)  and between an  origin based system and the present 
one. 
Road hauliers should be the most direct beneficiaries of an  end to 
chronic border delays. And before 1993 these delays were chronic, gen-
erally bad in southern Europe and especially so on the borders between 
Spain/Portugal, Greece/Italy,  Spain/France and Italy/France. The tail-
backs  of trucks  have  by  no means  disappeared  since.  Today's  worst 
delays are reported at the Franco-Spanish border and at Austria's borders 
with Germany and Italy. The entry into the EU of  Austria, which by its 
accession  treaty is  allowed to enforce environmental limits on trucks 
crossing its territory, has done nothing to ease trade between Germany 
and Italy. 
But the ending of  old-style frontier delays is estimated to have created 
a potential gross saving of  around Ecus BOOm a year to the road haulage 
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Figure 3.3  System preferences 
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industry.
2 The cost of  today's residual delays is put at around Ecus 55m 
a year,  mainly accounted for  by average waiting times of around one 
hour at Austrian  borders  and of some  40 minutes  at most crossing 
points between Spain and France.  But,  of course,  the  real saving  to 
hauliers depends on how much of  the time 'saved' can now be spent dri-
ving. Not only are truck drivers now subject to much tighter health and 
safety controls, such as  maximum driving and minimum rest periods, 
but many of  them had grown accustomed to taking their meal and rest 
breaks at frontier points which often developed into truck-stops. And 
many clearly intend to go on doing so. 
As one driver told a Commission consultant, 'the only thing that has 
changed is that I don't have to keep looking out of the cafe window to 
check whether the customs queue has moved on'. Depending on what 
assumptions are made about average loads, and therefore about the fre-
quency of vehicle movements, the real saving to the haulage industry 
from the reduction in frontier delays is put at around Ecus 370m a year, 
or at least somewhere in the range of  Ecus 275m-450m. 
Have road hauliers passed these cost savings on to their customers in 
the form oflower freight rates? Generally, it seems not but perhaps they 
were not able to. For road freight, increased excise duties have swallowed 
up  the benefit  of the savings.  According  to  one study,  freight  rates 
dropped by 1-8 per cent.
3 But most traders did not obtain a cut in their 
freight charges in 1993 and, of  the minority which did get a rate reduc-
tion, half had to press the road haulage company to get it.
4 Here, those 
who reaped cost savings from the single market programme have mostly 
not been able to pass them on in lower prices, though more broadly they 
may in the end have provided some benefit in terms of  improved service. 
Certainly,  the  ending  of routine  delays  at  frontiers  has  helped 
improve  the  way  that  companies  warehouse  and  distribute  goods 
around Europe, and triggered a secondary revolution in logistics, the art 
or science of moving goods. Companies that used to specialise in cus-
toms clearance have  been forced  to  look for  other work.  Many have 
become logistics  specialists,  taking over  distribution from  traditional 
wholesalers.5 The trend for manufacturers to concentrate production on 
fewer sites has reinforced the scope for centralised distribution. At the 
same time, the distribution of  these products still needs to cater for the 
differentiated tastes of Europe's consumers and for price differences in 
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various national currencies. So, in the single market, manufacturers can 
increasingly turn to a new breed of logistic companies, which provide 
services going far  beyond mere delivery of finished goods to retailers. 
Some logistics companies handle all raw material inputs, as well as fin-
ished good outputs for manufacturers, while others have become sec-
ondary manufacturers, 'finishing off' goods to suit the tastes of  different 
customers,  re-packing them with home language  leaflets  or national 
alphabet keyboards, or price-tagging them in different currencies. 
All this is producing change in the way goods are dispatched around 
Europe.  The ending of internal  border  controls  and serious  delays 
means that distribution is now less on a country-by-country basis, but 
resembles more the pattern, long prevalent in the US, of  a bicycle wheel 
with spokes radiating out from a central hub. One result of this is  the 
growth in European Distribution Centres, set up either in-house by big 
companies or by logistics companies. These EDCs were first developed 
in the Netherlands, but now appear to be spreading to Belgium, south-
east England, the northern, north-eastern and Mediterranean parts of 
France, Denmark and south-west Sweden (for Scandinavia) and Austria 
(for eastern Europe). Though mainly used by larger companies, these 
EDCs appear to be attracting custom from some smaller firms,  espe-
cially US-owned ones. 
Removal of  border checks has also given a boost to other logistic tech-
niques  such as  'just-in-time' delivery of manufacturing components, 
'quick response' replenishment of retail stocks,  as  well as  encouraging 
the start up of  scheduled freight transport services running according to 
a set timetable. All such techniques and services depend on reliability of 
delivery  as  much as  sheer  speed  of delivery.  The removal  of border 
checks at last makes it possible to guarantee a certain reliability. 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS 
The myriad technical rules and regulations on products in Europe have 
been proved to be far more pervasive barriers to trade than customs con-
trols. Without Community action to remove technical trade barriers, 
over  three-quarters of the value of intra-Community trade in goods 
would be disrupted by differences between national rules on product 
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specifications.  But these  barriers  cannot be swept away  like so  many 
unneeded customs posts. It is  essential to have some  technical regula-
tions to protect the health and safety of  consumers and citizens. And it 
is essential to have some technical standards for the smooth operation of 
commerce and contracting. 
But  national  technical  regulations  - there  were  estimated  to  be 
100,000 in the mid-1980s when the EU first began to take seriously the 
problem of  technical barriers to trade-can also be a very effective obsta-
cle to commerce when they have the force of  national law behind them. 
The slightest inconsistency or variation between them can be used by a 
government, industry or firm of one state to keep out products from 
other countries - occasionally with justification, usually without. 
National regulations which impose technical specifications can be an 
enormous  headache  for  outside  producers.  The latter often  have  to 
redesign,  repackage and re-label their products, go  through a compli-
cated registration procedure for such goods as cars, chemicals, pharma-
ceuticals and foodstuffs and go to the expense of  obtaining duplicate test 
certificates to satisfy local health and safety inspectorates. Rather than 
face all this, many firms decide to stay at home. Even today, there is less 
cross-border trade in those sectors which are most subject to technical 
regulation; these industries account for 33 per cent of  gross added value 
within the EU but only 28 per cent ofits trade.
6 Those companies which 
were not deterred from taking the plunge into a foreign market face  a 
handicap against local firms,  because meeting local  technical require-
ments imposed higher production costs and shorter production runs on 
them. So the new competition tended to be weak competition. 
Yet  the  pointlessness  of many  of these  barriers  is  clear.  For,  in 
demanding that products be tested and often reconfigured in each of 
their markets,  European governments or testing authorities have  just 
been regulating for exactly the same product risks - will this boiler blow 
up? can that toy injure a child? - in slightly, and often insignificantly, 
different ways. 
It  was this reasoning that led the EU to make an assault on technical 
barriers a major part of  its campaign to force a single market and it can 
now claim considerable success in this very difficult field. Of  the 75 per 
cent of intra-EU trade which is subject to mandatory technical regula-
tions, some major and many minor obstacles have been removed. Take 
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Harmonisation of  Mutual recognition of  Conformity assessment 
technical regulations  technical regulations  procedures 
and/or standards  and/or standards 
positive  no  negative  don't  positive  no  negative  don't  positive  no  negative 
impact  impact  impact  know  impact  impact  impact  know  impact  impact  impact 
Food, beverages  35  44  9  12  30  48  8  15  24  52  6 
&  tobacco 
Machinery &  45  29  20  5  43  37  11  9  32  50  6 
equipment 
Electrical &  36  48  9  6  50  36  6  8  31  52  8 
optical 
machinery 
Chemicals,  33  47  10  10  35  49  7  10  27  53  6 
rubber & 
plastics 
Transport  30  56  11  4  49  39  7  5  24  47  5 
equipment 
EUR 12  31  51  9  9  32  49  7  12  23  56  5 
Table 3.1  Impact of  single market measures aimed at removing 
technical barriers 
Source:  Business survey 
don't 
know 
19 
12 
9 
14 
24 
15 
cars, as an example of  a major improvement. Following the move from 
separate national systems for authorising sale of  a new model in each and 
every  EU  market  to  a  single  harmonised  European  'Whole  Type 
Approval' Directive for the entire European market, manufacturers can 
now expect to save up to Ecus 30m, or nearly 10 per cent, on the total 
cost of  developing a new car.? On a smaller scale, a German toy manu-
facturer reckons to have saved DM 100,000 in 1995 simply from the 
way the Toy Safety Directive has eliminated different testing procedures 
for his products.
8 
Those who have felt  most sharply the impact of technical barriers 
generally see improvement. In the Eurostat survey of business opinion, 
between 30 and 45 per cent of  managers in chemicals, mechanical engi-
neering, office equipment, foodstuffs and motor vehicles said they had 
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gained from the EU effort to remove technical barriers, compared with 
20 per cent or less who had experienced negative consequences, proba-
bly due to the cost of  switching over to new specifications or because of 
increased competition on their market. Table 3.1 shows the reactions of 
firms as a whole who responded to the Business survey of  the impact of 
measures to remove technical barriers. 
As  almost always  in this review of the single market's performance, 
larger companies are more positive than smaller firms about the impact 
of single  market legislation.  In  the area  of technical  regulation,  this 
might seem surprising,  since most small enterprises find  it harder to 
overcome technical barriers. to export markets than big groups do. But 
most small companies are also relatively recent entrants to export mar-
kets, and therefore have less experience of  the jungle of  technical restric-
tions that prevailed in Europe a decade ago. 
Lower levels of enthusiasm on the part of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises  (SMEs)  may also  reflect  their generally more national or 
local scope. Nevertheless, SMEs in some sectors are positive about the 
single market. For example, SMEs in the detergent and cosmetics sector 
have had better access to European markets. And, in the construction 
machinery sector, 29 per cent of  SMEs, as opposed to 7 per cent oflarge 
firms, feel that the single market has encouraged them to sell abroad.
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Mutual recognition. Much of  what progress has been made in recent 
years is due to a change of  strategy, particularly towards a reliance on the 
principle of mutual recognition.  This principle is  based on the well-
founded assumption that EU states have been regulating for exactly the 
same products risks.  Therefore, they should 'mutually recognise' each 
other's technical regulations as effectively equivalent in the level of  pro-
tection they offer consumers. This principle, now well-enshrined in EU 
law, has proved particularly useful in avoiding the lengthy horse-trading 
involved in detailed harmonising legislation. In broad economic terms, 
mutual recognition has been instrumental in overcoming or removing 
trade barriers affecting more than 25 per cent of intra-EU trade. This 
figure perhaps underestimates the importance of  mutual recognition or 
acceptance;  in  areas  where  member  states  raise  no  problems  about 
applying the principle, it is easy to overlook its use. The full potential, 
too, of mutual recognition is perhaps yet to come in new products, as 
national testing authorities begin to adopt a gradually more convergent 
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approach to product risks.  Figure 3.4 sets  out the framework of the 
mutual recognition principle. 
Mutual recognition is  not a magical  remedy.  It works  quite well  in 
ensuring that minor differences in capital goods or consumer durables do 
not become a trade barrier. But-based as it essentially is on mutual trust 
-it  runs up against considerable difficulties on such products as foodstuffs 
or pesticides where national authorities are understandably worried that, 
if there is  any underlying risk to the product, their consumers will  be 
immediately exposed to it. There are some striking exceptions. For exam-
ple, in Germany,  not a country noted for lax consumer protection, the 
import and sale of  some 200 foods  or food additives is permitted, even 
though their local manufacture is forbidden. But the same sector provides 
an equally striking example of  where achieving mutual recognition is very 
difficult and the EU market therefore remains fragmented (see box). 
Fortified foods and drinks 
The addition of  vitamins and minerals to foods and drinks is catch-
ing on, as  Europeans become more health-conscious despite - or 
perhaps because of- adopting a more sedentary lifestyle and eating 
more low-nutrition fast food. Yet there are almost no common rules. 
Four  member states  - the  UK,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark and 
Sweden - require compulsory restoration in margarine of the vita-
mins  destroyed  in its  manufacture.  France  permits  restoration  of 
nutrients lost in processing, but requires  any fortified foods  to be 
classed as dietetic products. Germany is liberal on vitamins but strict 
on minerals, while the Netherlands is strict on vitamins but liberal 
on minerals.  Notification procedures are  required in Austria,  Bel-
gium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nordic countries. In addi-
tion, significant national variations exist on the type and quantities 
of nutrients allowed. It would be hard to find a market or series of 
markets  better  designed  to  raise  European  producers'  costs  and 
shorten their production runs. 
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Mutual recognition can thus make little headway in an area like fortified 
foodstuffs. The industry's European umbrella organisation, the Confed-
eration des Industries agro-alimentaires, has been canvassing its members 
about the possible desirability of  at least some degree of  harmonisation. 
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Figure 3.4 Making the mutual recognition principle work 
Even where governments allow mutual recognition in theory, there may 
be  insufficient  mutual  trust or knowledge  between  their health  and 
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safety inspectorates to 11_1ake it work in practice. And even where it does 
work in practice, there may be other non-regulatory factors to thwart 
outsiders. For instance, about half of the products subject to technical 
regulations of one kind or another are simultaneously affected by the 
existence of  voluntary standards or marks, such as quality marks. In Ger-
many, for example, many customers prefer to see on construction equip-
ment  the  'GS'  quality  mark  which,  in  the  past,  it  was  hard  for 
manufacturers  outside  Germany  to  obtain. 
11  Local  buyers  tend  to 
hanker after familiar local marks on the goods they buy. This is under-
standable and there is  nothing the EU can, or should do, about this, 
except first, to ensure that such quality marks are not construed as con-
ferring regulatory approval nor that the absence of such quality marks 
means absence of regulatory approval, and second, to encourage con-
vergence between these voluntary standards and marks through Euro-
pean-level standardisation. 
There is some evidence that mutual recognition works best among a 
limited subset of  member states, essentially neighbours (see box). 
Cement is generally regarded as not worth trading across frontiers 
and certainly not across  any great distance, because it is  low in 
value  and costly  to  transport.  It  is  in  fact  traded  quite  a  lot, 
because  demand  for  it  changes  with  construction  cycles  and 
supply  alters  with  technical  factors.  The  differing  geological 
make-up of  cement components across Europe has delayed agree-
ment on a harmonised Euro-standard for cement, though a Con-
struction Products Directive now exists on member states' statute 
books even if it is  not yet properly in force.  In the meantime, 
mutual recognition arrangements exist,  but only between Ger-
many,  France  and  the  Benelux  countries.  The  real  problems 
appear to confront exporters wanting to sell to countries of  which 
they have  limited experience.  Thus,  northern Europeans com-
plain about southern Europeans, and vice versa (one Spanish pro-
ducer took 5 months to get a test certificate in Denmark)- but 
the Portuguese face  no obstacles supplying the Spanish market, 
nor the Dutch the Belgian market. 
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The task of  flattening Europe's technical barriers is made no easier by the 
fact that new national regulations keep sprouting up. Under a system 
that requires countries to give notice of  new technical rules they propose 
to make, the member states notified to Brussels some 430-470 new pro-
posed regulations each year during 1992-94, and this in a period when 
the EU was supposed to be moving towards a common technical envi-
ronment. All the more surprising is the fact that member states appear 
to be devoting much of  their regulatory energy in precisely those areas 
where the EU has concentrated -its efforts-foodstuffs, transport equip-
ment, chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  telecoms  equipment, construction 
products and mechanical engineering. 
However,  this procedure of notifying proposed new rules gives  the 
Commission and other member states the right to object to any poten-
tial trade restrictions they spot in the proposals before the latter become 
law.  They can react by insisting that any new national rule contains a 
general provision giving mutual recognition rights to partner country 
products. This may seem of little immediate import to company man-
agers,  but it can be of considerable future use  to their lawyers,  if and 
when they want to mount a legal challenge to the law in question. From 
1997 onward, too, member states will have to notify Brussels and each 
other of  all products where they withhold the benefits of  mutual recog-
nition. Not only will this allow better scrutiny of the remaining obsta-
cles,  but failure  of a  member state  to  raise  an objection  to  a  given 
product will also be read as a signal that it is ready to permit free sale of 
that product. 
Technical harmonisation. The new realisation that mutual recogni-
tion has  certain limits inevitably gives  harmonisation - the quest for 
identical rules and standards - renewed importance. In truth, however, 
it was never dropped as a strategy, only modified. 
Old-style harmonisation, product-by-product, even component-by-
component, is  as  relevant as ever to products like:  cars, medical drugs, 
chemicals or some foodstuffs, which are considered of  potentially high-
risk or where evaluation requires EU states to pool their expertise. Here 
detailed harmonisation has been an arduous business, but, in the view 
of  business and governments alike, worth it. Deeply entrenched techni-
cal  barriers affecting some 34 per cent of the value of intra-EU trade 
have, in this painstaking way, been removed. 
29 The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
However, one of  the novelties of  the single market programme lay in 
the adoption of another more flexible  harmonisation technique, still 
called the 'new approach' even though it is now ten years old. The idea 
was simple. To try to speed harmonisation up, it was decided to let those 
involved concentrate on what they do best. The legislators would legis-
late the ends to be achieved,  the standardisers would standardise the 
means by which these ends might be achieved. So, member states would 
confine themselves  to setting 'essential  requirements' which products 
would need to meet before being placed on the market. They would 
then instruct or 'mandate' European standards organisations to come up 
with harmonised standards. Any manufacturer choosing to follow these 
standards could benefit from the presumption that his product met the 
essential  requirements, and could effectively 'self-certify'  his  product. 
But these standards are not compulsory. They are just an optional tech-
nical guideline. A  manufacturer is  free  to opt for other specifications; 
but if  he does so, he needs some independent testing body to certify that 
his product conforms with the 'essential requirements'. Figure 3.5 shows 
the 'new approach' to technical harmonisation and how the sequence of 
events works in practice. 
12 
Community efforts to remove barriers are judged to be effective as far 
as two-thirds of  the value of  intra-Community trade in products is con-
cerned. This success is mitigated by technical barriers of  a non-manda-
tory nature  (such  as  national  standards  on conformity)  which  may 
require adaptation and retesting of products before they are placed on 
sale in partner countries. It is estimated that such technical barriers may 
arise in the case of  two out of  three products for which regulatory tech-
nical barriers have been removed. 
As for the remaining third of  intra-Community trade in products, it 
can be divided equally between the areas where there are no apparent 
technical barriers and those where there are,  and where Community 
rules, either in the form of  Directives or the 'mutual recognition' prin-
ciple, are not judged to be effective. Difficulties can arise, for example, 
in the interpretation or enforcement of  a Directive, or because of  delays 
in the production of harmonised standards which make it easier for 
manufacturers to follow the rules. 
To date, 17 'new approach' Directives, which concern 17 per cent of 
intra-Community trade, have been adopted; but many have yet to come 
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Figure 3.5  Functioning of  the 'new approach' to technical 
harmonisation 
into force.  For instance, the Toy Safety Directive was  the first one to 
come into effect, on 1 January 1990 and it applied fully from that date, 
while others have long transition periods. So it is early days to judge the 
results. 
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But one problem has  become evident. The standardisers have had 
great difficulty in keeping up with the legislators - but not for want of 
trying. The European Standardisation Committee, CEN, has no fewer 
than 500 technical committees at work, while its sister body for electri-
cal-mechanical machinery, CENELEC, has set up 170 working groups. 
Altogether, the European standards bodies have produced some 5,000 
standards, and are working on a further 16,000- with participants in 
the member states often now using the Internet to circulate draft texts 
and modifications and even to vote. But despite such Herculean efforts, 
they have fallen inevitably behind in some areas. The worst backlog con-
cerns the Machine Safety Directive, where only about 10 per cent of  the 
required 550 accompanying standards have been agreed. 
Experience has since shown that manufacturers will only choose 'self 
certification' for their products where there are clear standards to stick 
to; to do otherwise might risk product liability suits. Where no agreed 
Euro-standards  are  available,  a manufacturer has  little choice  but to 
devise his own specifications at his own expense and then to go to a cer-
tification authority- a Notified Body, in the jargon - for testing. These 
Notified Bodies usually charge more for testing to a manufacturer's in-
house specifications than to a European standard, because they have to 
design a one-off test for the product. Some Notified Bodies are indeed 
said to be reluctant to do this kind of  testing at all, because they, too, fear 
that without the backing of  a standard some customer might sue them 
if  a product they approved goes wrong. 
Experience has  also  shown that the best  results  in standardisation 
seem to come in sectors, like toys, where intra-EU trade is already high, 
where there is a small number of  dominant manufacturers with poten-
tial economies of scale  that make it possible or advantageous to get a 
larger slice  of the whole EU market.  By  contrast,  in sectors  such as 
cement where any economies of scale can be achieved within national 
markets  and where  transport  costs  are  high,  companies  seem  to  be 
unwilling to initiate standards. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Some of the biggest returns from  the single market programme were 
expected from the extension of  cross-border competition to public pro-
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curement. The expectation was not surprising, given the sums that cen-
tral and local governments and public utilities spend each year on goods, 
construction projects and services- Ecus 721 bn in 1994, or 11.5 per 
cent of  the European Union's total output in that year. 
This is big money, often in the past spent badly- not in the sense of 
what it was spent on but how it was spent. Out of a general desire to 
secure  jobs  and win votes,  governments  have  a  strong tendency  to 
reserve contracts to home firms, even though these firms may operate at 
a sub-optimal level and may not be competitive at the European, let 
alone world, level. 
There could be good reasons for buying locally-lower transport and 
trading costs, speedier delivery and after-sales service. But aside from the 
fact  that such local advantages are reduced in the single market, they 
cannot be fully tested and proven unless set against competition from 
outside suppliers. 
So EU legislation in this area has aimed at trying to get governments 
to adopt the behaviour that comes naturally to private companies and to 
shop around for the best bargain, which is  in the end the best service 
they can render to their taxpayers.  The legislation,  beefed up by the 
single market programme, requires among other things central and local 
governments and private or public utilities to advertise in the EU's Offi-
cial  Journal  and  its  electronic  database,  Tenders  Electronic  Daily 
(TED), tenders for all contracts above a certain value for goods, projects 
and services. They must then apply specific rules of  procedure which are 
based  on elementary  principles,  such  as:  no  unfair  discrimination, 
equality of  treatment, objectivity and transparency (or openness). Once 
they have awarded their contracts, these public bodies are then required, 
in the interests of transparency, to publish the contract awards and the 
criteria on which they were awarded. 
The immediate results
13 of  this are encouraging: 
•  the total number of  tender notices in the Official Journal rose from 
12,000 in 1987 to more than 95,000 in 1995, with the increase 
varying from 200 to 900 per cent according to member states; 
•  armed with this  information, some 14-20 per cent of company 
suppliers to the public sector identified new opportunities in their 
domestic markets, and 9-13 per cent of them went on to win new 
business as a result; 
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•  some 9-13 per cent of  suppliers spotted new opportunities in other 
EU states and 3-4 per cent won extra business as a result. 
There are other results
14 which are equally encouraging (but are also the 
consequence  of broad  economic  factors  like  recession,  technology 
change, restructuring, mergers and takeovers affecting particularly the 
capital goods sector): 
•  public sector purchases of  non-domestic origin rose from 6 per cent 
in 1987 to 10 per cent in 1994. Imports sold directly across borders 
increased from 1.4 to 3 per cent. Most of the increase was in indi-
rect imports (sold through local subsidiaries or agents) which rose 
from  4  to  7 per cent of total public procurement over the same 
period. This last increase reflects the trend of bigger companies in 
telecommunications, power equipment and railway rolling stock to 
swallow up smaller companies in other EU states; 
•  competitiveness, as  measured by the EU's trade balance with the 
rest of  the world, increased in power transformers, X-ray equipment 
and telecoms switching equipment. In this last sector, the EU trade 
surplus rose from Ecus 250m in 1988 to Ecus 900m in 1994; 
•  prices fell  by 20-30 per cent for telecoms equipment and railway 
rolling stock, and by 30-40 per cent for electrical equipment. This 
was inevitably of  benefit to public budgets and taxpayers. But it was 
partly or mainly due to downward pressures on prices exerted by 
recession,  over-capacity  in  these  industries  and  the  squeeze  on 
public procurement budgets as much as to EU public procurement 
Directives. 
These Directives built on the EU's first attempts in the 1970s to open 
up public procurement to  competitive cross-border bidding.  But the 
effort was incomplete; the Directives only applied to public works, like 
buildings, or supplies, like uniforms or paper. So the new single market 
Directives of the late 1980s added in services,  like municipal garbage 
collection, and included the very important utility sectors of telecom-
munications, water, energy and transport. 
Enforcement. Some of  these Directives are fairly recent: three of  them 
entered into force in mid 1994. The Utilities Directive has yet to come 
into force in Greece, and Portugal. But, as we have seen in Chapter 2, 
even when they enter into force, the Directives are not always incorpo-
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rated  into  national  law.  The Commission  is  consequently pursuing 
some member states  for  failing to transpose the Directives into their 
national law, as it pursues those who have failed to do so correctly. Even 
when the right legal framework is  all in place, there is  the problem of 
policing it. This task falls chiefly to the Commission, not least because 
there is  anecdotal evidence that, even where they feel  they have been 
unfairly discriminated against,  many contractors are  shy of offending 
potential customers by trying to take public authorities to court. 
In the past, public authorities have used a variety of  ruses to dodge the 
Directives'  impact.  These  tactics  include  splitting  up  contracts  into 
smaller lots, each of  which (all below the value threshold requiring open 
tendering; specifying national technical standards or local firms' propri-
etary products in tenders; demanding more financial or technical require-
ments of foreign  companies than local firms;  giving first-time bidders 
insufficient time to respond to tenders; and bogusly classifying contracts 
as 'continuations' of previous contracts, or as 'emergency' procurements 
so as to exploit loopholes in the EU Directives and so escape advertising. 
It is possible that some public authorities are still using such tactics. 
Certainly, there is  a discrepancy between the number of public bodies 
who probably ought to be advertising their contracts, and the number 
which actually do so. The number ofEU public bodies or utilities which 
are covered by the legislation and which are of  a size to award contracts 
big enough to exceed the value thresholds in the Directives is estimated 
at 110,000.15  But the number which advertised contracts last year was 
only around 16,500, about 15  per cent.  Back in 1993, one tenth of 
Europe's towns with a population of  over 100,000 and nearly one third 
of  towns of  50,000-100,000 inhabitants, publicised no contracts what-
soever. 
Perceptions. There are some striking examples of  how public procur-
ers have benefited from the market-broadening- and mind-broadening 
- effect of international contract tendering. One public buyer was able 
to buy from another EU state, electrical equipment that was 50 per cent 
cheaper (because of a different technical solution)  than what was  on 
offer from his domestic companies. In another case, a railway authority 
ended up buying rolling stock from a supplier in another EU state which 
the authority had never heard of  until the supplier replied to the author-
ity's tender notice in the Official Journal. 
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Sector/Product  NACE  o/oO}  o/owhich  o/owhich  Public sector import 
readership' won new  won new  penetration (%)
4 1994 
domestic  other, EU 
businessZ  business3  direct  indirect 
Low-tech products 
Office furniture  316  34  9  2  5  8 
Uniforms  453  47  12  4  3  13 
Printing and paper  471/2  26  6  0  1  17-19 
High-tech products with 
common tech.  specs. 
Office machinery  33  45  17  3  4  22-29 
Motor vehicles  351  41  12  3  3-4  16-19 
Medical equip.  37  26  10  2  5-6  19-21 
High-tech products with 
different tech.  specs. 
Boilers  315  31  12  4  4  9-10 
Power generating equip.  341/2  42  10  4  6-7  11-14 
Telecomm. equip.  344  42  13  7  6-8  18-22 
Railway rolling stock  362  49  12  10  10-11  19-21 
WOrks 
Construction/  civil eng.  502  44  11  4  3  4-7 
Services 
Consulting engineering  83  52  22  4  1  5-6 
EU average  41  9-13  3-4  2-4  5-9 
Table 3.2  Supplier response and public sector import penetration 
Sources:  1. Procurement Study (Figure 13.2) 
2.% of  suppliers to the public sector winning additional domestic business 
(Figure 13.12) 
3. % of  suppliers to the public sector winning additional business in other EU 
Member States (Figure 13.23) 
4. Table 1.1.31. 
But many public procurement authorities profess a certain disappoint-
ment that their contract advertisements have  not drawn enough new 
bids, or sufficiently competitive bids.  Part of the trouble may be that 
companies from other EU states are often bidding through their local 
subsidiaries, which in turn tend to price their offers  in line with the 
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domestic competition. It is  notable that the two successful bids men-
tioned above - on electrical equipment and railway rolling stock-were 
by suppliers selling direct from another member state. Table 3.2 from 
the  Procurement  study shows  the  picture  for  supplier  response  and 
public sector import penetration in 1994. 
Larger companies appear to be gaining the most from the new system. 
They are more likely to read the OJ or tap into TED, and more likely 
to win new business in both domestic and non-domestic markets as a 
result than smaller firms are. This is predictable. Larger companies have 
more manpower to scan tender notices for business opportunities and a 
wider range of  goods and services potentially to fill those opportunities. 
However, those small and medium-sized firms which used the OJ and 
TED were as successful as their bigger brethren in winning business in 
at least domestic markets. And it is  this greater intensity of domestic 
competition that may be one of the least anticipated, but most signifi-
cant, benefits of  the new EU measures. 
Trade flows. To use the categories in the EU Directives, import pen-
etration has increased more in supplies than in works or services, with 
any increase in the latter coming as a result of  a few large international 
construction projects and their related services  provided by architects 
and consultant engineers.  Among goods  deemed to be  'procurement 
sensitive' -because it is mainly governments who have the money or use 
for them - the highest import penetration has occurred in those goods 
with a relatively high technology content, railway rolling stock, medical 
equipment, office machinery and telecoms equipment. The main bene-
ficiaries of  this increased trade are Germany, France and to a lesser extent 
the UK and Italy. But many of  these imports are indirect, in the sense of 
being made locally  by subsidiaries  of companies  based  in other EU 
states. This reflects the restructuring in many high-tech sectors, with the 
few  remaining big groups buying up other companies or establishing 
themselves in other member states (see box, p. 38). 
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Telecoms equipment. This is  now dominated by three globally 
competitive companies - Alcatel of France, Siemens of Germany 
and Ericsson  of Sweden  who have  all  taken over  a number of 
smaller companies in other countries in recent years. As a result 
the degree of import penetration in intra-EU telecoms trade by 
direct imports was only 6 per cent in 1994, but indirect imports 
supplied by local subsidiaries or affiliates accounted for a further 
19 per cent of  the market. 
Railway rolling stock. This is again dominated by three groups -
Siemens, the Franco-British joint company of  GEC-Alsthom and 
the Adtranz joint venture of  ABB  (the Swiss-Swedish group) and 
of  AEG of  Germany. All have a strong presence in other member 
states. GEC-Alsthom, for example, manufactures in Austria, Bel-
gium, Italy,  Germany as well as  in France and the UK. In 1994 
direct imports accounted for  10 per cent of intra-EU trade, and 
indirect imports for another 20 per cent. 
Power generation equipment. Five companies - GEC-Alsthom, 
Siemens, ABB, Fiat and Ansaldo of  Italy-have 80 per cent of  the 
market. In intra-EU trade, direct imports took 5 per cent of the 
market, and indirect imports, 13 per cent in 1994. 
Prices. The disappearance of buy-at-home habits, plus the removal of 
technical barriers, was expected to produce a convergence of prices of 
many goods bought by the public sector. There is little evidence of  this 
happening over the 1987-94 period, except in cardiac monitors, buses 
and office  machinery.  Exchange rate movements and inflation differ-
ences partly explain the failure of  prices to move together. Certainly, as 
we  have  seen,  some  prices  have  moved  downwards,  sometimes  very 
sharply.  But other economic factors  are  as  responsible  for  this as  the 
single market programme. 
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Now that we have taken a look across the board, we can sum up the 
overall position as far as barriers are concerned. Today's single market is 
a world away  from  the old days  when  all  goods  were  stopped and 
checked at borders. Border controls have been completely abolished and 
businesses across Europe say that they are already reaping the benefits. 
The single market legislation has also assured the free movement of  most 
products and the new regulatory system is generally welcomed. But, as 
we have seen, there is still some way to go before all the barriers are com-
pletely  removed.  Only  complete  implementation  of the  remaining 
Directives will enable full exploitation and appropriation of  the benefits. 
It's true that 'mutual recognition' is difficult to apply in practice but the 
problem is  being addressed. More European standards are also needed 
to help get rid of  non-regulatory obstacles to market access. Willingness 
on the part of companies to think and operate in new ways  that will 
exploit the single market's opportunities, are crucial to success. 
So it is  up to governments to take mutual recognition seriously and 
down to business to help make the new standards if  it wants a fully func-
tional single market. That will only happen when national governments, 
and businesses themselves, decide to play the game seriously. 
Notes 
1  Customs &  frontiers. 
2  Idem. 
'  Road freight. 
4  Customs & frontiers. 
'  Impact of Internal Market Integration on Organisation and Performance of  Distribution, 
Coopers &  Lybrand 1996. 
6  Technical Barriers. 
7  Vehicles. 
8  Technical Barriers. 
9  Business Survey. 
10  Technical Barriers. 
11  Construction. 
12  Technical Barriers. 
13  Procurement. 
14  Procurement. 
11  Procurement. 
39 Chapter 4 
Milestones in 
Manufacturing 
It is  time now to look more closely at how individual industries have 
been affected by the elimination or reduction of some of the 'horizon-
tal' obstacles to trade - ie problems faced by most sectors - discussed in 
the previous chapter as well as by single market legislation designed to 
remove  barriers  specific  to  those sectors.  By  examining some of the 
detail, we can get more of  a feel for the impact of  the single market pro-
gramme on the ground, before taking a broader view of  its wider effects 
in later chapters. 
We  start with manufacturing,  because  it is  here  that many of the 
longest-lasting barriers have existed and here that EU efforts to remove 
barriers  began even  before  the single market programme.  But before 
doing so, it is worth bearing in mind how services, the focus of  the next 
chapter, interact with manufacturing. 
A service like road transport is vital to all manufacturers. It  is thus not 
surprising that deregulation of road freight is rated as one of the single 
market's main successes with 43 per cent of firms surveyed claiming it 
had a positive impact on their business. Services can not only have this 
supply-side  effect  of increasing  manufacturers'  ability  to  reach  cus-
tomers across the Union; they can also stimulate demand for products. 
New telecoms services use new telecoms equipment. A more pan-Euro-
pean approach in a service sector like advertising can also create more 
pan-European demand for goods. 
Some generalities about the single market's impact on manufacturing 
can be extracted from polling evidence. Table 4.1 shows what firms who 
responded to the Business survey thought. 
41 Industry sector 
+  0 
Food products & beverages 15  30  48 
Tobacco products 16  30  50 
Textiles & clothing 17 +  18  17  61 
Chemicals & chemical products 24  37  47 
Fabricated metal products 28  32  55 
Machinery & equipment NEC 29  43  37 
Office mach. & computers 30  31  63 
Motor veh., trailers 34  43  44 
Table 4.1  Impact of  the single market 
Source: Eurostat 
Firms  Firm 
break-
- ?  down  + 
8  15  20.9  33 
0  20  0.1  55 
7  15  22.2  25 
4  12  6.9  47 
4  9  22.0  36 
11  9  20.8  48 
0  5  2.5  41 
8  4  4.7  52 
Employees  Employee  Turnover  Turnover 
break- break-
0  - ?  down  +  0  - ?  down 
47  7  12  20.4  32  49  6  13  30.0 
29  0  16  0.5  60  27  0  13  0.8 
60  3  12  14.5  24  62  2  11  7.3 
38  2  13  13.6  48  37  2  13  17.3 
54  5  6  14.2  36  55  4  5  11.5 
37  8  7  20.7  49  37  8  7  16.0 
50  0  9  2.5  42  48  0  10  2.2 
36  7  5  13.4  51  36  7  5  14.9 Milestones in Manufacturing 
Manufacturers are more upbeat about the single market than service 
companies.  Of the  13,500 companies which responded  to  the  1995 
Eurostat Business Survey,  41  per cent of manufacturing firms said the 
single market programme had been successful in eliminating obstacles 
to EU trade in their sector, compared to only 22 per cent of  service com-
panies which thought likewise. However, manufacturers were more cau-
tious when asked the question: 'Has the single market programme been 
a success for your firm?' Only a third answered yes. By nationality, man-
ufacturers from the periphery- Mediterranean countries and Ireland -
were more positive than those from more centrally-placed countries. By 
size, larger companies say they have benefited more than smaller ones -
who may of  course be less likely to trade across borders. 
In fact, global 'models' - simplified simulations of  reality- using evi-
dence from various studies shows benefits all round. For example, prices 
of  highly traded consumer and equipment goods have converged across 
the EU. This is mainly due to changes in market structures and compe-
tition prompted by the single market programme. Models and types of 
consumer goods  on offer  are  also  more similar,  thanks to  the single 
market measures.  In 1980, EU prices for identical goods varied by 26 
per cent for consumer goods and 18 per cent for equipment goods. By 
1993, this variance had fallen to 19.5 and 14.5 per cent respectively. 
To get a more precise view of  the single market's impact, one has to 
delve into more sectoral detail. The six case studies examined below -
telecommunications equipment, processed food, cars, chemicals, phar-
maceuticals,  textiles  and construction equipment - represent  38  per 
cent of the EU's industrial output and 43 per cent of its  total added 
value. 
TELECOMS EQUIPMENT 
The telecommunications equipment industry is Europe's third biggest, 
with an annual turnover of  around Ecus 35bn and employment of  over 
700,000. But only in recent years has it become one of its most com-
petitive. It has slashed its prices, raised its exports and with GSM mobile 
phone technology developed what is fast becoming a world standard. 
Credit for  this can by no means be attributed wholly to the single 
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market programme. Technology has helped, in particular the arrival of 
digital integrated circuits, which are cheaper to manufacture and more 
reliable to use, and of  fibre optic cables capable of carrying more data. 
So did the world-wide move towards telecoms deregulation. Inside the 
EU this started a decade ago in the UK and (among new EU members) 
Sweden. 
But the EU has matched this world-wide trend with its own liberal-
ising legislation, creating a positive feedback between what was happen-
ing at the level of the EU and of member states. This EU legislation 
specifically directed at equipment included: 
•  ending the monopoly rights of  national telephone operators to dic-
tate  what  terminal  equipment  like  faxes  or  modems  could  be 
attached to their lines; 
•  mutual  recognition  of  'type  approval'  of telecommunications 
equipment, which therefore became cheaper and easier to sell in all 
member states; 
•  creation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) which has reduced technical incompatibilities between sys-
tems. 
Matching this in services have been the moves to: 
•  end by 1998 national telephone operators' monopoly right to pro-
vide ordinary voice telephony and build telecom infrastructures; 
•  rules  to guarantee new telecoms service  providers open access  to 
public networks; 
•  freedom for new operators to provide mobile phone services using 
the GSM mobile phone standard which has now been adopted by 
138 operators in 77 countries. 
All  these  measures  have  forced  the old national telephone operators, 
who account for 80 per cent of all  telecoms equipment purchases, to 
change their buying habits. In this new competitive world, they have 
simply had to get the best price and quality from their supplier. In the 
past,  this supplier always  used to be the national telecom equipment 
manufacturer, where one existed.  So  France Telecom always  went to 
Alcatel, Deutsche Telekom to Siemens, and so on. This automatic link 
between national operator and national supplier no longer exists. The 
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tendency of EU operators to buy a large share of their switching and 
transmission equipment from  their traditional sources  has  not disap-
peared  overnight.  But  liberalisation  has  strengthened  competition 
between traditional suppliers and opened the way for new companies to 
enter the market, particularly network suppliers from the US  and ter-
minal equipment suppliers from Asia. 
1985  1995  CAGR (real) 
Public switching 
Competitive world price (1995 ECU)  420  170 
EU maximum price (1995 ECU)  820  260 
EU minimum price (1995 ECU)  450  170 
EU median price (  1995 ECU)  670  210 
EU average price premium  60%  24% 
Transmission equipment 
Competitive world price per channel 
(1985 = 100)  100  2.4 
EU maximum price per channel (index)  160  3.2 
EU minimum price per channel (index)  130  2.4 
EU median price per channel (index)  138  2.6 
EU average price premium  38%  5% 
Customer premises equipment 
Competitive world price (1985 = 100)  100  39 
EU maximum price (index)  180  58 
EU minimum price (index)  130  40 
EU median price (index)  152  49 
EU average price premium (index)  52%  25% 
Approximate overall average 
price premium  50%  20% 
'Corrected' price premium
1  20%  8% 
Table 4.2  Estimated EU equipment price premiums, 1985-95 
Source: Telecom. equipmentl 
1  See Chapter 7, footnote 15 of  Cecchini (1988). 
-9% 
-11% 
-9% 
-11% 
-31% 
-32% 
-33% 
-33% 
-9% 
-11% 
-11% 
-11% 
1995 figures were derived from an Analysys survey of industry contacts and 
synthesis of  known contract terms. 
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This has exerted enormous downward pressure on prices. A decade 
ago EU telecoms equipment prices were estimated
1 to be at least 20 per 
cent above  the most competitive world level  (usually US).  This pre-
mium over US levels is now greatly reduced. 
In general, this progressive reduction in the 'excess' of  EU prices over 
US levels has benefited EU customers-be they national telephone oper-
ators or individual Europeans-by some Ecus 3.5 bn a year over the past 
decade of 1985-95. By  no  means  all  of this  is  thanks  to  the single 
market measures. But perhaps half of  it is. 
Stripping  out the  many  other  factors  at  work  in  the  European 
telecommunications industry, research has estimated that if  the EU had 
not taken the liberalising steps that it did, European customers would 
have foregone average equipment price reductions of approximately 7 
per cent- equivalent to an annual extra cost of  Ecus 1.5-2bn to Euro-
pean equipment buyers. 
The equipment manufacturers could hardly be expected to welcome 
such sharp price reductions. But generally they have offset lower mar-
gins on their products by reaping economies of  scale across the enlarged 
single market through higher output and exports. Their exports outside 
the EU rose from Ecus 4bn in 1988 to Ecus 7bn in 1993, while the EU's 
trade surplus with the rest of  the world in this sector rose from virtually 
zero to Ecus 1.5bn over the same period. 
Since the EU's major competitors have benefited from roughly the 
same technical advances  as  the EU itself,  it is  a fair supposition that 
much of  this improved trade balance is due to improved competitiveness 
spurred  on  by  the  liberalisation  in  telecommunications  services. 
Research confirms
2 that in the absence of  the single market  programme, EU 
telecoms equipment output would be about Ecus 1  bn less than it cur-
rently is. 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
The car industry differs from telecoms and most other sectors in that it 
is  possible to attribute some very precise savings directly to the single 
market  programme,  while  the  indirect  impact  of the  broader  EU 
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measures  has  had relatively little effect on an industry that has  long 
organised itself to operate across Europe's borders. 
The cost savings flow from a belated success in technical harmonisa-
tion. Cars and their components have long, for obvious safety reasons, 
been clear candidates for straight harmonisation at a considerable level 
of  detail. Starting in 1970, negotiators agreed common requirements for 
more than 40 different car components. But for a long time the attempt 
to agree a harmonised approval test for an entire car - or 'whole type 
approval' - was  frustrated by some countries and car industries who 
worried that outsiders, especially the Japanese, would benefit more than 
they themselves from the freedom of marketing that such whole type 
approval would bring.  Eve~tually, after a trade arrangement was agreed 
with Japan in 1991, whole type approval was agreed in 1992 and came 
into effect for new models in 1996. 
As a result a car approved in one EU state is automatically authorised 
for sale in all the others. The new system is not only easier but cheaper. 
Research3 estimates that car manufacturers may be now able to save up 
to 10 per cent of  the cost of  developing a new model (for the arithmetic 
of  this, see below). 
Car test savings 
The savings come in two forms - hardware and time: 
•  each test of  a new car involves the destruction of  three versions of 
the new model to see how the new car stands up to the impact of 
a crash  from  the front,  rear  and side.  Test  15  times  (in  each 
member state), and you destroy 45 cars. Test once, and you only 
destroy three cars  and save  from  demolition 42 others whose 
value is put at an average of  Ecus 1 m; 
•  the  length  of national  approval  tests  has  varied  according  to 
country, about 3 months in the UK but 6 months in Germany. 
The effect of  one-stop approval will be for approval procedures to 
converge towards the speediest, or at least for manufacturers to 
have the choice of  opting for the speediest. The research, design 
and development costs of  a new car are around Ecus 400m and 
the process takes about 36 months. If  that process is shortened by 
3 months, you save the cost of  keeping your development team 
active for that extra time and you save up to Ecus 30m. 
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By contrast, the broader aspects of the single market programme have 
had relatively little impact on Europe's car industry at a time when it was 
already  undergoing  important  changes  as  a  result  of globalisation, 
improved working methods (often borrowed from Japan)  and a deep 
recession. The EU measures have made it easier for new entrants, chiefly 
Japanese and Korean, to compete on equal terms with existing manu-
facturers.  This has therefore increased the level of competition, which 
has so far shown itself in more choice and service for consumers rather 
than in lower prices. 
The single market programme has not changed the pattern of trade 
in finished cars. Intra-EU trade has remained fairly stable, at a high rate; 
as  a proportion of total  registrations  in the  EU,  those  assembled  in 
another EU country account for slightly over 50 per cent. Imports from 
outside the EU have  increased  slightly,  mainly due  to  the arrival  of 
Korean companies in 1991 and their capture of  about 2 per cent of  the 
market. Japanese companies have increased their share of  the EU market 
from 9 per cent in 1988 to 11 per cent in 1994, but the increase has been 
almost entirely with cars made in the UK through investment undoubt-
edly attracted by the single market. 
However, the removal of border delays and the deregulation of road 
freight seem to have encouraged companies -both assemblers and com-
ponent-makers - to reap  the advantages of implanting themselves in 
lower cost countries around the EU's periphery. Most of  the investments 
have been in areas of  Spain, Portugal, the UK and Italy which have not 
traditionally made cars, though some have also gone into central Europe 
in expectation of  the EU's enlargement to the east. 
The single market programme appears to have little effect on pro-
duction, as distinct from R&D costs, while measured across the EU as 
a whole the variations in final prices of  cars are (slightly) wider than ever. 
These price differentials are caused chiefly by currency fluctuations and 
tax.  Member states  still  tax  cars  very  differently- six  countries  base 
vehicle purchase tax on cubic capacity of  engines, four on weight, two 
on levels of  horsepower and two on the type of  fuel used. 
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PROCESSED FOODSTUFFS 
No industry has been more beset by technical barriers than processed 
foodstuffs.  Nearly  100  of the  original White Paper's  282 Directives 
applied to the food industry. Removing these barriers and getting EU-
wide  agreement on ingredients,  processing,  packaging,  labelling  and 
marketing has been difficult. Even where harmonisation directives are 
agreed,  member states  have  often  been  slow  to  transpose  them into 
national law. The mutual recognition principle has had its part to play 
in the agreement that there is no harm-indeed positive benefit in terms 
of consumer choice- in foods  having different ingredients, provided 
that these ingredients are clearly pointed out to the consumer on the 
label. But some member states have tended to require manufacturers to 
put more detail on the label than the Labelling Directive demanded. 
Yet,  overall,  the industry seems generally positive about the limited 
progress  made.  Of companies which  responded  to  an industry-wide 
survey, 96 out of 108 said the single market programme had either 'sig-
nificantly' or 'to some extent' removed trade barriers.
4 A combination of 
some harmonisation and mutual recognition has helped companies in 
some sectors to realise  economies of scale  and scope. They can more 
easily manufacture according to a single recipe rather than maintain lots 
of parallel  recipes  for  different  national  markets.  The resulting  cost 
reductions tended to be seized by the small number of  very big compa-
nies in the industry more easily than by the large number of  small niche 
manufacturers which characterise this industry. 
The varied nature of  this sector makes generalisation hard. One of  the 
biggest increases in intra-EU trade came in what are classified for cus-
toms as  'other foods',  a heterogeneous category mainly of coffee,  tea, 
soups, sauces, condiments, whose only common factor is that they are 
of relatively high value compared to their bulk and therefore to their 
transport cost. Sharing the same high value to bulk ratio, cross-border 
sales of spirits and chocolate also  increased.  But there has  also  always 
been considerable intra-EU trade in spirits because they are  relatively 
standard products and because in each case their production is concen-
trated in a few  member states.  By contrast, in products like beer,  soft 
drinks, mineral water and pasta, the single market has not seen any real 
increase in intra-EU trade because of local preferences  (in  the case of 
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beer and drinks) or of  ingredients (like the durum wheat which Italians 
insist  should  go  into  pasta).  Not surprisingly  in  such  a  variegated 
market, there is little evidence of  price convergence, except to some lim-
ited  extent  in  soft  drinks  and  also  in  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal, 
undoubtedly  a  catch-up  effect  of their  relatively  recent  entry  into 
the EU. 
CHEMICALS 
Single  market  legislation  has  reduced  obstacles  to  trade,  helped  the 
chemical industry exploit its considerable economies of  scale, increased 
competition and concentration and led intra-EU trade to rise relative to 
total trade. But - in contrast to most other sectors - the EU measures, 
particularly accompanying legislation on pollution control and waste 
management, have increased industry's short-term costs. 
With the Single European Act (1986) providing the basis  for  envi-
ronmental legislation, environmental protection became a key element 
in the construction of the single market. Partly as a result, industry in 
the EU found itself by the early 1990s spending more on environmen-
tal protection as a share of  capital spending than in the US or Japan - as 
can be seen from Figure 4.1. But the evidence is that this did not of  itself 
lead to a loss of  international sales because environmental costs are a rel-
atively  small  share  of the  total.  In  surveys  a  number of companies 
stressed the benefits of  EU-wide environmental measures in creating a 
level playing field, quite apart from the long-term welfare benefits for all 
- see Chapter 9 for more on environmental issues. 
Elsewhere, the single market programme acted on industry's costs in 
both directions.  New harmonised regulations and certification proce-
dures  pushed up the short term costs  of chemical companies, which 
nonetheless shared in the general benefit to industry of  quicker, cheaper 
transport as  a result of the disappearance of border delays and freight 
deregulation. 
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Figure 4.1  Chemical industry capital spending on environmental 
protection 
Source: CEFIC, US Department of  Commerce survey 
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lntra-EU trade rose as a share of  total trade (though this is partly due to 
a fall in the European chemical sector's trade balance with other major 
trading blocks) see Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Competition increased, partic-
ularly in southern Europe, while there was a general increase in merger 
and acquisition activity across  the EU. This in turn led to more con-
centration in the industry,  but this does  not appear to have  had any 
detrimental  effect  because  of the  simultaneous  impact of the  single 
market programme on competition, through easier market access and 
increased intra-EU trade. 
As to the future, the chemical industry is far from alone in wanting to 
see a greater degree of  tax harmonisation and an end to trade-distorting 
currency fluctuations. But it has signalled a particular interest in a more 
consistent approach to environmental protection and in a freer energy 
market.  Large  amounts of energy go  into making chemicals and the 
industry welcomes the prospect of cheaper supplies Bowing from the 
energy liberalisation agreed in June 1996. 
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CONSTRUCTION SITE EQUIPMENT 
The characteristic of this industry is  that while a few  companies spe-
cialise at a global level and make the most common types of excavator 
in long production runs, most manufacture is in small batches or even 
single items. A lot of  cranes or 'off-highway' equipment like bulldozers, 
bucket loaders, graders and road rollers are tailored to the customer. 
This limits opportunities for making economies of  scale in the single 
market. At the same time, the large number of variants and specialist 
equipment produced by some manufacturers, especially smaller niche 
producers,  has  made  the  business  of getting national  type  approval 
costly  and time-consuming.  This  has  made  EU Directives,  like  the 
Machinery Directive and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 
of 1989 which create a one-stop type approval for the EU market, par-
ticularly relevant to this sector. But, generally, these Directives still lack 
harmonised standards produced by standards bodies to make them fully 
effective. 
Most companies have welcomed these measures taken so far to reduce 
technical barriers. But as Table 4.3 shows, they are in two minds about 
the Directives' effect, even though the longer term benefits of  technical 
standardisation will last longer than the largely one-off cost of comply-
ing with the new Directives. 
The majority agreed the measures helped improve the quality of  their 
machines, but only about one in six believed that this had helped make 
their products more competitive or encouraged them to sell in world 
markets. This was because three-quarters judged that the EU Directives 
had raised the cost of  their products. And some manufacturers went on 
to complain that over-regulation was  costing them business  in many 
markets outside the EU which only required basic equipment with little 
regard for safety. 
The views  of companies are  naturally coloured by the cycle of the 
construction industry which after a long period (  1984-90) of  growth has 
gone into an equally long decline since 1990. Inside the EU, demand 
has  held up fairly well.  But EU production has  fallen  because while 
extra-EU exports have also decreased, imports from the rest of  the world 
have stayed steady. As a result, the ratio of  extra-EO exports to imports 
fell from 5:1  in 1981 to 1.5:1 in 1992. 
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Yes  No  No response 
Improved quality of  your 
products  55%  34%  11% 
Increased product costs  74%  16%  9% 
Technical problems in meeting 
legislative requirements  53%  36%  11% 
Making your products more 
competitive in the EU  16%  65%  19% 
Encouraging you to sell in other 
world markets  18%  52o/o  30% 
Base: all, n = 74 
Table 4.3  'Have these directives contributed to the following?' 
In this climate, EU manufacturers have tended to be on the defensive, 
protecting their market position rather than expanding it across EU bor-
ders. Nonetheless, competition has increased in the single market, partly 
because of imports, with the market share of the top five  producers in 
the EU falling from 50.3 per cent in 1988 to 42.7 per cent in 1994. In 
order to try to stay competitive, construction equipment makers have 
taken advantage of  freer movement of goods around the EU to source 
their components more widely. Over 40 per cent of  firms reported they 
had revised their purchasing policy as a result of  the single market mea-
sures. 
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
Textiles and clothing fall  into the category which marketing men call 
'fast moving consumer goods'. They need to move fast in response to 
fashion and demand - and they are indeed moving faster as a result of 
the removal of border delays. 
This has cut the average time between orders and deliveries by 15-20 
per cent, a finding confirmed more generally in the distribution sector. 
Manufacturers can give their retailers not only a quicker service but also 
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a more flexible one, because lower transport costs appear to make them 
readier  to supply in small batches.  Companies reckon the absence of 
border checks and delays has cut an average 10 per cent off their trans-
port costs. These costs are typically 2-5 per cent of sales, so the trans-
port saving is  equivalent to 0.2-0.5 per cent of total turnover. Textile 
and clothing firms claim that abolition of the old system of organising 
cross-border shipments has saved them anywhere between 0.08 and 0.6 
per cent in of  turnover, though some of  this saving has been wiped out 
by the new system for reporting trade statistics. 
5 
To a degree only shared by the car industry, national textile industries 
in the EU used to depend on intra-EU border checks to protect them-
selves  from  indirect imports (ie  coming from India to France via  Bel-
gium). These intra-EU controls on textile imports finally disappeared at 
the start of 1995 to be replaced by EU-wide quotas on textile imports 
administered at the EU's external frontiers. Textile and clothing compa-
nies have not fared too badly, however. 
Imports have  risen.  The share  of the EU textile  market taken  by 
imports from outside the EU increased from  13.6 per cent in 1986 to 
25.6 per cent in  1994, while for clothing,  the proportion of outside 
imports  rose  from  15.6 to  33.4 per cent over  the same  period.  But 
because competition is more on price rather than on quality, EU indus-
try has  generally  switched  to  higher value  products.  Counterfeiting 
remains a problem, but the EU introduced common legislation against 
this in 1995. 
However, there are still technical barriers within the market. Some 24 
technical standards have been agreed, but some 170 more are still being 
drafted. &  a result,  manufacturers still have  to resort to country-by-
country testing of their goods  for  inflammability,  for  certain banned 
chemical substances and for use by the construction industry. 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
Europe's pharmaceutical market still remains fragmented along national 
lines, chiefly because it is subject to price controls which national gov-
ernments impose through what their health insurance schemes choose 
to reimburse patients. 
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Nonetheless, there is now: 
•  the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, set up in 1995, to co-
ordinate the authorisation of  new drugs on the market; 
•  the Transparency Directive of 1989 which requires governments to 
be quicker to take decisions on prices and reimbursement on drugs 
and to explain the decisions they have taken; 
•  the 'rational use  of medicines'  Directives  of 1992, which create 
common rules on how drugs are advertised and what information 
is given to patients. 
This has helped increase intra-EU trade. Cross-border trade in retail fin-
ished medicines rose from 9.8 per cent of  total consumption in 1988 to 
17.2 per cent in 1994, and the growth in this cross-border trade has 
been above the EU average in southern countries-France, Greece, Italy 
and especially Spain. Table 4.4 shows the size of this increase. 
Thus, EU actions have helped somewhat towards unifying the market 
and providing the means of supplying it. But it is surprising that cross 
border trade is  not higher, given the price gaps between national mar-
kets. Some trading takes place in parallel to that organised by manufac-
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
B  42.1  45.6  45.0  47.0  50.9  47.7  56.8 
D  6.7  8.5  9.0  9.5  9.9  9.2  11.0 
DK  39.2  38.4  37.0  41.2  46.7  32.6  43.3 
E  2.6  3.8  4.2  5.1  8.5  11.5  15.3 
F  4.6  5.6  6.7  7.8  8.3  8.3  8.9 
GR  15.9  21.8  29.0  25.8  31.6  27.5  29.6 
I  5.0  5.2  5.7  5.7  7.3  8.7  10.8 
IRL  75.1  90.8  91.8  92.7  92.6  78.8  87.2 
NL  53.8  58.9  58.6  59.8  62.1  61.6  82.3 
p  16.0  13.8  15.3  13.7  16.6  16.7  18.5 
UK  15.2  18.2  17.5  18.8  19.1  18.6  21.1 
EU  9.8  11.2  11.6  12.2  13.6  13.9  17.2 
Table  4.4  Imports  of finished  medicines  from  other  EU  member 
nations as a percentage of  consumption (1988-94) 
Source: Eurostat Nace 257 database 
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turers and their main distributors - mainly buying in low priced mar-
kets  (Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Spain)  and selling in higher priced ones 
(Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, the UK). But this form of  arbitrage 
is still very small, accounting for only 4 per cent of  the consumption of 
prescription drugs. 
Cross-border marketing of drugs remains difficult, despite the 1992 
Directives which went as far as member states were able to agree at that 
time. Member states' practices vary, according to what they deem to be 
a prescription drug and what advertisements  they will  allow.  Selling 
pharmaceutical products by mail order - a form of  marketing which has 
taken 10 per cent of  the US market-is illegal in several EU states, while 
in the Netherlands even prescription pharmaceutical products can be 
sold in this way. 
The research-based end of the pharmaceutical industry is,  not sur-
prisingly, concerned about any increase in parallel trading. R&D costs 
as a share of  sales have risen in the EU from 9.3 per cent in 1982 to 12.3 
per cent in 1993. Some potential economies exist in R&D. There are no 
less than 128 R&D plants in the EU outside the company's country of 
origin, even though the evidence is that most breakthroughs come in a 
company's home base. Rationalisation of  R&D, as well as of  production 
sites, is now occurring, but mainly through the mega-mergers which are 
driven more by global than EU competition. 
Overall, in spite of  the fact that it is still early days, it is possible to see 
and measure the actual advances achieved in manufacturing. Of  course, 
these are only milestones along the way, rather than arrival at the desired 
destination. Manufacturing still stands to benefit further from all of  the 
action being taken to improve the application and enforcement of the 
rules and the provision of the necessary standards. This is  because the 
fact  that one is  dealing with tangible identifiable products makes  the 
whole  exercise  fairly  concrete.  However,  the  story  is  not  quite  so 
straightforward for services. 
Notes 
Cecchini report. 
2  Telecom. equipment. 
3  Vehicles. 
4  Foodstuffs. 
5  Textiles. 
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Breaking New Ground 
in Services 
The single market programme was the first serious assault on barriers to 
the provision of  services across the EU. It was the first attempt because 
services are generally a more recent economic activity to develop than 
manufacturing and because services are a more complicated area, due to 
the contractual relationship between supplier and customer. At the same 
time there was a serious need to liberalise services because they form the 
fastest growing part of  the European economy. 
Trade in services takes place through the use of  international services, 
such as when you send your goods in a truck to a neighbouring country, 
or telephone abroad, or hire a foreign architect. Or through, as econo-
mists would say, the international movement of  production factors like 
capital or labour, such as when you make a money transfer through your 
bank or set up an after-sales company abroad to service goods like cars. 
Or through consumption of foreign  'non-traded' services,  as  a tourist 
might when he stays in a foreign hotel or eats in a foreign restaurant. 
These latter services  are  still  called  'non-traded'  because  the service-
provider-the hotelier or restaurateur-can not bring his hotel or restau-
rant to you. 
But the definition of  what is non-traded is shrinking with the advent 
of the single market. Municipal garbage collection might, for instance, 
have been regarded as  typically non-traded. Under the opening up of 
public procurement, however,  a town council in one EU state might 
well  award the contract to collect its garbage to a company based in 
another member state. 
Member states  have  spun a web  of regulatory  restrictions  around 
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services, for several reasons. In banking, insurance, road and air trans-
port, they have often sought to ensure market stability, or safety, or con-
sumer  protection  in  ways  which  create  significant  barriers  to 
cross-border  trade  and/or discriminate  against  outside  operators.  In 
telecommunications, audio-visual services,  and again in air transport, 
they have invoked the requirements of  public service and/or the physi-
cal limitations of  a network to award special or exclusive rights, owner-
ship rules,  or restrictions on broadcasting frequencies which have had 
the effect of limiting competition and denying access  to outsiders. In 
professional and business services, obstacles to cross-border trade have 
stemmed from  member states'  different requirements for  people like 
architects, engineers, lawyers,  management consultants, and so  on, to 
exercise their profession in another member state. 
The single market programme in services started slowly but has gath-
ered  pace.  It began in what people regarded as  traditional services -
banking,  insurance and transport.  Telecommunications services  were 
added and, subject to the approval of the European Parliament, elec-
tricity will be added soon. Among newer technologies, the single market 
programme tackled audio-visual services  from  the outset, but is  only 
now confronting the explosive growth in on-line information services 
which have opened new ways of  selling across Europe's borders. Partly 
because of  this phased timetable, the progress has been significant in lib-
eralising transport and financial services, but more modest in other ser-
vice sectors. 
Before examining this in sectoral detail, it is worth noting that, just 
as we saw in the last chapter, some service sectors have had a powerful 
influence on manufacturing. Some of the single market measures tar-
geted at improving the flow of  goods across borders have also had pow-
erful ramifications for services. 
This is  obvious in the case of road transport, where the removal of 
internal border delays has enabled hauliers to save, on average, 5 per cent 
of  their total costs on a typical intra-EU journey of l,OOOkm.  It is evi-
dent, too, in air transport where liberalisation has increased traffic that 
is now mainly constrained by the difficulty of  getting into main airports 
at peak times. 
Another 'cross  reference'  from  manufacturing to services  has  been 
mutual  recognition.  This  principle,  chiefly  devised  to  encourage 
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Table 5.1  Effectiveness of  single market measures in removing barriers to the free provision of  services (as 
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member states  to mutually recognise and accept the technical differ-
ences in their goods, has also been successfully applied to services. The 
general approach to services  has  been to separate the issue  of market 
access  from  that of prudential, safety and consumer protection stan-
dards. These latter aspects have been left for the home country of the 
service  provider  (whether  a  bank,  insurer,  stockbroker,  airline,  road 
haulier)  to  supervise.  With their  basic  financial  soundness  or safety 
record controlled by their home authority, these companies are free  to 
do business around the EU. And it is  the mutual recognition of this 
'home country' control that allows this system to work. In these service 
sectors, mutual recognition, in principle, gives Europe's consumers ade-
quate protection while still giving Europe's companies plenty of  access 
to each other's markets. 
To see better how all this has worked in practice, we now take a look 
at several sectors. 
BANKS 
The single market programme gave European banks a sounder financial 
base  and made  them more  competitive,  more  international in  their 
operations or alliances,  more diverse  in the products they offer,  and 
more explicit about the fees they charge. But it did not generally lead to 
a sharp downward convergence of the prices of corporate,  retail and 
mortgage loans across the EU, as had been hoped.
1 
The price- the difference between the interest the bank charged its 
customer and what it had to pay on the three-month inter-bank market 
- of corporate loans  fell  slightly across  the EU. As  can be seen from 
Figure 5.1, relatively large decreases were reported in Ireland, France, 
Spain and, in the case of  lending to large companies, in Greece and Den-
mark. Retail and mortgage loan prices also fell  across the EU, but the 
price falls were less than in the corporate sector. Banks in Ireland, France 
and Spain  reported  the  biggest  decrease  in  retail  loan  prices,  while 
Greece, Spain and France reported the biggest drop in mortgage prices. 
Those in the once-heavily regulated and restricted banking markets of 
the south, as well as  in Ireland, were the most ready to attribute these 
price drops to the single market measures. 
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Figure 5.1  Change in loan prices by country and impact of  the single 
market programme 
Source: Postal survey 
But these modest declines, unequal as  they were, did nothing to push 
banking prices closer together across the EU. In general, loan prices con-
verged in 1978-85, but thereafter stopped doing so. Deposit prices con-
tinued to converge from 1978 to 1995, as  is shown in Figures 5.2 and 
5.3, but there is  no evidence that the single market programme had 
much to do with this. 
Taking the five financial products and seven countries which the Cec-
chini Report examined for 1987, and comparing them with the same 
products in the same countries today, shows that only in the cases of 
credit cards and mortgages has the spread of prices narrowed over the 
past nine years see Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
There are several reasons for this. A major one is that EU, as well as 
international, regulators have obliged banks to set aside more money or 
profit to boost their own capital provisions against the risk of  bad loans. 
Thus  the  liberalisation  legislation  for  mutual  funds  (1988),  banks 
(1989)  and investment firms  (1995)  has  been matched by the Own 
Funds/Solvency Directives of 1989, the Capital Adequacy Directive of 
1993 and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme of 1994. Bank clients there-
fore gain from having at their disposal institutions that are more solid 
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Figure 5.2  Change in deposit prices by country and impact of  the 
single market programme 
Source: Postal survey 
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Product  UK  F  D  8  NL  I  E  Range' 
Commercial loan  6875  4375  5000  4500  6750  5125  5625  2500 
Credit card  61  37  84  94  75  99  66  62 
Mortgage  290  653  575  480  343  350  800  510 
Current cheque 
account  112  10  117  0  0  240  2  240 
Personal equity 
transaction  23  9  11  14  22  10  17  13 
NB: All prices are in ECUs. 
Table 5.2  Cecchini Report results: the prices of  five products in 1987 
Source: Cecchini Report 
The range is simply the difference between the most and the least expensive 
Member States 
Product  UK  F  D  8  NL  I  E 
Commercial 
loan  7500  3885  2114  3755  2741  4843  6976 
Credit card  35  33  32  71  27  40  43 
Mortgage  475  626  245  408  180  552  540 
Current cheque 
account  4  -70  52  38  *  280  109 
Personal equity 
transaction  18  51  20  13  3  3  13 
NB: All prices are in ECUs 
Range' 
5386 
44 
446 
350 
48 
Table 5.3  Postal survey study results: the prices of  five products in 
1996 
Source: Postal survey 
* Figures not available 
1  The range is simply the difference between the most and the least expensive 
Member States 
65 The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
financially, though of  course they might also have liked to see a decline 
in their bank interest bill as well. 
Another reason is that banks preferred not to compete on the price of 
lending, especially in market conditions that were often in recent years 
volatile.  In addition,  cross-border operations  may bring a bank cus-
tomers of whose credit-worthiness it is  less  sure, and therefore it may 
build a higher risk premium into the price of its loans. Instead, banks 
have competed more on the range of  their products and quality of  their 
service. They have also become more explicit about the fees they charge 
customers, as required by consumer protection laws (see Chapter 9). 
The single  market provides  most banks with what economists call 
'economies of  scope' - the ability to use a given network to sell a wider 
range of  products or goods. Recent econometric research has concluded 
that these scope economies have been most exploited by the very biggest 
banks, with assets in excess of Ecus 50bn, and small to medium banks 
with assets of Ecus 1-10bn
2
• The same research concludes that there is 
still potential for economies of  scale or reduced costs through an increase 
in market size, particularly in corporate banking, and that smaller banks 
in France and Germany-the two biggest national economies - are best 
placed to seize them. 
The diversity in financial service products has, of course, broadened 
with  the  increase  in cross-border banking business.  The aim  of the 
'single passport'  legislation was  to avoid financial  services  companies 
from having to set up a full subsidiary in each and every EU country in 
which they wanted to do serious business.  Nowadays,  a bank can do 
business in a given member state either from a branch there, or directly 
from its home base where all the key aspects of  its solvency, liquidity and 
risk  are  supervised  by  its  home  regulator.  The number of branches 
which banks based in one EU state established in other member states 
rose by 58 per cent - from 308 to 487 - in the three years after 1992. 
Over the same period, the Commission received from third countries 43 
notifications of  the establishment or acquisition of  subsidiaries as credit 
institutions. 
In addition, mergers and acquisitions have increased in wholesale cor-
porate banking, with, for instance, many of the big continental banks 
buying up London merchant banks. Some of  the previously heavily reg-
ulated banking markets - Italy, Spain and Portugal - plus more mature 
66 Breaking New Ground in Services 
but smaller  markets,  like  the Netherlands,  have  seen  an  increase  in 
domestic mergers that have been essentially defensive. 
Banking done directly across  borders has  increased,  particularly in 
off-balance sheet business and investment management, in contrast to 
retail banking which has seen almost no increase. Though some of the 
most active players in this have been German, Dutch and Irish banks, 
increased  trade in banking services  has  primarily benefited southern 
countries, France, Belgium and the UK. 
Generally then, the single market's impact on banking has been pos-
itive but not startling. Though barriers remain, the chief of which are 
the differing tax rates and regimes which persist around Europe, most 
bankers surveyed  in  the  research  have  their minds fixed  on the next 
target in European integration-monetary union. 'Without this', one of 
them said, 'the single market is like Hamlet without the Prince'. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
SERVICES 
The liberalisation of  telecommunications services stems from two land-
mark Directives of 1990:  the Services  Directive which allowed  unre-
stricted access  for  service providers to the public phone network both 
within and between member states and the Open Network Provision 
Directive, which provided a framework for competition in value-added 
services, data transmission and ordinary voice telephony. 
Rapid growth has followed.  For example, the market in value added 
networks increased by 22 per cent in 1992 and by 26 per cent in 1993, 
while the expansion of the GSM mobile phone has been exponential. 
Since the 1990 Directives,  the non-domestic providers'  share of data 
transmission within the EU has risen from 24 to 35 per cent
3 but with-
out squeezing out EU companies which have also seen their part of  the 
market almost double from 12 to 23 per cent. 
Growth has meant change. The liberalisation of  telecommunications 
equipment,  data  and value-added  telecoms  services,  satellite  services 
and, from 1996, mobile communications and the use of utility-owned 
networks and cable TV networks adds up to a transformation of the 
telecoms scene. In each of these areas, the change has removed barriers 
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to  investment,  led  to  lower  prices  (particularly  for  telephone  calls 
between member states) and improved the quality of  service for users. 
Subscribers to telephone services, in particular, will have noticed that 
waiting times  for  a new phone line are  shorter, faults  occur less  fre-
quently and are  being repaired more quickly.  Compensation is  often 
available when deadlines are not met. 
The new competitive environment has  resulted in a succession  of 
recent alliances between big players in the market, such as the Unisource 
consortium, and link-ups such as the one between France Telecom and 
Deutsche Telekom, or between British Telecom and Generale des Eaux:. 
Encouragingly,  these  reveal  the  industry's  ability  to  meet  business' 
demand for Europe-wide services. But this is also part of  strategic posi-
tioning by the operators as they gear up to take advantage of  the fulllib-
eralisation of  networks and the public voice service from 1998. 
Change has been for the better. Community legislation has success-
fully  set the pace for  the liberalisation process.  It should continue to 
ensure that benefits are passed on to consumers in terms of  more choice, 
better quality and lower priced telecommunications services. For exam-
ple, the increase in competition has pushed prices downwards, most dra-
matically in international phone calls. Since 1990, calls from the EU to 
the US have fallen by 42 per cent, partly pushed down by the challenge 
from US 'call-back' companies. But, preparing themselves for the loss of 
their monopoly on ordinary telephony in 1998, EU telephone operators 
have also  reduced the cost of long distance calls  by 22 per cent. As  a 
result, the 'gap' between the highest and lowest phone rates in the EU 
has narrowed from a ratio of  4:1 in 1991 to 2: 1 in 1994. However, oper-
ators still struggle with some bottlenecks, such as  the dearth and high 
price ofleased lines. Tariffs on high capacity leased lines (capable of  car-
rying data at 2Mb/s) remain on average 10 times higher than compara-
ble lines in north America. 
Liberalisation is also the 'means to the end' of bringing in a wide array 
of  new phone-based services that are changing the way we live. Transac-
tional  services,  such  as  phone-banking,  tele-shopping,  tele-medicine, 
distance learning, on-line news, information and entertainment services 
and remote-access services are becoming increasingly accessible at lower 
costs, thanks to the opening up of  the market. 
To maintain this rapid expansion, the single market in telecommuni-
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cations services must work properly. In particular, no new obstacles to 
the creation of  trans-European networks must be allowed to emerge and 
rob users of  the full benefits. As a first step to heading off  problems, new 
rules  have  recently  been  proposed  that member states  should notify 
Brussels (and each other) when they propose new national regulations 
on information services, just as they already do in the case of  new draft 
technical rules. 
GSM - a signal success. 
GSM, or Global System for Mobile Communications, is arguably 
the world's most advanced mobile telecoms standard in the world, 
and is  the  second  most widely  used  behind  the  US  analogue 
mobile standard, AMPS.  GSM has  been adopted by some  140 
operators in 77 countries. One of  its major benefits is the ability to 
use  the same handset throughout Europe and beyond, enabling 
users to roam between countries and be contactable on the same 
number and have all their calls billed to the same account. 
Its  success  owes  much to  the  beneficial  effects  of the single 
market programme. 
4 For the most significant factor in its success 
has been the breadth of its adoption, and the subsequent impact 
on production volumes of  equipment (leading to rapid reduction 
in prices as manufacturers benefit from economies of  scale) and its 
roaming capabilities. To date, some Ecus 20bn have been invested 
in GSM in Europe alone,  75  per cent of this going to the five 
major European manufacturers. 
Among several key steps along this road were: 
•  the European Commission's decision to reserve the 900mhz 
frequency range for GSM, and to defend it over a prolonged 
period against other claims; 
•  development of  the standard by the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute; 
•  rapid agreement on mutual recognition of  tests and approvals 
of  handsets; 
•  single market legislation introducing competition into tele-
coms equipment manufacture, and into telecoms services. As 
a result, handset prices and air-time rates have fallen sharply. 
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AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTION 
The seminal single market law in this area was the Television Without 
Frontiers  (TWF)  Directive of 1989,  which  aimed  to guarantee  free 
transmission across  frontiers  of broadcasts that conformed to certain 
standards on advertising, sponsorship and decency. In addition, a major-
ity of transmission time was  to be reserved for European programmes 
and 10 per cent for works made by independent producers. 
The record is mixed. The TWF Directive helped some pan-European 
channels  start up  by making licensing easier,  by reducing costs  and 
encouraging a belief that a pan-European advertising market (see below) 
would emerge.5  But audience penetration by pan-European channels 
has  often been limited.  In terms of trans-border broadcasting, single 
market measures have not, up to now, been followed by any spectacular 
extra-territorial expansion of territorial broadcasters. Some in fact have 
found it easier to enter markets by exercising their right to freedom of 
establishment, in most cases in joint ventures with domestic operators. 
Recent  Court of Justice  judgments  upholding  the  Commission's 
application of the  Directive are  expected  to  encourage trans-frontier 
activity. They clarify certain provisions and will give rise to a higher level 
oflegal certainty, as would adoption of  the Commission's proposal for a 
revised Directive now before the Council and European Parliament. 
Indirectly,  the  TWF  Directive  appears  to  have  encouraged  the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Germany, Greece, Spain, 
Belgium and Denmark to liberalise their own domestic broadcasting 
markets. Competition has increased in some of  these markets, with con-
centration- as measured in audience share- reduced in Portugal, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
The rise in total hours broadcast in the EU appears to have increased 
the level of European television production, and the full effect of this 
will be felt more in the years  to come. Although new broadcasters are 
more likely to import non-EU programmes in the early phases of their 
development,  they will  transmit more European programmes as  they 
move  into profit. The European quota provisions have had a certain 
impact but it has  been  somewhat limited by  uneven  application  at 
national level.  By contrast, the TWF Directive appears to have helped 
independent producers. 
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In film production, the EU's Media programme has encouraged pro-
fessionals to look beyond their borders for partners and investors. But 
the programme is too limited by the size of  its budget to do more than 
promote this form of  personal networking. It  is still noteworthy that the 
largest  direct  TV investment,  by  Canal  Plus  in  France,  stems  from 
national licensing regulations there rather than from EU regulations. 
Intra-EU trade in audio-visual products has increased over and above 
what would  have  been  expected  on the  basis  of relative  prices  and 
exchange rates,  but there has equally been a large increase in non-EU 
imports, mostly from the US. 
ADVERTISING 
The single market's main impact on the advertising industry has come 
indirectly,  via  the effect  on its  clients.  As companies have  seen  their 
potential markets widen across  Europe, so  they have sought, through 
advertising agencies, a more international approach to promoting their 
products. 
As a result, there is growing standardisation of  advertising campaigns, 
particularly in promoting products for the 'youth' and 'luxury' markets 
where European tastes have converged the most and where products can 
be sold on a single message across the EU. Even in the ordinary range of 
consumer goods, whose promotion is still heavily adapted to individual 
national markets, advertising agencies have been pressed by their clients 
to form themselves into international networks or alliances. A series of 
mergers and acquisitions has led to the creation of  several Europe-based 
giants - among them WWP and Cordiant based in London, and Euro-
RSCG and Publicis based in Paris. Some multinational groups have cen-
tralised their advertising expenditure with a single agency, though there 
is no clear trend here. 
Cross-border trade  is  not a very good gauge  of integration in the 
sector,  because of the necessary proximity between agency and client. 
Nevertheless intra-EU trade as  measured by advertising credits within 
the EU rose  from Ecus  2bn in  1987 to Ecus  3.28bn in  1993, while 
extra-EU trade increased only from Ecus  1.15bn to Ecus  1.48bn over 
the same period. 
6  General growth in advertising has been strongest in 
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Germany and in the relatively 'young' markets of  Greece, Portugal and 
Spain; only Finland has seen a downturn. 
EU legislation specific to the advertising industry has had a mixed 
impact. The first  attempt to  harmonise advertising rules - the 1984 
directive on 'misleading advertising'- is rated as having had little effect, 
because member states have different views on what is 'misleading'. Ger-
many, for example, takes a rather literal approach, believing that prod-
ucts must live up to all the claims made for them, while most other states 
accept a certain exaggeration as  part of the promotion game. A 1991 
Commission proposal  for  a  Directive on 'comparative'  advertising -
defined as any ad which identifies similar goods or services offered by a 
competitor- has yet to be passed; so while comparative advertising is 
permitted in many member states, it is still banned in Belgium and Lux-
embourg. However, other Commission proposals governing advertising 
of baby  formula,  medicines,  life  insurance,  and  alcohol  have  been 
approved. 
The Television  Without Frontiers  Directive  (see  previous  section) 
contained provisions  on advertising.  In  themselves  these  provisions, 
which for instance banned cross-border promotion of  tobacco products 
and limited that of  alcohol, would probably have restricted the volume 
of  advertising. But this potentially restrictive effect has been more than 
offset by the actual growth in programming, stimulated by liberalisation 
at the national and EU level. The number of  national and cross-border 
TV  channels has risen steadily, from 77 in 1988 to 129 in 1993.7 Of  par-
ticular interest to advertisers is the arrival of  thematic channels, devoted 
to a single topic (sport, culture, music, even teleshopping), especially if, 
like Eurosport, they reach a pan-European audience. 
But generally the proliferation in the number of European media is 
rated as  a handicap to the development of pan-European advertising. 
Over the 1981-91 period, the number of  radio stations rose from 1,800 
to 8,400, newspapers from 7,000 to 8,500 and magazines from 5,300 to 
10,900.
8  This fragmentation of the media market makes it harder for 
agencies to mount pan-European campaigns. At the root of  all this, of 
course,  is  the linguistic and cultural diversity of the EU, about which 
nothing can, nor should, be done. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the nature 
of  the differences involved for advertising agencies and companies. 
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Items  Advertising agencies 
Different cultural frameworks 
a) Different languages  4.16 
b) Cultural differences  4.67 
c)  Different attitudes towards advertising  3.36 
Different distribution and trade habits and systems 
a)  Different product classification systems  2.77 
b) Local trading and/or distribution traditions  3.26 
c) Different product type customer preferences  3.34 
d)  Different media buying habits  2.43 
(scale 1 not important, 5 very important) 
Table 5.4  Cultural factors preventing advertising standardisation for 
advertising agencies 
Source: Advertising 
Items  Companies 
Different cultural frameworks 
a)  Different languages  3.54 
b) Cultural differences  3.57 
c) Different media buying habits  2.50 
{scale:  1 not important, 5 very important) 
Table 5.?  Cultural factors preventing advertising standardisation for 
compames 
Source: Advertising 
DISTRIBUTION 
The single market has triggered a minor revolution in the trans-EU dis-
tribution of  goods. It goes beyond the effects that the ending of  controls 
and delays on the EU's internal border have had in reducing the costs, 
and extending the ambitions of  transport companies (see next section). 
It  has encouraged both manufacturers and retailers to tighten their con-
trol over distribution, leading to more vertical integration of distribu-
tion either by doing it themselves or by handing it over to new-style 
logistics companies (see Chapter 3). 
This reorganisation is estimated to have reduced the costs of  logistics 
- the whole process of transporting, warehousing and handling goods 
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between the factory and the shop - by an average 29 per cent for some 
1,000 major European companies between 1987 and 1992.
9  Over the 
same period, the average delay between placing an order and receiving 
the shipment shrank from 21  to  15  days.  These gains appear to have 
produced a narrowing of distribution margins between producer and 
consumer prices in some countries (Germany and the Netherlands) but 
not in others (the UK and Spain). 
The casualties in this reorganisation have tended to be the middle-
men. General wholesalers have often been bought up by other distribu-
tion companies or eliminated from the distribution chain and forced 
into other activities.  Likewise,  the elimination of border controls has 
been a blow to many specialised customs clearers.  But some of these 
companies have turned themselves into logistics specialists. The latter 
have become far more international, first following their customers into 
foreign markets and then setting up their own EU-wide systems. 
Manufacturers and retailers are  also  adopting a more international 
approach. Sony, for instance, has reduced the number of  its warehouses 
in the UK from 8 to 1 and is looking for as  few as 4 for the whole of 
Europe, while Philips Lighting is  in the process of reducing its  major 
warehouses in Europe from 14 to 4. Warehousing and buying patterns 
have also  changed. The single market also  revived  the vogue for  EU-
wide buying groups, particularly in food.  Typically,  they make only a 
relatively small share of  their purchases together, usually for some com-
monly designed private-label goods or in limited products where the 
volume of individual purchases would be  too low.  As  a result,  these 
buying consortia have often evolved into training centres, or forums for 
the exchange of  ideas or pressure groups against manufacturers. 
AIR TRANSPORT 
Liberalisation is opening up traffic rights on all intra-EU routes, includ-
ing from April 1997 so-called 'full cabotage' or the operation of  a purely 
domestic service in another member state. It has wrought big changes. 
Scheduled passenger services increased by 3 per cent a year between 
1989 and 1992 and then accelerated by 7 per cent a year in 1993-4. 
Further increases in capacity and traffic can be expected in 1997, when 
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full cabotage starts. In the past, the airline industry has been very sensi-
tive to the performance of  the economy at large. Yet in the last recession 
to hit Europe, in the early 1990s, it managed to fare better than in the 
past. Indeed research has shown that, due to single market liberalisation, 
air traffic was actually 20 per cent higher in 1992-94 than could have 
been predicted from the industry's performance during past recessions.
10 
The shipment of  air cargo has also increased, made easier by the removal 
of  internal customs controls. 
The response of airlines to this more competitive environment has 
been varied. In larger EU countries- France, Germany and the UK-
national flag carriers have acquired domestic airlines in order to prevent 
competitors  from  doing  so.  Direct  cross  border  investment  has 
increased, with British Airways buying a share of TAT in France and 
setting up Deutsche BA  in Germany,  Lufthansa investing in Austria's 
Lauda Air and KLM in Air UK. There is also a growing trend towards 
alliances. These have the effect of restricting competition in domestic 
markets, though they can create more competition in the broader EU 
market.  Two  such  alliances  with  a  major  intra-EU  impact  are  the 
linkups between Lufthansa and SAS and between Swissair, Austriair and 
Sabena. 
The early stages of liberalisation saw some failures, such as  Dan Air, 
German Wings or Air Europe; this led to a net loss of four EU-based 
carriers serving scheduled intra-EU routes in the 1989-92 period. But 
1992-95 then saw a net increase of  six airlines, chiefly serving low den-
sity regional routes, though a few former charter airlines (EBA in Bel-
gium,  Air  Liberte  in  France)  have  opened  up  in  competition  with 
national flag carriers. 
Some barriers to entry remain. The most important is the problem of 
finding new slots at big airports at peak times, where the traffic is dens-
est but the returns best. This may prove an insuperable physical prob-
lem  to  further  major  increases  in  competition,  although  the 
Commission's  recent  proposal  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council suggesting greater transparency and liberalisation in this area 
should help. 
Free movement of  services has come a long way. A wider range of  ser-
vices  is  available  to  retail,  public sector and industrial consumers at 
lower prices, particularly in newly liberalised sectors such as transport, 
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financial services, telecommunications and broadcasting. In spite of  the 
difficulties,  price variations  for  identical services  across  the EU came 
down slightly from 33 per cent in 1980 to 28 per cent in 1993. So there 
is a perceivable trend in the right direction. The needs of the Informa-
tion Society and the importance of  services for the EU economy (about 
70 per cent of  jobs) means that this should be an area to watch for pos-
sible new measures. For such a promising 'emerging market' there must 
be a system of  swift identification and removal of  obstacles if  all the ben-
efits are to be realised. 
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The 'New Look' 
Market 
Let us now lift our gaze above the detail of  individual sectors, and get a 
bird's eye view of how the single market programme has affected the 
European economy as a whole. This chapter examines the overall shape 
of  the new European market, the increase in trade, investment and cap-
ital flows and the extent to which this greater market integration has also 
reduced the number of companies and price differences in certain sec-
tors. Chapter 7 focuses on the behaviour of  companies and on how they 
have chosen to react to greater cross-border competition. And Chapter 
8 takes a look at some of  the macro-economic results of  all this and the 
impact on Europe's growth, jobs and regions. 
Ideally,  we  should see  a virtuous circle of benefits {see  Figure 6.1). 
Single market measures should give companies some initial cost savings, 
increasing their efficiency and productivity. This should increase sales, 
and therefore profits. The profits would be ploughed back into invest-
ment and employment. Investment would give more business to makers 
of  capital goods, while the increase of  people in work with more money 
to spend would stimulate demand for  consumer products. A rise  in 
growth and demand would lead to a further increase in sales. And so on. 
Real life, however, is rarely so simple. The first part of  this cycle - the 
subject  of this  chapter - has  produced  economic  results  which  are 
almost in line with economic theory. The removal of  technical and reg-
ulatory barriers has in fact encouraged more cross-border trade, invest-
ment and  concentration  as  stronger  companies  extend  their  reach, 
allying with or buying up competitors and sometimes just knocking 
them out of  the market. 
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The single market programme 
Greater efficiency and productivity 
Figure 6.1  Single Market - the Virtuous Circle 
But even here many extraneous factors have influenced the pace of  this 
closer integration. Some factors pushed the single market along. Take, 
for instance, technical change in telecommunications. Advances in dig-
ital, cellular and satellite technology have helped telecoms equipment 
and mobile phone manufacturers and TV broadcasters. They have also 
helped to render obsolete the old monopolies of traditional national 
telecoms operators: new radio or satellite-based communications made 
it technically possible to bypass the fixed line networks of  national tele-
com operators. Some member states were quick to recognise this obso-
lescence by abolishing telecoms monopolies and, thanks to the single 
market programme, this change is  now spreading throughout Europe. 
Unrestricted access  to Europe's  phone lines has,  in turn, spurred the 
development of  a wide range of  new cross-border information services. 
Even more significant an influence on the pace of  integration was the 
overall cycle of  the European economy. Early expectations, for example 
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those  outlined in  the  Cecchini  Report,  that the  single  market  pro-
gramme would give  a big boost to growth, competitiveness and jobs 
were based on the assumption that macro-economic forces  like world 
commodity prices and interest rates would push in the same direction. 
The assumption was sound at the time. Oil prices fell sharply in 1985-6 
and stayed low, cutting the costs of  oil-consuming regions like the EU 
and raising their spending power. The 1987 stock market crash proved 
just a blip, but frightening enough for many EU countries to relax their 
monetary policies. This provided a favourable backdrop against which 
companies could confidently gear up for the challenges and opportuni-
ties of  the emerging single market. 
Then the economy turned downwards in 1991-2, just as many of  the 
single  market  measures  were  coming  on stream.  Demand failed  to 
respond to any early price cuts or quality improvements from the single 
market programme, and then it slackened. This diminished the enthu-
siasm of  companies to risk expansion. Recession made it harder for the 
economy to find alternative use for those resources-companies, people, 
even capital-displaced by the process of  adjusting to the single market. 
All  this  appears  to have  dampened the 'animal spirits' of Europe's 
entrepreneurs. It is  a reasonable surmise- from the evidence in trade 
and investment- that after the euphoria of  the build-up to '1992' they 
began to take a harder look at the precise benefits from the single market 
programme and to gauge their behaviour accordingly. 
For instance, we have seen that, from the abolition of customs and 
fiscal  formalities,  a manufacturer or retailer  buying or selling goods 
across borders has typically saved Ecus 1  0-30 per consignment. This is 
a sizeable, but not enormous, saving, though of  course its significance to 
a trader depends on the volume he trades. It is big enough to encourage 
a company to trade more, when times are good, but not so big as to sus-
tain its interest in cross-border commerce when times are harder. So, the 
period 1985-92 saw a steady rise in the share of  components which EU 
companies 'sourced' or bought from other EU countries. The trend then 
breaks. The post-1992 recession reversed, though not completely, this 
rise in EU sourcing. 
1 The cost/benefit calculation of  whether or not to 
trade more changes,  however,  when the border-related savings  are  in 
excess ofEcus 100 per consignment, as is the case in southern European 
states. Most southern states have seen a sharp and sustained rise in their 
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intra-EU trade.
2 This is especially true of Spain, even allowing for the 
fact  that the single market programme coincided with that country's 
entry into the EU. 
For services,  the single market changes can be more significant and 
absolute. Some barriers to services took the form of  quantitative restric-
tions (such as in road freight) or denial to networks or essential facilities 
(like computer reservation systems or landing rights and slots in the air-
line industry).  Removal of these  barriers gives  a company not just a 
saving on the cost of shipping a good to another country, but a first 
chance to do business in that other country. This is  bound to have a 
greater psychological effect.  It is  significant that airlines continued to 
expand their intra-EU services  through the  recent  recession,  despite 
running overall operating losses that until 1994 were increasing.
3 
Trade. The 1985-95 period saw a significant rise in intra-EU trade-
on average an increase of 14 percentage points in exports of manufac-
tured  goods  and of 7.6  percentage  points  in  services  exports.  For 
imports, the increase is less significant- a rise of 6.7 percentage points 
in manufactures and of  3.1 percentage points in services. The tendency 
for this intra-EU trade to suffer under the impact of recession is  illus-
trated in Figure 6.2. 
The fact  that member states, on average,  evidently found it rather 
easier to sell  to each other,  but were,  relatively speaking, slightly less 
inclined to buy from each other may be a poor reflection on the com-
petitiveness and quality of  EU goods and services. But overall the single 
market programme gave trade integration a powerful push. In a perfect 
world, that is  one with perfect competition, maximised economies of 
scale  and so  on, the creation of the single market should have led to 
greater industrial specialisation by countries on the basis of  their respec-
tive comparative advantage - one country exporting predominantly in 
cars while another relies on its main export of  shirts. This would mean 
an increase of  'inter-industry' trade (ie one country's trade with another 
in a particular sector represents less than 10 per cent of  that other coun-
try's reciprocal trade flow in the same product). 
In fact, the trade increase between the member states has been quali-
tatively different. It is  'intra-industry' trade which has been increasing, 
that is trade within the same sector where countries engage in the simul-
taneous import and export of  similar product lines, for example, cars for 
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Table 6.1  Share ofintra-EU trade in total trade: manufacturing 
Source: Eurostat 
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lntra-EU export  lntra-EU import 
{share in o/o  vis-a-vis world) 
EUR  1985  42.6  46.9 
1995  50.2  50.0 
BLEU  1985  62.9  63.0 
1995  69.3  62.1 
DK  1985  28.6  44.3 
1995  31.3  39.2 
o~  1985  37.4  42.9 
1995  43.6  45.7 
GR  1985  43.2  44.1 
1995  50.1  49.6 
E  1985  57.8  48.3 
1995  69.2  60.5 
F  1985  39.4  43.4 
1995  46.0  47.5 
IRL  1985  61.1  62.4 
1995  59.7  59.9 
1985  53.2  49.7 
1995  54.0  50.6· 
NL  1985  53.6  51.6 
1995  59.5  54.3 
p  1985  49.4  51.0 
1995  70.3  71.7 
UK  1985  24.4  39.2 
1995  30.8  40.8 
I  1985: West Germany 
1995: Whole Germany 
Table 6.2  Share of  intra-EU trade in total trade: services 
Source: Eurostat 
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trade in goods 
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cars,  or shirts for shirts which are  differentiated by price and quality 
(expensive cars or brand-name shirts for less  expensive cars or shirts). 
This was probably the best thing which could have happened to the EU 
at this time. The specialisation which would have happened in inter-
industry trade would have meant some countries experienced contrac-
tions in certain sectors and expansion in others (for example, clothing 
vanishing in high labour cost countries and high-tech disappearing in 
countries with low skill levels).  With intra-industry trade, the adjust-
ments take place within firms  rather than among industries. The EU 
economy becomes  more diversified and therefore more able  to stand 
sector-specific shocks, such as sudden increases in the price of  raw mate-
rials. A shock like this would not affect one EU country more than any 
other - which is particularly important during the run-up to monetary 
union. 
The rise in intra-industry has been mainly due to an increase in trade 
of  differentiated products (from less than 35 per cent in 1985 to over 42 
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per  cent  in  1994)  whilst  intra-industry  trade  in  similar  products 
remained steady at around 20 per cent of  total intra-EU trade. 
In every member state, the last decade has seen a decline in the market 
share held by purely domestic firms. This expected result of  the assault 
on internal trade barriers is borne out by surveys of  polling, particularly 
in manufacturing. Some 28 per cent of  manufacturers, and 12 per cent 
of  service companies, told the Eurostat Business survey that the single 
market programme had contributed to their sales in other EU states. 
Significantly,  fears  that  trade  within  the  EU would  grow  at  the 
expense of  trade with the outside world have not been borne out. For a 
wide range of industrial sectors,  intra-EU imports as  a share of total 
demand in Europe rose from an average of  20.8 per cent in 1985-88 to 
an average 22.9 per cent in .1989-93. This indicates that EU states cre-
ated extra trade between themselves.  But they did not do this at the 
expense of  diverting trade away from the rest of  the world. 
As a share of final  consumption, extra-EU imports have  increased 
from 12 per cent in the period 1980-1984 to 14 per cent in the period 
1989-1993.
4 In areas where the single market programme has required 
changes  in  the  Community's  import  regime,  for  example,  where 
national quotas had to be replaced  by  common trade arrangements, 
these changes have been to the benefit of  producers from countries out-
side the EU. The EU's trade partners have benefited from the single 
market as much as European consumers who now have more choice at 
competitive prices. 
lntra-EU imports, expressed this time as a ratio of  total imports into 
Europe, stayed almost rock steady, moving only from an average of 60 
per cent in 1985-88 to 60.8 per cent in 1989-93.5 
Imports from both EU and non-EU countries have gained market 
share to varying degrees in EU industries and countries. For instance, in 
pharmaceuticals, the slice of the market held by domestic drug compa-
nies has fallen sharply in Italy, Belgium, Spain and Portugal-to the ben-
efit  of EU  and  non-EU  companies  alike.  Boiler  makers  have  lost 
domestic share in the UK, Italy and Spain to manufacturers from other 
EU states, but in Germany it is to non-EU firms that domestic manu-
facturers have ceded ground. In office machines and computers, domes-
tic  market  shares  have  generally  declined,  to  the  benefit  of 
non-European producers in France,  Belgium  and Ireland and of EU 
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producers in Spain. Indeed, non-European manufacturers have actually 
gained  in  some  areas,  like  telecommunications  and data processing, 
which are high-tech sectors and were typified by heavy regulation and 
discriminatory public procurement habits.
6  This shows that deregula-
tion has been good for everyone. 
Investment. Curiously, all this increased trade has not displaced for-
eign investment within the EU. With the prospect of  being able to sell 
their goods more freely around the EU, one might have imagined that 
many companies might be  tempted to supply the new single market 
from a single factory, even to the extent of  closing down other plants and 
dis-investing. In isolated cases,  this has happened. But, overall, foreign 
direct investment - both in terms of building greenfield plants from 
scratch and of mergers with, or acquisitions of,  existing companies -
rose sharply in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Such foreign investment 
doubled as a share of  total EU fixed asset investment, from a 2.8 per cent 
average in 1980-85 to 5.8 per cent in 1990-92. In 1992 the EU took 
in a full 50 per cent of all foreign direct investment in the world. Over 
half of  the total foreign assets of  US companies now lie in the EU. 
There seem to be several reasons for this investment surge. Investors 
were enticed by the prospect that the single market would make local 
firms more competitive as suppliers, and also by the prospect of  higher 
growth and income levels in Europe. They also appear to be attracted by 
the reduction in technical barriers and more open bidding for  public 
contracts. They now know that they can decide where to build a factory 
within the EU more on economic or market criteria and less  on the 
political need to be  present in a particular member state to have any 
hope of  winning a public contract in that country. 
Some foreign investment, especially by non-EU companies like the 
Japanese, may have been drawn in by worries over possible EU threats -
from dumping actions or local content rules - against direct imports. 
But such concerns have  obviously not troubled Europeans who, in a 
break with the past, are now investing more in each other's countries 
than in the outside world. 
In general, the smaller Benelux countries in the geographical core of 
the EU and Ireland, Spain and Portugal on its periphery were the main 
gainers of foreign  investment coming from other EU states. The UK 
remained the dominant destination for  investment arriving from out-
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side the EU (with 37 per cent of  all investment placed in Europe by non-
European firms in 1990-93). Detailed analysis of  the pattern of  invest-
ment in the UK and Germany showed that the existence of the single 
market programme led the UK to raise its foreign direct investment in 
other EU states by $15bn by 1992, or 31  per cent of  its overall stock of 
investment in the EU, while Germany increased its foreign direct invest-
ment in the EU by $6bn by 1992, or nearly 7 per cent of  its total invest-
ment in Europe. 
In manufacturing, there was one sector - foodstuffs - where foreign 
investment rose much faster  than intra-EU trade. This was  evidently 
because food producers felt they needed to be present in local markets 
to adapt products and marketing to local tastes. Elsewhere, investment 
has tended to reflect different comparative advantages, going, in north-
ern countries, mainly into engineering,  transport and machinery sec-
tors,  and,  in  the  south,  chiefly  into  textiles,  clothing,  timber  and 
furniture. 
However, the bulk of  foreign investment went into services, because 
they are the fastest growing part of the European economy and because 
they are often still more easily supplied via a local branch or office than 
sold across borders. A significant portion of  the extra UK and German 
investment was in financial services elsewhere in the EU. Some of this 
'non-producing'  investment was  also  made  by  manufacturers  them-
selves, setting up R&D centres to track local market developments more 
closely, or to ensure the after-sales servicing of their goods, such as the 
setting up of  dealerships to service cars. 
Much of  this investment took the form of mergers and acquisitions. 
These soared in the late 1980s, declined slightly in 1991-92 and then 
picked  up  again  (see  Figure 6.3).  Some of this  increase  came  in  the 
number of  deals made across EU borders, which in 1995 were running 
at three times their rate in 1986-88. However, some 60 per cent of all 
mergers and acquisitions still take place within a single member state. By 
country, France and Italy saw the biggest relative increase in mergers and 
acquisitions  involving a company in another member state,  but the 
absolute level of  deal-making remained highest in the UK. During this 
period  of implementing  the  single  market,  British  companies  were 
involved in no less than 58 per cent of  all intra-EU mergers and acqui-
sitions. 
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Figure 6.3  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions where a 
Community firm is the target (total number of  events) 
As  we  have seen in the individual cases of the UK and Germany, the 
single market programme was probably the major spur for companies to 
go  on this buying spree.  In addition to holding out the carrot of an 
expanded  commercial  marketplace,  it has  encouraged  the  freer  and 
more integrated capital market that has made mergers and acquisitions 
easier to arrange financially. 
Capitalliberalisation. The removal of  national controls on the move-
ment of money- agreed in 1988, in force for most member states by 
1990 and for all of  them by 1994 - has paved the way for both the single 
market  and for  economic  and monetary  union  (Emu).  It abolishes 
restrictions which, ironically, disappeared in the early days of  the Com-
munity, only to return in the 1970s when the Bretton Woods monetary 
system broke down and countries tried to stabilise the value of  their cur-
rencies by stemming outflows. 
Freedom  to move  money around is  essential if people  are  to  take 
advantage of  cross-border financial services or to buy foreign shares: the 
right to buy an insurance policy in another country is  useless  if you 
cannot move the money to pay the premium to the company in ques-
tion.  Today  money  moves  around  the  EU  freely,  or  almost  freely. 
Member states can still retain the right to restrict certain cross-border 
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capital transactions, if  they lodge reservations with the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD),  the  Paris-based 
group of the world's  major industrialised countries  to which all  EU 
states belong. 
Some ten EU states have entered such reservations against freedom of 
establishment and operation by foreign branches of  banks and insurance 
companies. These apply equally to third countries as  well as  to other 
member states; none applies to other member states alone. In general, 
companies consider the freedom to move capital around the Commu-
nity to be largely achieved. Indeed in some countries, like Greece, they 
rate capitalliberalisation as one of  the 'single market' measures with the 
most impact on their economy. But a few barriers to a completely free 
capital market remain. France and Portugal limit access to government 
debt or bond markets to local or selected banks, and in the UK, Ger-
many  and  France  foreign  institutions  must  issue  mortgage  bonds 
through a local operation. But it is important to see this in a global con-
text.  In fact,  the  overall  number of reservations  to  the  OECD by 
member states  is  low (an average of 3.5  reservations).  Capital moves 
more freely within the EU than it does between the EU and the rest of 
the world and there are fewer restrictions inside the EU than in the US 
andJapan.
7 
Concentration. Because some companies have bought each other up, 
while others just grew internally by extending output and sales,  the 
result has been a smaller number of  bigger players in many sectors. 
Concentration, as measured by the market share of  the top four sup-
pliers, has not changed much in national markets, indicating that many 
companies with perhaps less of  a competitive edge or with less access to 
the money to finance takeovers, have at least held onto their own turf. 
At the EU level,  however, concentration had increased markedly. The 
share taken by the leading four manufacturers, averaged across industry 
as a while, rose from 20.5 to 22.8 per cent over the 1987-93 period. 
But as Table 6.3 shows, this concentration ratio jumped by more than 
6 percentage points from 32.9 to 38.9 per cent for sectors carrying out 
a lot of  R&D. These industries, like telecoms and transport equipment, 
some processed food, and electrical machinery and appliances, are either 
particularly sensitive  to  the single  market  programme  (through,  for 
instance, the opening up of  public procurement), or they present oppor-
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Industry type:  CR4 in 1987  CR4 in 1993 
(%)  (%) 
Unweighted average for total 
manufacturing  20.5  22.8 
Conventional industries  13.2  14.4 
Advertising-intensive industries  22.3  23.6 
Technology-intensive industries  32.9  38.9 
Industries with both high advertising  30.1  32.4 
and R&D expenditure 
Table 6.3  Evolution of  concentration at EU level 
(measured by share of  market held by top 4 firms (CR4)) 
Source: EAG, Davies &  Lyons (1996) 
Change in 
CR4 
(87-93) 
2.3 
1.2 
1.3 
6.0 
2.3 
tunities for economies of  scale that larger companies have clearly seized 
(see also Table 6.4). 
The ever-narrowing spectrum of suppliers of railway rolling stock is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 6.4 in an industry which is in fact only 
a relatively moderate spender on R&D. The moves by non-EU groups 
like Nestle of  Switzerland to buy EU companies like Perrier and Rown-
tree, or Philip Morris of  the US to buy Suchard, demonstrate the desire 
of  managers to spread the high costs of  advertising consumer foodstuffs 
across a wide range of  products. 
The white goods industry straddles both categories in the sense that 
the  refrigerators  and washing  machines  which it makes  for  Europe's 
kitchens require both R&D and promotion. It has  seen  considerable 
compression. In 1985, some 150 companies supplied 75 per cent of  the 
European market;  by  1990  15  groups  controlled 80 per cent of the 
market; by 1995 seven groups had 86 per cent of  the market.
8 
Pointing in the same direction, but far less dramatically, is the change 
in the car industry. The top three car manufacturers, as well as the top 
ten manufacturers, have seen their collective market share rise by a bit 
more than one per cent between 1989 and 1994. In a minority of  cases, 
the  number of EU-wide players  has  increased.  The market for  con-
struction equipment has become more fragmented.  Its top five  manu-
facturers held 50.3 per cent in 1988, but only 42.7 per cent by 1994.
9 
This sector is similar to railway rolling stock with medium level R&D 
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Figure 6.4  Evolution of  Europe's three leading suppliers 
Source: Advertising 
and hardly any advertising.  But there are fewer  natural economies of 
scale in this industry where equipment is often tailored to the specifica-
tions of  individual construction companies. As a result, smaller special-
ist firms have held their own in niches of  the market, which has also seen 
the arrival of  new entrants from Japan and Korea. 
Price convergence. In a perfectly unified and perfectly competitive 
market, there would be a single price, or at least series of  single prices per 
90 The 'New Look' Market 
Growth in size  Concentration 
%growth 1986-91  Mean national  EU level (C4EU) 
at nationallevd  change (C4NAT) 
Industry  Firm  Industry  1986-92  1987 
Type 1  Homogeneous goods  3.2  1.8  -0.3  12.3 
Type 2a  High advertising  14.3  3.5  1.3  21.1 
intensity 
Type 2r  High R&D intensity  -0.7  0.2  -1.9  31.6 
Type 2ar  High R&D and  -3.9  2.3  1.3  34.8 
advertising 
intensity 
All  -0.1  19.7 
Table 6.4  Changes in size and concentration by industry type 
Source: Scale economies 
Notes: 
1.  All means are simple arithmetic averages. 
1993 
16.5 
23.5 
38.9 
37.2 
23.8 
2.  'Mean national' refers to the simple means of Belgium, France, Germany and the 
UK; for France the time period is 1985-92, for Germany it is 1987-93, and for 
Belgium it is 1986-91. 
3.  Changes in concentration ratios refer to percentage points. 
sector. This has dearly not yet happened across  the EU. But over the 
1989-93 period, prices for a given  product or service,  have generally 
tended to converge (see model simulation figures in Chapters 4 and 5).
10 
The trend has  been more marked in consumer and equipment goods 
than for energy and construction and some services where the spread in 
prices  actually  increased.  This  is  because  consumer  and  equipment 
goods are more heavily traded across borders and are more open to com-
petition from non-EU imports than energy, pharmaceuticals, construc-
tion  and  services  where  trade  is  still  limited  or  prices  sometimes 
regulated. Of  the ten product/service categories in which there was the 
widest price spread in 1993, four are  related to health care,  reflecting 
national price controls in this areas. 
Among consumer goods,  there is  a difference.  The price spread is 
smaller for homogeneous goods like clothes or shoes where competition 
is mainly on price. It is wider for goods like heavy household appliances 
which require considerable spending on R&D and advertising {itself a 
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barrier to entry into the market) and which are sold as much on quality 
and brand as price. Where lots of  advertising is built into a product, like 
alcohol, coffee, tea and confectionery, price disparities around the EU 
remain (see Table 6.5). 
1980  1985  1990  1993 
Inc.  Exd.  Inc.  Exd.  Inc.  Exd.  Inc.  Exd. 
VAT  VAT  VAT  VAT  VAT  VAT  VAT  VAT 
EU-6 
Consumer goods  15.9  15.7  14.2  14.2  13.5  13.4  12.4  12.6 
Services  22.7  23.1  23.9  24.6  20.0  20.2  21.3  21.7 
Energy  18.4  17.2  12.5  10.4  19.4  18.8  24.3  23.4 
EU-9 
Consumer goods  19.9  18.8  19.1  17.7  20.3  18.5  18.0  16.6 
Services  25.2  25.7  25.6  25.2  24.6  23.7  23.4  23.3 
Energy  22.1  20.5  16.1  13.3  24.7  22.6  30.6  27.4 
EU-12 
Consumer goods  - - - - 22.8  21.8  19.6  18.4 
Services  - - - - 31.8  30.9  28.6  28.4 
Energy  - - - - 28.0  26.8  31.7  24.7 
EU-15 
Consumer goods  - - - - 25.9  24.6  19.6  18.4 
Services  - - - - 35.9  37.4  28.1  28.4 
Energy  - - - - 27.5  26.3  31.9  30.7 
Table 6.5  Coefficients of  price variation for selected groupings (based 
on prices incl. and excl. VAT) 
Source: DR] 
Price convergence takes time. It is evident that from the above table that 
the longer a country has  been in the EU, the nearer its prices match 
those of its  partners.  So  the price differentials existing in  1993 were 
smaller for the original six signatories of  the Treaty of  Rome than for the 
EU of  nine, smaller for the EU of  nine than for the EU of  12, and so on. 
But the single market appears to have brought a slight acceleration of 
this narrowing of  prices over time. Different levels and changes in VAT 
do not appear to have distorted general price trends, and they exert less 
influence  on price  differentials  than exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Car 
prices,  for  example,  were  converging until  1993 when exchange  rate 
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movements forced  them apart again,  particularly in countries whose 
currencies were more loosely linked to the exchange rate mechanism. 
In theory, arbitrageurs should be able to close the price gap by trad-
ing in parallel with established distribution networks and buying goods 
in cheap markets and selling them in expensive ones. In practice, they 
still run up against considerable resistance from established distribution 
networks when they are dealing in products like cars or pharmaceuticals. 
However, fear of this parallel trade may prove a valuable discipline. A 
number of  pharmaceutical companies claim to aim at a common launch 
price across Europe for their new drugs, precisely in order to avoid par-
allel trade, but they add that this effort is often quickly undermined by 
differing  inflation  and  exchange  rates  so  that pharmaceutical  prices 
rapidly diverge, even before governments start imposing differing levels 
of  control. 
Notes 
1  Distribution. 
2  Trade Patterns. 
3  Air Transport. 
4  Competition. 
5  Competition. 
6  Competition. 
7  Capital Markets 
8  Price convergence. 
9  Construction. 
10  Price convergence. 
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Competition and 
Competitiveness 
This chapter examines the impact on companies of the single market 
programme, and whether and with what success they have reacted to it 
by improving their efficiency or by finding various ways of  blunting the 
impact of  competition. 
These questions are important, because most of the gains from the 
single market programme were expected to come from  injecting new 
dynamism into Europe's companies, giving them the opportunity and 
the incentive to gear production up for the larger market and forcing 
them to innovate more. For there is a handicap to be overcome. Europe 
still spends less of  its GDP on R &  D, 2 per cent, compared to 2.7 per 
cent in the US and Japan, and has proportionately fewer researchers and 
engineers, than the US  and Japan, where the cost of filing and main-
taining patents is also less than in Europe. 
1 
That companies have felt the winds of competition more keenly is 
clear from various business surveys. 
Table 7.1  illustrates the clear perception by a majority of businesses 
that they now face  more  rivalry from  domestic,  European and non-
European companies in their markets, both in terms of price and the 
quality of  goods and services. Within that overall perception, the table 
also shows that manufacturers detect relatively more new arrivals from 
other EU states in their sector than do service companies, who see more 
home-grown competition through national as well as EU deregulation 
of their sector. This squares with what we know statistically- that the 
EU market in manufactures is more integrated than that in services. 
By sector, it appears from other polling evidence that competition is 
95 The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
felt keenly in transport equipment, electrical machinery, textiles, food 
and beverages but hardly at all in non-metallic mineral products. Finan-
cial services reported themselves under competitive pressure from other 
EU states, while in road haulage, construction and business services the 
rivalry was more from domestic competitors. By country, companies on 
the EU periphery-mainly Irish, Spanish and Greek-reported that new 
competition was mostly from within the Union, while manufacturers in 
the two biggest national markets - Germany and France - felt them-
selves most exposed to competition from the outside world. 
Manufacturing  Services 
Classification  Increase  No change  Decrease  Increase  No change  Decrease 
No of  competitors 
Domestic firms  25  64  11  30  63  7 
Other EU owned firms  39  59  2  21  77  2 
Non-EU owned firms  25  74  2  9  88  2 
Price competition 
Domestic firms  44  51  42  37  60  3 
Other EU owned firms  41  55  4  16  81  3 
Non-EU owned firmS"  29  67  4  9  87  3 
Quality competition 
Domestic firms  33  64  3  27  69  4 
Other EU owned firms  29  69  2  14  83  3 
Non-EU owned firms  18  79  3  8  89  3 
Table 7.1  Change in competition level on the domestic market in 
recent years 
Profit margins. As  a result of new competition, companies generally 
now have to strive a bit harder to make a living and to trim their profit 
margins. This emerges clearly from studies into price-cost margins. This 
can be calculated by taking the added value of  a company's output, sub-
tracting its labour costs, and then expressing the remainder as .a share of 
its sales. The resulting price-cost margins are a good gauge of the prof-
itability of  companies and also of  their market power. For instance, if a 
96 Competition and Competitiveness 
company has considerable market power - either through the quality of 
its products or equally through barriers that keep its competitors out or 
place them at a disadvantage- then it can just pass on cost increases in 
raw materials or labour in the form of  higher prices to its customers and 
keep  its  price-cost  margin high.  If,  on the other hand, a company's 
power to dictate prices to the marketplace is weakened - as one would 
expect from the single market programme- then it has to absorb cost 
increases itself, and its price-cost margin dips. 
It is now clear that the single market programme has had a positive 
effect on competition. Efficiency gains have in fact been passed on to 
consumers, particularly for manufactured goods. Without this, it is esti-
mated that profit margins would have grown by another 1 per cent per 
year. This competitive pressure on profits has been greatest in 'high tech' 
public procurement (see Figure 7.1  below)  and sectors most sheltered 
from competition before 1993, such as consumer electronics, cars, tex-
tiles and clothing. 
The difficulty is that, overall, price-cost margins are also heavily influ-
enced by general swings in the economy. But if Figure 7.1  is corrected 
to iron out the ups and downs of  the economic cycle, then the general 
trend becomes an annual decline of an average 0.2 per cent, or a full2 
per cent over the past decade. 
0.165....--------------------------, 
0.155  -------------------------------------------------------------------
0.145  ---------------------·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------·····-------------·- ................  . 
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92 
Figure 7.1  Price-cost margins, 1980-92 
97 The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
This trend happens to be matched by the behaviour of price-cost mar-
gins in sectors like office equipment, data processing systems, telecom-
munications  and  medical  equipment.  These  are  classically  products 
which are bought by governments in large quantities and where barriers 
to free competition were highest before the single market programme. 
Margins here have fallen by an average 0.2 per cent a year, though from 
an average margin that a decade ago was as high as 14 per cent. 
2 In other 
sectors  which  were  plagued  by  technical  barriers,  such  as  electrical 
equipment, or sectors heavily regulated at the national level,  such as 
pharmaceuticals and railway rolling stock, margins have shown an aver-
age decline of  up to 0.15 per cent a year. 
Costs. The majority of manufacturers - irrespective of their size -
believe that the single market programme has had no impact on unit 
costs of their production, with the minority seeing a decrease almost 
exactly offset by those reporting an increase in unit costs. This emerges 
from the Business Survey (see Appendix B). But among larger manufac-
turers, more report lower rather than higher costs. And this trend con-
tinues  until  one  reaches  the  category  of firms  with  less  than  50 
employees. It is the fact that there are so many more small firms than big 
ones which makes the overall total look so neutral (see Table 7.2). 
But there is no doubt - because they say so - that many small manu-
facturers have found the costs of  adapting to new single market Direc-
tives  quite high.  These are  'one-off' costs,  which involve  a manager 
getting to grips with new EU legislation and its implications for equip-
ment specifications, instructing his or her workforce, and redesigning 
the equipment.  Single  market legislation  has  not generally  imposed 
extra recurring production costs, except where in relatively rare cases it 
is  clearly more demanding than most of the national rules it replaces, 
such as EU environmental protection laws which particularly affect the 
chemical industry. Yet, the 'one off' cost and 'hassle' of  adapting to EU 
measures  can seem high to smaller companies.  Because  they are  less 
likely to be involved in trade or use  relatively few services,  they have 
found fewer offsetting benefits flowing from the removal of  border con-
trols and deregulation of  telecommunications and financial services. 
Prices. There is no general trend in the level of final prices that one 
can firmly attribute to the single market programme. As we have seen, 
inflation - the rate at which prices rise - has steadied and declined in 
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Decrease  No change  Increase 
EUR-12  15  53  14 
More than 1,000 employees  26  55  7 
500 to 999 employees  22  57  9 
200 to 499 employees  21  53  8 
50 to 199 employees  16  56  13 
20 to 49 employees  12  51  17 
Table 7.2  Impact of  the single market programme on enterprises' unit 
costs by size: manufacturing sector 
Europe. Although the cycle of the general economy and monetary and 
demand-management policies in individual member states are bound to 
have had their own effects, simulations using data from various studies 
suggest that inflation rates were nevertheless 1.2 per cent lower in 1994 
than they would have been without the single market programme. This 
figure might have been higher without the recession. 
Prices  in some sectors - telecoms equipment, electrical machinery, 
rail locomotives and wagons - have fallen  dramatically, sometimes by 
20-40 per cent. Some of  these price falls are due to the changed behav-
iour of public procurement authorities who have thereby saved them-
selves  and their taxpayers money.  But recession, over-capacity (supply 
exceeding demand) and technological invention have also played a role. 
Companies' room for manoeuvre to reduce prices was, as we have seen, 
often constrained by their thinner profit or price-cost margins. For the 
sectors benefiting from improvements in distribution across EU borders 
stemming from the single market programme, there should probably 
have been more price reductions than consumers actually saw in the 
shops. But to the extent that distributors passed on their efficiency gains 
in lower charges to retailers, retailers may have often kept the savings to 
themselves to boost their own profit margins. 
Pro-competitive behaviour. To judge from companies' own views of 
the single market impact on their own strategies, it has led them to focus 
more on buying a wider range of  inputs, making their prices more com-
petitive and developing new products and services rather than striking 
new cross-border alliances,  setting up production plants in other EU 
states or buying up other companies (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). 
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Important'  Little or no  Don't know 
importance 
Purchase of  raw materials from other 
EU markets  42  45 
Pricing  37  48 
Penetration of  EU markets  37  46 
R&D of  new products  36  47 
More specialised products  30  52 
Distribution networks in other EU markets  30  49 
Pan-European labelling and packaging  30  48 
Cooperation agreements with other 
companies  18  47 
Establishment of  production plants in other 
EU countries  16  54 
Direct investment in other companies  16  50 
Purchase of  financial services from other 
EU markets  12  62 
Table 7.3  Importance of  the single market programme to the 
development of  the strategy of  enterprises in recent years: 
manufacturing sector 
Sum of'very important' and 'quite important'. 
Weighted by number of  employees. Percentages. 
13 
15 
17 
17 
18 
21 
22 
35 
30 
34 
26 
Impo~t
1  Little or no  Don't know 
importance 
Development of  new products/ 
services  31  38 
More specialised products/  services  29  37 
Pricing  29  39 
Efficiency in the provision of 
products/  services  29  37 
Increase in cross-border provision of 
services  23  39 
Establishment of  operations in other 
EU states  19  40 
Direct investment in other companies  16  39 
Purchase of  financial services from 
other EU markets  10  46 
Table 7.4  Importance of  the single market programme to the 
development of  the strategy of  enterprises in recent years: service 
sector 
Sum of  'very important' and 'quite important'. 
Weighted by number of  employees. Percentages. 
100 
31 
34 
32 
34 
38 
41 
45 
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Certainly, it seems true that companies are  now seeking to provide a 
wider range of goods and services to customers, in compensation per-
haps for their reluctance to pass on any cost savings in lower prices. Like-
wise, a general decline in cross-border alliances fits with the logic of  the 
single market which makes it easier for companies to trade around the 
EU from their home base. Indeed, the reciprocal marketing agreements 
which EU companies made purely within the EU declined - from 24 
per cent in 1986 to 17 per cent in 1993 - as a share of  the total number 
of their corporate alliances world-wide.
3 By contrast, they have entered 
into more such agreements with the rest of  the world, particularly with 
eastern Europe of  late. 
A company can often make savings, or economies of  scale, when by 
extending its production run it can reduce its average  unit costs as  a 
share of its overhead costs. It was  thought that large benefits from the 
single market would come from companies exploiting their potential 
scale economies. But, generally,  they have not. The implication of the 
Business survey is that companies say they have concentrated more on 
internal rather than external growth but this does not square with the 
recent wave of  mergers and acquisitions. Nor is their claimed emphasis 
on internal growth consistent with evidence that most EU companies 
are still failing to realise the full potential of  scale economies that can be 
made in their sector. Companies seem to be claiming that they are grasp-
ing the nettle of  economies of  scale when, in fact, they are going for the 
'soft option' of  mergers and acquisitions in order to stay profitable. 
Economies of scale vary from  sector to sector,  depending on over-
heads, technology and inputs. Using engineering estimates of  what con-
stitutes a minimum efficient  technical scale of production, and then 
comparing it with the average size of  companies' actual market in rela-
tion to EU markets as a whole, research reveals that 47 out of  53 major 
industrial sectors in Europe still show unexploited scale economies. And 
this unexploited opportunity may be growing, not diminishing. In sev-
eral sectors-which were thought to be at the same time particularly sen-
sitive to single market changes and particularly rich in opportunities for 
scale economies, the average size of firms in terms of gross value added 
shrank by 11 per cent in 1981-86 and a further 13 per cent in 1986-91
4
• 
The reason for this puzzling trend may be the introduction of new 
technologies or working methods, which would reduce the importance 
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of  long production runs for these products. Ironically, for other sectors 
where scale economies were considered less important and which were 
thought to have only limited sensitivity to the single market changes, the 
average size of  firms grew. In fact, changes in firm size seem to have more 
to do with the nature of competition in each industry than any direct 
effect  of the  single  market  programme.  But,  overall,  the  European 
Union has benefited from gains in efficiency and competition due to the 
single market programme, mostly as a result of exploiting scale advan-
tages  related  to  investments  in  marketing,  brand  development  and 
R&D. 
The  climate  for  European  companies'  competitiveness  could  be 
enhanced by the right adjustments to company law. Cross-border merg-
ers are still hampered by legal problems and the organisation and admin-
istration of a firm  trying to  operate as  a truly European company is 
anything but simple (see Chapter II). 
Anti-competitive  behaviour.  This  should  be  distinguished  from 
uncompetitive behaviour. Companies can decide - usually to their detri-
ment - not to compete or expand, rather to stay at home and count on 
customers staying loyal to unchanged products or services. Or compa-
nies can decide to compete on a very selective front by tailoring their 
products to very specific markets or abandoning some of their existing 
product or service range to new lower-cost suppliers and inventing new 
products or services. But this is, of  course, competitive behaviour; it just 
happens  not to be  the full-throated corporate response  to  the single 
market that many people hoped for. 
In contrast, anti-competitive behaviour takes the form of  a company 
or industry trying to distort the rules of  the game to its own advantage 
or to side-step or reverse single market legislation in particular and EU 
treaties in general. It  was to be expected that some would find the winds 
of  competition ushered in by the single market programme too chilly for 
comfort, and would seek to find shelter from them. In EU integration, 
as in nature, each action brings a reaction. Indeed, the anti-competitive 
reaction to the single market programme by some companies and indus-
tries, and to a lesser extent by governments through their provisions of 
state  aid  to  industry,  constitutes  a  back-handed  tribute  to  the  pro-
gramme's effectiveness5• 
While it is true that the Commission has been more vigilant against 
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anti-competitive practices in recent years, these practices may also have 
multiplied in reaction to the single market. Here are some examples: 
•  the Commission carried out investigations of alleged price-fixing 
cartels involving polypropylene (1986), milk quotas (1986), roof-
ing felt  (1986),  flat  glass  (1988),  thermoplastics  (1988),  welded 
steel  mesh  (1989), soda ash  (1990), storage facilities  (1992), the 
construction  industry  (1992),  customs  agents  (1993),  elevators 
(1993), and steel beams, cement and carton board, all in 1994; 
•  the  Commission  has  also  acted  against  moves  by  companies  to 
reseal  borders ostensibly opened up by the single market in cases 
involving pharmaceuticals, farm machinery, a number of  consumer 
products  like  tennis  balls,  fountain  pens,  photo  film,  alcoholic 
drinks and cars. In the latter case, for instance, the Commission has 
allowed car dealers to retain their territorial rights while gradually 
reducing the exclusivity of  their franchises and permitting individ-
uals to trade cars in parallel with dealers; 
•  utilities or service providers have often tried to deny competitors 
access  to basic assets like energy grids, telecoms and broadcasting 
networks or sea ports and airports. One of the aims of liberalising 
utilities is to crack down on this abuse. 
Some forms of  corporate behaviour in the single market can be ambigu-
ous. Take joint ventures and cooperative agreements. These are gener-
ally  a laudable  form  of cross-border  integration.  They can  enhance 
competition and service, especially if they bring together complemen-
tary assets and activities, such as those between the makers of TV pro-
grammes and the owners of the cables  to carry the programmes into 
people's sitting rooms. But joint ventures can also restrict competition, 
especially if  the activities or assets are similar or identical. We have seen 
that the number of cross-border agreements involving EU companies 
only has declined, as cross-border trade has grown freer. But there is still 
a worryingly high ratio of marketing alliances  between companies in 
exactly the same  product line.  In 1986-93 such agreements between 
'rivals' constituted around 70 per cent of  the total. 
Europe has enough natural divisions and segments within its single 
market,  created by  language,  culture, different national tastes,  habits 
and loyalties,  without companies artificially adding to them.  Instead, 
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the challenge for companies, large and small, is to grasp the new oppor-
tunities which continue to be offered by the single market. 
Notes 
Green Paper on Innovation, European Commission, 1995. 
Competition. 
Competition. 
Competition. 
Annual Reports on Competition, European Commission. 
Scale Economies, 1996. 
104 Chapter 8 
Growth, Jobs and 
Cohesion 
The acceleration in economic integration fuelled by the single market 
programme has made the European Union richer.' But by how much? 
The question is far from easy to answer - even on a theoretical level. 
According to economic theory, integration can boost growth in several 
ways. A freer flow of  goods, capital and labour leads to a more efficient 
allocation of these resources around the EU. This may only produce a 
short-term increase to the level of output per head, an increase which 
would  tail  off as  the  European  economy settles  down  into  its  new, 
though more efficient, equilibrium. However, in addition to producing 
this static effect,  there is  also  the potential for integration to trigger a 
series  of dynamic effects  in the economy.  Individuals and companies 
would  respond  to higher  incomes  and  increased  rates  of return  on 
investment by saving and investing more. A bigger, freer and more com-
petitive market would increase the level and quality of research, devel-
opment and technical innovation. 
Some of  these assumptions lay behind earlier estimates
1 that the single 
market programme - provided it was fully implemented and supported 
by expansive  macro-economic policies  - could in the medium term 
(technically defined as six years)  boost the EU's level of  GDP by some-
where between 3.2 to 5.5 per cent over that period. With only half of 
that time elapsed (1993 to 1995), it is now estimated that the increase 
in GOP is  between  1 per cent and  1.5  per cent above  the level  that 
would have been achieved without the single market programme. But, 
theoretically at least, it is equally possible that the impact of the single 
market, bringing with it increased competition, might for some compa-
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nies reduce the incentives to sink money into research and innovation 
on which they might never see a return. So, it is not possible to say that 
all the effects of  the single market programme point in the direction of 
increased economic growth. 
Nor, of course, is  it easy to strip out all  the other factors  that have 
affected the European economy over the last decade, such as liberalisa-
tion of  international trade, fluctuations in commodity prices and polit-
ical changes, notably the changes taking place in the central and eastern 
European  countries  and the  Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The incorporation of  eastern Germany into the German Federal Repub-
lic boosted east German demand for goods from western Germany and 
other EU states, but eventually triggered inflation that led to a monetary 
tightening by the Bundesbank and other central  banks.  And for  the 
newer members of  the Union accession effects have also been extremely 
important. 
But it is possible to try to 'control' for these factors by comparing the 
EU's growth record with that of its main partners, the US and Japan, 
which were subject to many of these broad economic trends, such as 
falling oil prices or the 1987 stock market crash, but not to the single 
market  programme.  (The  North American  Free  Trade  Agreement, 
affecting the US, only came into force in 1995.) Plotting annual average 
growth  in  terms  of gross  value  added  per head  over  two  periods -
1975-87 and 1987-93, the EU-12 grew faster  in the second period 
than in the first, slightly ahead of  Japan's growth increase, while the US 
growth average fell. 
The differences are small but they become larger if  the change in aver-
age growth is compounded over time. So, if  you look along the columns 
in Table 8.1 on p107 you will·see that by 1993, EU-12 output per capita 
was  1.1  per cent higher than it would have been if the European econ-
omy had  continued to  expand  at  its  pre-1987  rate,  while Japanese 
output was only 0.2 per cent higher and US output around 2 per cent 
lower on the same basis. This tends to be supported by model simula-
tions which show the same result of  1.1 per cent for 1994. This may not 
sound much until you equate it to Ecus - in the range of 60 bn to 80 
bn. It is as if  an income the size of  Portugal's (with a GOP ofEcu 75 bn 
in 1994) had been added to the Union. 
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o/o pa  pp  Cumulative impact (per cent) 
1975-87  1987-93  Difference  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
UK  1.82  0.38  -1.44  2.63  5.54  5.59  3.86  -0.23  -2.88 
PO  1.74  3.55  1.81  3.08  4.89  7.96  15.39  15.96  15.00 
NL  0.88  2.00  1.12  -0.34  0.73  3.90  6.42  7.00  6.63 
LX  2.20  2.59  0.39  -0.05  3.10  6.43  6.08  6.16  5.02 
IT  2.41  1.50  -0.91  0.55  2.01  2.38  1.89  0.41  -1.46 
IR  1.73  8.60  6.87  3.97  8.46  19.00  23.78  29.88  38.78 
FR  1.64  1.42  -0.22  0.18  2.56  4.66  4.49  3.16  2.18 
ES  0.85  2.40  1.55  4.66  8.72  12.40  14.98  16.18  15.85 
EL  1.37  1.17  -0.20  -2.03  0.83  3.20  0.26  0.94  0.00 
ow  1.90  2.60  0.70  -0.44  0.76  1.46  4.82  6.85  5.80 
OK  2.15  0.95  -1.20  -1.98  -3.02  -4.64  -5.52  -6.94  -8.02 
BE  1.59  2.12  0.53  0.32  3.29  4.81  6.17  6.52  6.49 
North Italy  2.53  1.67  -0.86  0.44  2.27  2.83  2.40  0.50  -0.92 
South Italy  2.27  1.17  -1.10  0.90  1.29  1.07  0.31  0.03  -3.24 
Non-obl Spain  1.13  2.36  1.23  4.24  8.28  12.21  14.15  14.88  13.98 
Obl Spain  0.64  2.45  1.81  5.03  9.02  12.34  15.52  17.15  17.34 
EU12  1.72  1.78  0.06  0.84  2.98  4.31  5.25  4.75  3.59 
EU6  1.85  1.96  0.11  0.03  1.74  3.04  4.30  4.38  3.29 
EU9  1.84  1.68  -0.16  0.54  2.47  3.52  4.15  3.42  2.13 
73 entrants  1.83  0.75  -1.08  2.20  4.78  5.02  3.61  0.15  -1.88 
new entrants  1.00  2.39  1.39  3.34  7.00  10.41  12.90  13.99  13.51 
Obl  1.05  2.87  1.82  3.38  7.09  10.96  13.62  15.08  15.32 
Japan  3.15  3.18  0.03  0.44  3.05  4.18  5.49  6.07  3.88 
us  1.53  0.72  -0.81  0.58  1.99  2.16  0.98  -2.78  -2.68 
Table 8.1  Gross value added per capita growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend 
Sources: CE's E3ME database, based on Eurostat Cronos, OECD. 
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-0.93 
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11.53 
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-0.14 
-0.48 
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13.96 
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Employment. Caught in the recessionary cycle of the early 1990s, the 
EU has  seen unemployment rise.  But, overall,  the single market pro-
gramme marginally helped counter the effect of recession. Various cal-
culations have been carried out and all of them suggest a positive net 
addition to jobs.  Only the scale of the benefit varies  - from  around 
300,000 to 900,000 depending on the simulation models used.  More 
job opportunities have been accompanied by higher take-home pay of 
0.4 per cent per annum as  a result of the single market programme.
2 
What we are seeing is the result of  this positive impact partly cancelled 
out by negative effects such as recession and some job losses in certain 
sectors.  In the manufacturing sector,  productivity improvements and 
restructuring may have resulted in net job losses but the single market 
has more than compensated by stimulating growth and employment in 
services. There is some evidence that this beneficial impact is accumu-
lating. Over the longer term, therefore, the positive effect of the single 
market programme on jobs may be  larger yet,  as  rationalisation and 
restructuring - made all  the more necessary for  being long delayed -
produce leaner and fitter companies and as the economy recovers from 
recession. 
Taking manufacturing alone, the single market programme may have 
caused a drop in overall employment of 0.53 per cent by  1993.3  By 
country,  the  EU  measures  appear  to  have  boosted  manufacturing 
employment by 5.11 per cent in Ireland, by 1.5 in Spain and Portugal 
and by 0.76 per cent in the UK and Belgium. In contrast, Germany, 
Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  Italy  are  estimated  to  have  lost, 
respectively, by 2.51, 2.67, 1.89 and 1.04 per cent more manufacturing 
jobs than they would have done if  the single market programme had not 
been  implemented.  Most  of the  evidence  suggests  that  low-cost 
economies  benefited  at  the  expense  of high-cost  economies,  even 
though Belgium can hardly be called a low cost industrial producer, nor 
Italy a high cost one. But one of  the overall results of  the single market 
has been, as  we have seen,  to accelerate structural change towards ser-
vices,  particularly cross-border services, and here the employment pic-
ture is positive for higher cost economies. 
It is scarcely easier to calculate the single market's impact on employ-
ment in individual sectors, because so  many other factors  are at play. 
Employment  in  pharmaceuticals,  for  instance,  fell  from  its  peak of 
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425,000 in 1992 to 397,000 in 1994.4 But the single market measures 
have barely touched this sector which is still fragmented by the policies 
and price controls of national governments. These job losses are more 
the result of  the global restructuring of  the pharmaceutical industry in a 
series  of mega-mergers.  However,  econometric studies show that the 
single market may have triggered job losses  in plastics, rubber, indus-
trial and agricultural machinery, while at the same time producing par-
tially  offsetting  job  gains  in  ferrous  and  non-ferrous  metals,  metal 
products, textiles,  clothing and shoes. Employment in these last three 
sectors has shifted markedly from higher to lower cost economies within 
the EU. 
In-depth research into some sectors raises the prospect of  a 'J-curve' 
effect,  in which employment dips initially but rises  higher later.  The 
telecoms equipment sector lost 150,000 jobs between 1989 and 1994. 
Without the single market, the loss might have been limited to 100,000, 
according to one study. 
5 The same study, however, comments that delay-
ing  chang~ would have severely compounded the European telecoms 
industry's problem of  competitiveness and reduced its capacity to create 
new jobs over the medium term. Indeed the study predicts that, in the 
absence  of the EU measures,  Europe's  telecoms  equipment industry 
would by the year 2000 have foregone far more jobs than the 50,000 
jobs it might have 'saved' short term in the early 1990s. 
This industry shed 115,000 jobs over 1990-94 in public switching 
and transmission equipment, where competition has been ferocious and 
demand stagnant. But over the same period it created 28,500 new jobs, 
mainly in making mobile phones. 
6  It is  this switch of resources - the 
essence of restructuring - that provides a certain gage for the future. If 
telecoms services are  included, the projections can be carried further. 
Assuming full  liberalisation,  the number of jobs in telecoms services 
might rise from today's level of 985,000 to 1.1m by 2005.7 The wider 
multiplier effect of this on future employment and growth will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 10. Suffice it to record here that the general rule of 
thumb is  that one new telecoms job creates  1.8 posts elsewhere in the 
economy. 
Regional cohesion. It was a particular concern of  poorer EU regions 
- particularly those in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain - that they 
would lose out in the single market. More precisely, they worried that 
109 The Single Market and Tomorrows Europe 
their  weaker  more  traditional,  labour-intensive  industries  would  be 
unable to adjust to foreign competition through innovation and restruc-
turing. This might mean that the 'knock-on' effect of revamping their 
economies would also be lost. They feared they would find themselves 
shoved to the technological sidelines, unable to upgrade their industry 
and to catch up with the richer core of the Union. These fears  have 
proved unfounded. 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal have generally benefited from the single 
market and have experienced convergence with the rest of the Union. 
The single market is an important factor in this, although it is impor-
tant to bear  two  special  factors  in mind. The first  is  that the single 
market programme coincided in the case  of Spain and Portugal with 
their entry into the EU, which itself gave their economies a powerful, 
and generally positive jolt. The second is  that all  four countries have 
received significant amounts of  aid from the EU Structural Funds, gen-
erally devoted to infrastructure, under the regional policy of 'cohesion' 
designed to help their economies converge with their richer partners. It 
seems to have worked. In terms of GDP per head, the cohesion coun-
tries have caught up with the EU average; in fact their annual growth has 
been above the average over the average over the period 1987-93. 
In terms of  gross value per head, the less developed countries, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, have forged ahead of  the EU average. They 
recorded below EU average annual growth of  1.05 per cent before 1987, 
but above average growth of2.87 per cent after 1987. The regions which 
have received fund by being designated as 'Objective 1' in the jargon of 
EU regional policy are the whole of Ireland, Portugal, Greece,  a large 
part of  Spain, southern Italy, the new German Lander and some parts of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and France because their GDP is less 
than 75 per cent ofEU GOP per head per year. 
The cumulative effect of this is striking. Together the 'new entrants' 
- Spain, Portugal and Greece - which entered the EU in the 1980s saw 
their gross added value per head rise by 1993 to 11 per cent above what 
it would have been if they had stuck to their pre-1987 growth paths. 
Add Ireland in, and the result is  even more spectacular - an improve-
ment of  nearly i4 per cent compared to what these four countries could 
have expected if  their pre-1987 growth trends were simply extrapolated. 
The extra increase reflects Ireland's very rapid average growth of 8.6 
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per cent in gross  added value  per head since  1987.  Part of Ireland's 
expansion may be due to EU structural funds. But the main reasons for 
the relative ease with which Ireland has adapted to, and benefited from, 
the single market lie in its economic history and structure. It has long 
had a close and free-trading relationship with the UK, giving it a fairly 
open economy even before it joined the EU in 1973 in advance of  other 
cohesion countries. Since the late 1970s, it has attracted a number of 
multinational  companies.  They have  continued to  invest  in  Ireland 
during the period of  the single market programme, with a decline after 
1987 in new investment projects being offset by the trend in existing 
foreign investors re-investing their profits in the country. 
The impact on the domestic economy can be gauged from the fact 
that annual investment flows into Ireland averaged over 9 per cent of  the 
country's GDP in 1990-93. This foreign investment in Ireland has been 
generally  capital  intensive  and  export-oriented  and,  as  it  happens, 
directed towards many of the sectors deemed particularly sensitive to 
single market measures such as  telecoms, data processing and medical 
equipment. Spain and Portugal have also seen sizeable increases in for-
eign investment, but it is of a more recent vintage because their acces-
sion to the EU dates from 1986. Foreign investment takes a certain time 
for  its  beneficial  effects  to  spill  over· and  to  promote  technological 
progress and competitiveness in the rest of the economy. This perhaps 
explains the more modest increases in Spanish and Portuguese growth. 
But both Iberian countries have more than held their own in the single 
market (see Table 8.2). 
Ratio of  total annual FDI inflows to GDP 
1986  1993  1990-93 
Greece 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
EUR-12 
0.86% 
1.20% 
0.25% 
0.05% 
0.65% 
0.49% 
0.56% 
1.32% 
7.68% 
0.40% 
1.47% 
0.94% 
0.64% 
1.75% 
9.41% 
0.40% 
2.64% 
1.17% 
Table 8.2  Significance of  the EU's FDI inflows to GDP by Member 
State (1986-93) 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services 
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The flow of foreign  investment into Portugal has been almost as  dra-
matic as  that into Ireland, more than doubling its share of Portugal's 
total  investment  compared  to  the  1981-8  5  period.  But  the  largest 
inflows of foreign money have gone into non-tradable sectors, such as 
construction or public works,  or into sectors like  banking,  insurance 
and wholesale trade which are largely geared to the domestic market. 
However, Portugal has increased its specialisation in electrical engineer-
ing and motor vehicles-both sectors of  considerable foreign investment 
-as well as in traditional industries like textiles and shoes. 
The pattern is not dissimilar in Spain, which attracted foreign direct 
investment amounting to 2 per cent of its total GOP from 1986-92.
8 
Since its entry into the EU, Spain has recorded growth above the EU 
average and has therefore slowly converged with the rest of  the EU. But 
Spain is the largest and most diversified economy on the EU's periphery, 
as well as having been the most closed one before 1986. Its entry into 
the EU, with the consequent disappearance of  tariff and quota barriers, 
therefore had as much effect on its economy as  the regulatory changes 
wrought by the single market programme. 
However,  the combination of accession  to the EU and the single 
market programme have  forged  close  trade links  between individual 
Spanish industries and their counterparts elsewhere in the EU. More 
than half (54 per cent) of  Spain's trade with the EU in 1995 was intra-
industry, either in exchanges of  goods of  different ranges or more com-
monly of  different qualities. This high level of  industrial interchange is 
typical of other larger EU states and of the overall trade pattern in the 
EU in recent years; it is, incidentally, also one of  the reasons why we have 
seen competition and variety in the EU. In any case,  Spain's  level  of 
intra-industry trade within the EU is now well above that of  other cohe-
sion countries, notably Greece. 
Only 14 per cent of Greece's trade in 1994 with the rest of the EU 
was  in the form of intra-industry exchanges,  showing that the single 
market programme has not promoted any major increase in the inter-
penetration of Greek industry with  its  counterparts. 
9  This,  in  part, 
reflects  the  relatively  modest inflows  of foreign  investment into  the 
country  compared  with  other  'cohesion'  countries,  and  consequent 
poorer growth performance. Among cohesion countries, the structural 
shock  attributable  to  the  single  market  programme  was  largest  in 
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Greece,  which joined the EU in  1981. The impact has  been all  the 
greater because it has been unevenly spread. Three quarters of  industrial 
output is based in just three of  the country's 11  regions; and half of  it is 
concentrated in a few sectors, such as food, textiles, and minerals extrac-
tion. Here, Greek exports still draw their competitiveness mainly from 
static comparative advantages like cheap labour and the availability of 
raw materials. 
However, Greece is not the only country to have performed relatively 
worse since the start of  the single market programme. Southern Italy or 
the Mezrogiorno grew,  in terms of gross value added per capita, by an 
annual average of 1.17 per cent in 1987-93, compared to 1.67 per cent 
for northern Italy and compared to the 2.87 per cent average for  the 
cohesion countries.
10  By contrast, the single market programme as well 
as, of course, the disbursement of EU structural aid, has seen the less-
ening of  regional disparities in Spain, with the poorer part of  the coun-
try growing faster than Catalonia and the Madrid area. 
All  of these  trends  and changes  are  vitally important in bringing 
member states together so that benefits are equally shared between busi-
nesses,  consumers, workers and citizens across the EU. This can only 
lead to benefits by creating a strong Union less vulnerable to economic 
shocks and better able to keep up with the relentless pace of globalisa-
tion and technological advances. 
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Protecting People and 
the Environment 
The ultimate test of the single market's success  is  whether it benefits 
people. As consumers, people want easy and sure access to a wider range 
of  cheaper goods and services. As workers, they want to be able to move 
to jobs if they are more plentiful over the border than at home. And as 
citizens, they want the right to travel and reside unhindered within the 
European Union. 
Take  consumers  first.  The single  market was  created  not just  to 
improve the economic environment for  European business but to let 
Europe's consumers benefit from greater competition in the form of a 
wider variety of products and services,  new channels of delivery and 
lower prices. 
As every European consumer will know from his or her personal bud-
geting, the single market has not by itself triggered a general decline in 
prices. True, in some selected areas - usually where deregulation or lib-
eralisation is occurring on a scale that surpasses that of  Europe alone -
prices charged to the final consumer have come down. Europeans, for 
instance, now pay 42 per cent less to telephone the US than they did six 
years ago.  The cost of telephone calls within the EU has also fallen by 
22 per cent. European travellers have seen the same sort of  deep cuts in 
economy, as distinct from business, air fares. Telecommunications oper-
ators are  estimated to  be  now able  to  buy their telecommunications 
equipment 7 per cent cheaper than they would have done if they had 
never agreed to set the single market programme in motion. 
But as we have seen elsewhere, manufacturers and distributors have 
made cost savings, but they have rarely passed them on in lower prices 
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to  the  final  customers.  The reasons  vary.  The territorial  network of 
established car dealers still tends to keep out imports made potentially 
cheaper by currency devaluations. Governments still regulate pharma-
ceutical prices. And, in food, consumers themselves often shun cheaper 
foreign  substitutes for  the higher-priced local  brands they know and 
savour. 
What is on offer to Europe's consumers, however, is  a more diverse 
range of  products and services. They can step into a shop and buy a fax 
or a mobile phone that either did not exist before or was only sold by 
the monopoly national telephone company. At home, they have more 
cross-border satellite TV channels to watch. At banks, there are more 
savings plans, pension funds, mortgage and insurance schemes to choose 
from. The price of  cars or business air travel may not be lower, but there 
are more car models or air flights to choose from. 
With more operators offering more products and services than ever, 
the choice can be confusing and the risks of  making the wrong purchase 
perhaps greater. Information has therefore become a guiding principle 
of  European consumer protection policy. Information about the ingre-
dients of  food products, or the operating instructions of  an electric drill, 
or the conditions of  a washing machine guarantee or a life insurance pre-
mium,  has  become  more  important so  that consumers  can  protect 
themselves. And if self-protection doesn't work, then consumers need 
more information about ways of  gaining legal redress for their grievances 
and of  alerting national or EU authorities to their problems. EU legis-
lation on product labelling or accurate advertising is directed precisely 
at creating better informed and therefore better protected consumers. 
But just as smaller companies are often nervous about plunging into 
the wider market, so many individual consumers remain wary of  what 
they see  as  the pitfalls of cross-border shopping. In a revealing Euro-
barometer survey in 1993 about consumers' reservations about cross-
border shopping, 52 per cent of people cited the difficulty of getting 
goods bought abroad exchanged or repaired, 40 per cent mentioned lan-
guage problems, 34 per cent had doubts about how any dispute arising 
from their purchase might be settled, and 31 per cent complained about 
the uncertainty over terms of  sale. 
To ease these fears,  the EU has passed legislation to: 
•  introduce a general requirement for product safety aimed at pre-
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venting defective  goods  coming onto the market,  backed  up  by 
measures to make manufacturers and retailers liable for any unsafe 
consumer  product goods  already  in  circulation.  In addition,  of 
course, there is EU safety legislation aimed at specific sectors, such 
as  cosmetics,  toys,  machinery, etc.  (see  Chapter 3).  Some of this 
specific legislation allows  the manufacturer to put a 'CE' confor-
mity marking on their products to show that they comply with the 
legal safety requirements. This mark, however,  is  normally only a 
manufacturer's claim, not an independently verified guarantee, of 
safety; 
•  protect consumers from  over-persuasive salesmen  on their door-
steps. This gives them time to reflect, a so-called cooling off  period, 
in which they do not have to make any payment, and also the right 
to rescind a contract within a specified time limit. However, the leg-
islation does not cover certain contracts such as insurance policies, 
which are these days often sold door-to-door; 
•  regulate  distance-selling,  an  increasingly  popular form  of cross-
border shopping in which the consumer does not even have to leave 
home. When the legislation comes into force in 1998, it will pro-
vide the buyer with a cooling off period for reflection and requires 
the distant seller to supply complete information. But it does not 
include financial services; 
•  prevent 'abusive' clauses in contracts which have not been explicitly 
negotiated between buyer and seller, and which give the seller too 
much power over the buyer or unfairly limits the buyer's rights; 
•  prevent 'misleading' advertising which exaggerates a product's ben-
efits or conceals its risks.  The 1989 Television Without Frontiers 
Directive has additional measures covering cross-border broadcasts. 
(See Chapter 5.) 
As opinion surveys show, many consumers remain anxious about what 
happens if  their cross-border purchase turns out to be defective in some 
way.  Every EU state has  legislation which gives  consumers a general 
right in law to seek redress- quite apart from any commercial warranty 
which  an  individual  manufacturer  or retailer  may provide.  But the 
period in which this right can be exercised varies widely.  In Germany 
and Austria, for  instance, this general legal guarantee only· lasts for 6 
months after a product's purchase, while in the UK and Ireland it lasts 
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for 6 years and in France, Belgium, Netherlands and Finland, it is theo-
retically indefinite. The Commission has therefore proposed that this 
legal guarantee last throughout the EU at least two years from the date 
of  the good's delivery. 
Much of  the EU's early consumer legislation was targeted primarily at 
protecting buyers of goods.  But the focus  is  increasingly switching to 
services, with the economic boost that the single market programme has 
given to this sector. Nowhere is this more apparent than in financial ser-
vices. In liberalising the banking, insurance and securities industries, EU 
directives have  already catered to consumers' interests with numerous 
provisions to give customers rights to redress, to withdrawal from con-
tracts and to a minimum of  information. The overwhelming number of 
financial institutions are also aware that their reputation for honesty and 
good customer service is among their most effective marketing tools in 
an increasingly competitive market. 
But though it is early days - because some financial service directives 
have only just come into force - a number of  problems encountered by 
consumers have been identified and reported to the Commission. They 
include: 
•  refusal of financial services to non-residents. Some insurance com-
panies in one member state have either refused insurance, or given 
less favourable terms, to residents of  certain other EU states on the 
ground that they constitute a higher risk than others. In another 
member state,  certain credit institutions have,  apparently for  tax 
reasons,  refused non-residents some banking services.  Many con-
sumers  complain  that insurance  companies  in  another member 
state are reluctant to give them cover for their cars - a reluctance 
which the insurance companies partly explain by pointing to the 
extra  cost  of appointing fiscal  and claims  representatives  in  the 
country of  the risk; 
•  difficulty in providing financial services in another member state. 
EU legislation allows countries to regulate the provision of  financial 
services  in order to protect the 'general good' of the public. But 
some  countries  appear  to  be  abusing  this  safeguard  clause  to 
regulate foreign financial institutions, by simply making it manda-
tory for the foreign company to observe all of  the rules of the new 
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country in which it is operating in addition to those of the home 
country; 
•  poor quality of  service and lack of information. Of  particular rele-
vance to the general functioning of the single market is  the delay 
and expense of transferring money within the EU. A Commission 
survey in 1994 found that 50 per cent of  banks gave no clients any 
written information on transferring their money abroad, that in 36 
per cent of  transfers, clients were double charged by both the send-
ing and receiving  bank,  and that that the average  total  cost  of 
making a cross-border credit transfer equivalent to Ecus  100 was 
Ecus 25.
1  Back in 1987, the average total charge on an Ecus  100 
payment was found to be only Ecus 9. Assuming that the exchange 
rate risk is fairly constant, the increased cost seems to be mainly due 
to double charging by banks.  To  prevent this,  the EU is  in the 
process of adopting a measure  that would speed up cross-border 
payments as well as reduce their cost. 
Free movement of workers has been a right established as  long ago as 
1968, and the single market programme has  not seen  any significant 
increase in labour mobility. The number of EU citizens (workers plus 
their families) living in another EU state rose only modestly from 5.15m 
in 1985 to 5.48m in 1993.
2 Nor was the single market expected to pro-
duce any surge in migration within the EU. The mobile 'factor' of  pro-
duction,  in economists'  jargon,  has  proved  to  be  capital  rather than 
labour.  The single market programme has  seen a rise  in cross-border 
investment so that jobs have come to people rather than people having 
to move to jobs, as happened in the past. This private investment, plus 
EU structural aid, has helped create jobs in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece 
and Ireland - all countries with a tradition of  emigration. Nor has eco-
nomic growth in the richer core of the Union been high enough to act 
as the magnet for job-seekers that it was in the 1960s. 
But the single market is accelerating the shift in Europe's work force 
from blue to white collar workers, and in employment from technical 
tasks to more commercial, high-tech functions. A study into the single 
market programme's effect on manufacturing shows that it had almost 
no impact on service-related jobs, reducing them by 0.04 per cent, but 
hit employment among technicians by nearly  1 per cent and among 
those  in  elementary  occupations  by  0.65  per  cent.
3  It  is  especially 
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managers and highly specialised workers who tend to be transferred by 
their multinational companies between EU countries, with the result 
that their pay rates are also slowly converging across Europe in contrast 
to pay bargaining for  the rest of the workforce which is  increasingly 
decentralised across Europe. 
Job mobility for  professionals has also  been made easier by an EU 
Directive on the recognition of  higher education diplomas. This applies 
to regulated professions not already covered by other specific measures 
(as  in the case of various medical professions,  hairdressers,  travel and 
insurance agents). The general system does not in fact provide for auto-
matic  acceptance  of professional  qualifications  obtained  in  another 
member state. But it sets the host state a time limit of  four months to 
consider an application and limits what it can demand of a would-be 
practitioner of  a profession. The latter can be asked to provide proof of 
experience in his or her home state, or to complete an adaptation period 
or aptitude test - but only one of  these three requirements. 
The Directive has worked well. Only 5 per cent of  applications have 
been  turned down  under the Directive,  which in its  first  four years 
(1991-94)  has  allowed  11,000  professionals  to  practice  in  another 
member state. More than half these - 6,000 - were recognised by one 
member state alone, the UK. Of  these 6,000, 3,800 were teachers. This 
is the result of  a shortage of teachers in the UK and a surplus in coun-
tries like the Netherlands and Germany. Here at least the directive has 
helped match supply and demand to resolve a structural labour imbal-
ance, even though most professionals appear to move around the EU to 
follow their spouses or for other personal reasons. 
There is, however, one treaty freedom which affects all EU citizens, 
and nationals of  countries outside the EU, which remains only partially 
fulfilled. This is the freedom to travel in the EU as if it was one's own 
country. Border checks on travellers, as distinct from goods, remain-
except where they have been abolished by the Schengen convention, the 
inter-governmental  agreement  currently  between  7  EU  states,  the 
Nordic Passport Union and the Common Travel Area between Ireland 
and the UK. The Commission is seeking to enlarge the achievement of 
this goal to the entire Union. Enlargement is desirable not only because 
unhindered travel within the EU is  a right which opinion polls show 
that Europeans prize, but also because retention of controls on people 
120 Protecting People and the Environment 
carries the risk of  a return to controls on their possessions or activities, 
even goods and services. 
In addition, border controls effectively shut many non-EU nationals 
out of the single market. Some 12.2m non-EU nationals legally reside 
inside one EU state, and even if  they are married or related to an EU cit-
izen,  they often  require  a visa  to  travel  to  another EU state.  A fair 
number of  these non-EU nationals now run their own small businesses, 
which they would like to see grow, perhaps branching out into another 
member state.  But it is  not easy to expand such firms when visa con-
straints keep the boss at home. 
However,  the Single Market has brought immediate benefits and a 
number of  specific individual rights to citizens of the Union. Unfortu-
nately,  most citizens are  still largely unaware of these  rights and as  a 
result in many cases fail to exercise them. 
The Commission is  now attempting to remedy this situation by a 
large-scale  public information programme,  called  'Citizens  First!',  in 
which people will be informed of  what their rights and opportunities are 
under Community law relating to the single market- the right to live, 
study,  work or look for work in another Member State,  the right to 
travel or to buy goods and services across frontiers, the right to health 
care and so on. This initiative should be launched in every national lan-
guage over several months and will not only help people to know and 
enjoy their rights but will also highlight areas where there are problems 
in particular countries which need to be addressed. 
Last but not least, everyone has an interest in, and a right to, a clean, 
safe and healthy environment. In fact, Article 2 of the EC Treaty pro-
vided that the Community should have  as  its  task,  by establishing a 
common market, to promote inter alia 'a sustainable and non-inflation-
ary growth respecting  the environment'.  The Community's environ-
mental policy and the single market are therefore intertwined. At the 
practical level, no-one recognises the need for environmental legislation 
more than business. In some sectors, environmental requirements have 
even been an incentive for business to invest in new environmentally-
friendly technologies which have also  increased competitiveness. It is 
still too early to get a clear read-out on how the single market measures, 
which  address  environmental  aspects  where  relevant,  have  actually 
impacted on the environment. But we  do not need to wait for  that. 
121 The Single Market and Tomorrow's Europe 
Work continues on improving coordination between the member states' 
environmental measures, so that maximum protection is combined with 
the minimum of  risk of  creating new technical barriers to trade. 
Looking  ahead  on the  environment,  studies  undertaken  estimate 
some important medium-term gains when single market measures in 
some sectors such as  energy are fully implemented. The single energy 
market is likely to increase gas consumption, which is far less polluting 
than other fuels, and decrease C02 emissions by 105 million tonnes per 
year. In transport, the increase in road freight traffic (around 15 per cent 
for EU-15 between 1990 and 1994) means that in the absence of  major 
improvements in vehicle fuel  economy the Community will  have  its 
work cut out to achieve its C02 stabilisation and reduction objectives. 
But all  is  not lost.  At  the same time,  technological  improvements 
made to vehicles  under Community legislation,  for  example,  in har-
monised  technical  specifications  introducing  stricter  emission  stan-
dards,  will  at least  in  the  future  lead  to reductions  in  air  polluting 
emissions from road transport.  Early estimations foresee  considerable 
emission reductions in the regional transportation of  goods. Hopefully, 
progress on fair and efficient transport pricing, as well as the Commis-
sion's proposed revision of  the current fiscal framework for heavy goods 
vehicles, will result in an additional substantial reduction in emissions. 
The strategy to 'revamp' the Community's railways should, in the longer 
term, strengthen the competitive position of  this environmentally more 
benign form of  transport. 
The main areas  of national  regulations  which  could benefit from 
closer  examination  are:  emissions  and  hazards  mostly  covered  by 
national legislation,  for  example,  emissions of solvents;  national eco-
label schemes, which currently proliferate, in spite of  progress to develop 
the Community eco-label, leading potentially to market distortions and 
customer confusion; and waste management regulations, where inade-
quate implementation or enforcement have resulted in different require-
ments for national producers. 
We should expect to see the Commission taking a lead in this key area 
of  proper integration of  single market and environmental policy so as to 
ensure  the  best possible  progress  towards  the  achievement of Treaty 
objectives. 
122 Protecting People and the Environment 
Notes 
EU Funds Transfers, COM (94) 436 final. 
Eurostat Migration Statistics 1995. 
Employment & manufacturing, table 4.17. 
123 Chapter 10 
Networks beyond 
the Nineties 
The single market is  not a static structure. The foundations are  now 
mainly in place but some important complementary elements are still 
missing. In particular Europe needs to review and update its infrastruc-
ture which has up to now been organised on a national scale and accord-
ing to national priorities. This means reaping the full benefit of  telecoms 
liberalisation  in  spreading  information  technology,  exploiting  the 
potential of  cheaper energy from greater competition in electricity and 
gas,  and providing itself with a more complete and balanced transport 
network. These are foundations which are just as essential to the future 
of  the single market as, for example, free movement of  capital was to the 
recent liberalisation of  financial services. 
The task is, generally, not revolutionary. Where it is,  the revolution 
has already begun. In telecoms, the EU is well down the road to liberal-
isation. In energy, it has taken a first step to opening up the electricity 
market. In transport, it is creating a more competitive market in air and 
road transport, but has yet to do the same for railways and, even more 
important, to address the separate questions of  how to transport people 
and goods across  Europe. It is  therefore more a question of pursuing 
these revolutions to maximise the benefits. 
This is especially true of telecommunicatiom, because it is the carrier 
for information technology. The big milestone in the telecoms revolu-
tion is 1 January 1998, the date for fullliberalisation of  voice telephony. 
It is crucial that member states stick to this timetable, because only an 
open telecoms market can usher in the 'information' society. This will 
create new electronic ways of  practising commerce, banking, medicine, 
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teaching,  publishing,  even  of conveying  entertainment.  Technically, 
these  'tele-services'  can  be  provided just as  simply across  borders  as 
within  borders.  Legally,  however,  they  could  be  frustrated  by  new 
national  regulations.  Indeed,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
member states will tend to regulate in very different ways, taking differ-
ent views of  what constitutes their general interest. Some coordination 
is therefore vital, which is why the Commission has proposed just such 
a coordinating and consultation mechanism. 
1 But if-and it is a big 'if' 
- member states meet their telecoms liberalisation deadline and avoid 
obstructing the new services flowing from this, new research shows that 
the gains could be great.
2 
Start with the telecoms industry itsel£ Swift, uniform and fullliber-
alisation in all member states could increase total revenue of telecoms 
operators by 25 per cent above what it would be if there was no further 
liberalisation  beyond what exists  today.  By  2005,  this  total  revenue 
could reach Ecus 232bn (and that in 1994 money). Much of  the growth 
would be  in non-traditional services,  especially  mobile  telephony.  If 
there was  only patchy and delayed  implementation of liberalisation, 
then the revenue increase would be correspondingly less,  up to Ecus 
214bn by 2005. 
Of course, operators would find themselves having to lay out more 
capital expenditure, particularly new operators establishing their own 
networks. Under the 'rapid liberalisation scenario', such capital invest-
ment would rise by around 6. 7 per cent to reach some Ecus 78bn a year 
by 2005, while under what might be called the 'un-synchronised' sce-
nario for liberalisation the increase would be around 5.3 per cent a year 
to reach Ecus 52bn by 2005. 
Jobs in the industry would increase, too. This may seem surprising in 
view of  the job cuts that occurred at British Telecom after its privatisa-
tion a decade ago.  But the current monopoly operators in Europe are 
now generally more efficient than BT was, and therefore have less need 
than BT did to shed jobs when their monopolies disappear in  1998. 
Lower  prices,  brought  about  by  liberalisation,  will  also  stimulate 
demand and thus create jobs.  So,  employment in telecoms - around 
985,000 today- would rise to some 1.03m by 2005, but to 1.12m by 
the same date under the 'rapid scenario'.  By  contrast, if liberalisation 
proceeded no further than where it is today, employment might actually 
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be 70,000 less than it is today. 
If  telecoms liberalisation proceeds apace, the resulting spread of  infor-
mation  technology will  bring about wider changes  in the European 
economy. Some sectors , like finance, commerce and entertainment will 
be able to increase business by tapping markets they could not previ-
ously reach through, for instance, phone-based banking services, tele-
shopping and on-line provision of video  films.  Others will  use  it to 
reduce their costs in, for instance, manufacturing or even health-care; 
tele-diagnosis could make it easier for doctors to consult specialists in 
hospitals. 
The upshot of these wider effects,  is  that full  liberalisation of tele-
coms, plus a thorough diffusion of  information technology and expan-
sion of  information services, could by themselves produce a cumulative 
increase in overall GOP in Europe that would amount to 1.18 per cent 
by 2005, creating along the way some 641,000 net new jobs (see Table 
10.1). The gains are more modest under the 'un-synchronised' scenario 
- an increase of 0. 7 per cent in total EU output and an extra 263,000 
net new jobs. 
The Information Society itself has enormous potential benefits for 
the Community, provided that it is underpinned by single market prin-
ciples of  free movement and freedom of  establishment. As well as liber-
alising telecommunications, the Community is well off the mark with 
its  forward  planning for  the  information  society  and  pilot  projects 
which aim to ensure that the essential networks will be in place to meet 
demand for new information society services. (It is not of  course the net-
works themselves that are attractive to consumers but the services they 
deliver.) 
An appropriate regulatory framework for a single market in informa-
tion society services is a key element in encouraging investment in the 
new services it will offer and ensuring consumer confidence in this new 
'virtual marketplace'. A regulatory response at EU level  is  required in 
areas such as  intellectual property, privacy and media ownership. Fur-
thermore, new single market barriers preventing the cross-border circu-
lation of information society services must be avoided and this is why 
the recently proposed Transparency Directive is so essential.3 
When it comes to the infrastructure, the success of the information 
society in Europe is  primarily an economic rather than technological 
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Telecom employees 
(million)  ~ 
antimonde  0.985  0.978  0.981  0.981  0.971  0.953  0.947  0.941  0.937  0.933  0.924  ~ 
unsynchronised  0.985  0.989  0.999  0.998  0.996  0.986  0.991  1.004  1.021  1.037  1.038  ~ 
rapid  0.985  0.988  0.997  1.001  1.006  1.013  1.038  1.068  1.096  1.120  1.121  ~ 
Capital expenditures  ~ 
(billion 1994 ECUs)  ~  antimonde  40.5  41.8  42.9  44.0  45.0  46.1  47.2  48.3  49.4  50.5  51.7  ~  unsynchronised  40.5  42.0  43.6  47.0  50.9  54.1  57.6  60.5  63.3  66.1  68.1  ~  ......  -
rapid  40.4  43.4  47.0  52.8  59.1  63.6  68.0  71.5  73.7  76.1  77.6  ~ 
N  Telecom value added 
;::: 
00  ~ 
(billion 1994 ECUs)  ~  antimonde  75.5  76.1  76.6  76.8  77.1  77.3  77.6  77.8  78.1  78.4  78.7  ~ 
unsynchronised  75.5  76.1  77.1  78.8  81.6  84.9  87.1  89.4  93.2  97.3  101.6  ~ 
rapid  75.5  79.1  83.2  86.3  90.8  94.6  98.1  101.6  106.1  111.1  116.2  ~ 
Telecom revenues  ~ 
(billion 1994 ECUs) 
....  v 
antimonde  134  140  147  155  161  165  170  175  179  183  185  ~ 
unsynchronised  134  142  152  161  168  175  183  192  201  209  214  ~ 
rapid  134  143  153  163  172  181  192  205  216  227  233 
~ 
Table 10.1  Annual EU-wide telecom sector projections Networks beyond the Nineties 
issue- the technology exists, whereas, so far,  the investment does not. 
Only the scale of  the single market is sufficient to justify and attract the 
finance necessary for high performance trans-European networks. They 
must be  Europe-wide:  first,  because  national markets are  mostly too 
small to fund the infrastructure costs of the most efficient broadband 
networks  and second,  because  many information society services  are 
likely to  be  aimed at niche markets which in any one member state 
could prove to be too small. An added bonus could be that the speed and 
capacity of  these new services in combining text, visual and voice com-
munications may allow them to break through language barriers. That 
could do a lot for the 'entente Europeenne'. 
As current initiatives on the part of  governments, business and Euro-
pean Institutions proceed, the big question that remains largely unan-
swered  is  whether  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  European 
Parliament will want to play ball as far as the Commission's efforts are 
concerned. There appears to be a general political consensus at all levels 
to ensure that Europe is well placed and indeed at the leading edge of 
developments in the information society. 
Electricity is the most versatile form of  energy and its price is vital to 
Europe's economy and competitiveness. However, electricity prices vary 
widely across the EU. In 1995, prices to the residential sector varied by 
almost 50 per cent, prices to industrial consumers by over 70 per cent, 
and prices  to commercial users  by  more than  1  00 per cent.  4  This is 
largely the result of  lack of  competition. 
The electricity industry is  often considered a 'natural monopoly'. 
This is certainly true of  its transmission. To cover Europe with compet-
ing lines of power pylons would make no economic, let alone environ-
mental, sense.  But its  monopolistic character has  often extended into 
power  generation  - an  area  which  is  not naturally  monopolistic -
through vertically-integrated companies which combine the generation 
of  electricity with its distribution. 
Important steps were made in the early 1990s in the form of Euro-
pean Union Directives on the transit of electricity between specified 
grids for industrial end users and on price transparency. But efforts at 
market liberalisation are only now coming to fruition. Member states 
agreed on a Directive about common rules for the single market in elec-
tricity on 25 July  1996 and the Directive was  later presented to the 
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European Parliament. Member states have agreed to open up a percent-
age of their national market to progressive levels of competition. This 
portion of the market must include all  end-customers who consume 
more than 100 GWh per annum. It must also include distribution com-
panies designated as  eligible to supply the volume of electricity con-
sumed by their customers. Beyond these requirements, member states 
are free to define customers eligible to take part in the market opening, 
which is due to be phased in gradually, over six years, starting in 1997 
(subject to approval by the European Parliament). 
It  is  estimated  that the share  of the  total  electricity  market  thus 
opened to potential competition will be around 22 per cent at the start, 
and around 33 per cent within six years. The Directive will then con-
tinue to apply for  a further three years.  Already,  member states have 
recognised  in this  Directive the need  for  further liberalisation.  They 
have undertaken to examine the possibility of further market opening 
which would be effective 9 years after the Directive's entry into force. 
New research, based on the assumption of a 30 per cent opening of 
the electricity market, shows that this measure should produce savings 
for consumers of around Ecus 4-6bn a year,
5 compared to what they 
could expect if the market stayed unchanged. These savings would be 
split between large industrial consumers who can expect a 5-11 per cent 
decrease in their power bills and a smaller decrease of 2-4 per cent for 
residential consumers. The majority of  the savings will come from lower 
construction and operating costs for generating plant, and from the like-
lihood that cheaper forms of generation, especially from gas,  will  be 
favoured. If, at some later date, the EU were to move to a completely free 
electricity  market,  savings  to  consumers  would  double,  to  Ecus 
10-12bn a year. 
Furthest from  realisation, but most significant in macro-economic 
terms, is an integrated and balanced transport infrastructure and policy 
for the EU. There are two pressing problems. One is action on the 14 
Trans-European Networks (TENs) projects proposed by the Commis-
sion, which still await agreement on their funding. More than half of 
these TENs projects concern improving old rail links or building new 
ones. The other 'missing link' is  a proper policy for Europe's railways. 
The latter has become the Cinderella of European transport, squeezed 
by its  two  sisters  - road  and air  transport - which  have  been  able, 
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through liberalisation, to increase efficiency and range and quality of 
service.  In a White Paper in July 1996 the Commission has called for 
action to clarify the finances of railways, open them up to more cross-
border competition and to modernise their infrastructure.  · 
The  message  of new  research  is  that  really  significant  gains  for 
Europe's  transport users  can  only come  from  combining policy and 
infrastructure improvements. This emerges from a complex study into 
EU transport problems. 
6 The bottom line of this study is  that the EU 
could save  transport users,  and earn transport operators, a combined 
total of  Ecus 138bn a year by 2005 in terms of  money, time, a~d  reduc-
tions in other indirect costs like inflexibility.? But such a big saving can 
only be reached if  a whole building block of  measures is carried out: 
•  under a 'partial integration' scenario, assuming that the TENs pro-
jects were started and completed by 2005 with little change in poli-
cies, the combined savings in so-called dis-utility costs (both direct 
and indirect transport costs) would amount to a mere Ecus 1  Obn a 
year. The reason is that while infrastructure improvements can have 
a major local impact, they produce macro-economic gains that are 
minor compared with policy changes affecting the entire EU; 
•  things change under a 'full integration' scenario. This presupposes 
that to the TENs infrastructure improvements is  added a whole 
series  of policy measures,  including price  changes.  Cost savings 
would  go  chiefly  to  passengers,  mainly  through  accelerated  air 
transport  liberalisation  and still  cheaper  air  fares.  Time savings 
would come from emptier roads, most of which would have tolls, 
increased use of  air travel and further elimination of  border delays. 
Higher road operating costs  (diesel  tax,  tolls)  would force  freight 
that was cost rather than time-sensitive onto other forms of trans-
port such  as  inland waterways.  Total direct and indirect savings 
would amount to Ecus 95bn; 
•  on top of this last set of policies might be added a policy of 'con-
gestion charging' to discourage use of  all busy roads at peak times. 
This would dramatically  raise  the  road operator revenues.  How 
much users gained in practice would depend on how these revenues 
were recycled; 
•  a last improvement would be a determined effort to improve the 
quality of  rail service to attract both passengers and freight. Only if 
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this ultimate step were taken would total potential savings to trans-
port users' approach the figure ofEcus 138bn a year. Yet, it is a prize 
worth considering, for it might amount to 1-1.5 per cent of EU 
output by 2005 (see Table 10.2). 
Cost  Time  Total cost  Total 
savings  savings  &time  savings 
savings  (including 
other indirect 
costs) 
Partial integration (PI) 
Passenger savings  -3,914  3,195  -719  2,854 
Freight savings  4,569  -1,649  2,920  5,980 
Operator revenue  1,434  1,434  1,434 
Total  2,089  1,546  3,635  10,268 
Full integration (FI) 
Passenger savings  44,280  23,377  67,657  77,708 
Freight savings  -6,999  -10,259  -17,258  -1,367 
Operator revenue  16,126  16,126  16,126 
Total  53,407  13,118  66,525  92,467 
Congestion charging (CC) 
(Based on FI) 
Passenger savings  102  37,953  38,055  51,330 
Freight savings  -12,302  -13,215  -25,517  -5,021 
Operator revenue  73,012  73,012  73,012 
Total  60,812  24,738  85,550  119,321 
Rail Service Quality (RQI) 
(Based on CC) 
Passenger savings  439  39,903  40,342  53,262 
Freight savings  -12,661  -12,229  -24,890  -3,412 
Operator revenue  79,115  79,115  79,115 
Total  66,893  27,674  94,567  128,965 
Table 10.2  Ranking of  overall benefits of  each scenario as compared 
with the 2005 Base (annual savings against 2005 Base-Million ECU 
91) 
Notes: Transport study see Appendix C 
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Proposed  Directive  for  a  Transparency  Mechanism  for  Information  Society  Services, 
COM(96)392 final of  30.8.96. 
Information. 
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Looking To The Future 
It is an exaggeration to liken the job of  completing the single market to 
that of  Sisyphus,  ~he ancient Greek condemned to roll a boulder uphill 
only to have it forever rolling back. But it is true that the EU's very suc-
cess in removing so many barriers to its single market, and embarking 
on new initiatives in sensitive areas  like  energy,  inevitably casts  more 
light on the obstacles that remain. So  this chapter looks at the unfin-
ished business of  the single market and what needs to be done to tackle 
the outstanding problems and take up new challenges. 
Some of the problems are old ones, like tax. Business has long clam-
oured for more simple and consistent tax conditions and an end to dis-
tortions  resulting  from  different  national  tax  regimes  that  prevent 
companies conducting their business as a single, Union-wide operation. 
But  Commission  proposals  to  try  to  achieve  this  have  so  often 
foundered  on  the  opposition  of member  states,  whose  unanimous 
approval is required for any fiscal change. As a result, no fewer than 18 
tax proposals still lie un-agreed on the table of  the Council of  Ministers, 
even  though over the years  the Commission has withdrawn some 30 
other proposals when they gathered too much dust. 
Yet the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union makes it all the more 
striking that the same member states which are  making efforts  to end 
exchange rate distortions once and for all through a single currency cannot 
seem to bring themselves to make a similar effort to end tax distortions 
throughout the EU. This is important; the most significant obstacles are 
cross-sectoral and not confined to any one area. The lack of  harmonisa-
tion itself is not a problem - differences between national systems are fine, 
as long as they are neither discriminatory nor distortionary. 
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There are four clear taxation policy needs for the single market: 
•  to end all forms of double taxation on cross-border income flows. 
Business complains about discriminatory tax treatment of perma-
nent establishments compared to domestic companies, the absence 
of  a common system for consolidating losses within groups and the 
levying of withholding taxes  on cross-border interest and royalty 
payments. UNICE, the European employers'  organisation, com-
plains of  the distortions these problems create. 
1 Withholding taxes 
on interest tends to favour local financing, it notes, even though this 
may be more costly to the company concerned; 
•  to remove cross-border anomalies in personal tax. At present, there 
is  the perverse situation that a frontier worker who resides in one 
EU state but works in another is often denied various forms of  tax 
relief, while another form of  cross-border activity - putting savings 
in a foreign bank-is often treated more advantageously. On invest-
ment income a non-resident can generally escape paying tax but a 
resident cannot; 
•  to convert the Value Added Tax system so that the tax is paid in the 
country where  the  product originates,  just as  happens  inside  a 
member state. There is strong business  ~upport for such a switch, 
which would be much simpler to apply (see Chapter 3). The Com-
mission  has  recently proposed a work programme which  could 
involve removing any distinction between domestic and intra-EU 
transactions over the next 3 years; 
•  to remove distortions in capital movements arising from differences 
in the Income Taxation of  investment earnings. 
But the problem of  taxation is only one of  the pieces of  unfinished busi-
ness which the European Union still has to address as far as  the single 
market is concerned. 
According to the Commission, in its latest report on the impact and 
effectiveness of the single market, issued in October 1996, the action 
needed to put the single market into top gear falls into four main areas: 
effective application and enforcement of  Community law; getting rid of 
unnecessary 'red tape' at national and EU level; filling a few important 
gaps still missing since 1985; and complementary action at Community 
level without which the single market would be forever hamstrung, the 
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first and foremost being a single currency. We will look at each of  them 
in turn. 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES 
Proper enforcement of common rules across the entire single market is 
a major priority. The removal of  internal frontiers has completely altered 
the environment in which enforcement takes place.  Products and ser-
vices which are only controlled (or not controlled) in their country of 
origin can be marketed anywhere in the Union. This issue of enforce-
ment is  widely seen  as  a problem by businesses and individuals who 
suffer from delays in implementation of  the law in some member states 
and variations in its interpretation and enforcement from one member 
state to another. To play fairly there must be one set of  rules to which all 
players  should  not  only  subscribe  but  be  seen  to  subscribe.  Each 
member state's benefit from the single market depends on the level of 
commitment and action of  the other fourteen countries, so openness is 
essential. 
Enforcement is also important for ensuring equivalent levels of  safety 
and security throughout the Union. This may mean that some changes 
are  necessary  in  the administrative and even  judicial culture in each 
member state. The Commission is the guardian of  the Treaty and in its 
role of 'referee' we should expect to see it suggesting a stepping-up of 
monitoring and surveillance of  compliance with Community rules. 
However, there is plenty of  room for an innovative approach. Improv-
ing the national collection of  statistical data (especially on services) and 
greater use of the Commission's network of Euro-Info Centres could 
make monitoring the operation of the single  market easier.  Member 
states could talk to each other more openly about enforcement and be 
ready to exchange detailed information about their enforcement struc-
tures, procedures and problems. 'Audits' of national enforcement mea-
sures  would  help  to  establish  a  high  level  of confidence  between 
enforcement agencies in the member states - to the benefit, of course, 
of business and consumers. Scientific and technical expertise will need 
to be better mobilised to give advice on how single market rules should 
be adapted to take account of new circumstances.  Complaints about 
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unfair or ineffective enforcement of  the rules will need to be followed up 
more quickly. 
GETTING RID OF RED TAPE 
The earlier chapters of  this book have shown that the single market ini-
tiative has already removed a significant amount of red tape by replac-
ing 15 different sets of  national rules by a single set of  Community rules. 
But it is clear that much more can be done to reduce the burden of  reg-
ulation to the minimum required to ensure the public good. 
When it comes to getting rid of this red tape, the situation calls for 
concerted action.  Some national legislation  untouched by the single 
market programme is  still a significant and perhaps now unnecessary 
barrier to market access and cross-border operations. There needs to be 
a way to highlight such legislation and simplify it where possible. 
More could be done, for example, by drawing up a register of  national 
measures which have the effect of  fragmenting the market so that such 
measures  could be  reviewed,  or looking at the possible  reduction of 
administrative burdens arising from member states'  regulations, espe-
cially measures which make it difficult for new companies to start up. 
Regular exchanges between member states of information from reviews 
of national legislation, in terms of  how it can be reduced or made less 
costly for business (or whether it is needed at all), would be a valuable 
way of  helping national authorities to learn from each other. 
In addition, there are long-standing national rules which can deter 
companies from entering a given market or expanding once they are in 
it.  The pharmaceutical  sector  remains  rigged  by  governments  who 
impose different levels of  price controls. Likewise, there are widely vary-
ing national rules on how long shops may stay open, or the extent to 
which supermarkets can expand. These have an economic effect; short 
opening hours, for instance, increase a retailer's fixed overhead costs. It 
has never been the EU's aim to harmonise such rules.  But critics who 
complain that European business is still over-regulated - and it proba-
bly is -should bear in mind that much of  the over-regulation now exists 
at the national, not the EU level. 
As  far  as  simplifying  Community rules  is  concerned,  a  start  has 
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already  been  made  through  the Simpler Legislation  for  the  Internal 
Market or, appropriately, 'SLIM' initiative. This is developing ideas to 
simplify Community Directives and where necessary the national rules 
which implement them. A report on the first four areas (INTRASTAT, 
construction products, ornamental plants and recognition of  diplomas) 
was presented to the Council in November 1996. But this is only a start 
and the scope of  the exercise needs to be extended. 
COMPLETING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Then there is the challenge of completing the single market so that all 
its benefits can be delivered. It is a great disappointment that 11  years 
after the 1985 White Paper some elements of  the original blueprint have 
yet to get off the drawing-board.  Developments in society since then 
also mean that it makes sense to have common rules in some new areas. 
These gaps in single market legislation are critical to furthering growth, 
competitiveness and jobs and to ensuring that people can easily exercise 
their rights. 
For example, there is the lack of  a legal framework for the removal of 
border controls on persons. The Council has  three proposals on this 
issue before it. And the implementation of  existing rules on the right to 
move and reside freely within the Community and the acquisition and 
preservation of  entitlements to social benefits both need to be improved. 
In company law,  business continues to suffer from being unable to 
free itself from 15 sets of  national 'red tape'. Problems which have been 
around for  a long time include the legal  problems involved in cross-
border mergers and the mass of  separate national regulations governing 
companies and their operations. Two  unadopted proposals,  the  1Oth 
Company Law  Directive  (which  would  provide  the  necessary  legal 
framework  for  cross-border  mergers)  and  the  European  Company 
Statute  would  allow  companies  to  reap  considerable  cost  savings 
through reorganisation.  The European Company Statute would save 
firms  the time and expense of having to register as separate companies 
all over the EU, together with the additional filing and disclosure oblig-
ations involved. The 13th Directive on takeovers would guarantee min-
imum  standards  of protection  for  shareholders  where  a  change  of 
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control occurs, as well as a more secure legal framework in which barri-
ers to takeovers might be addressed. 
Benefits  would  also  accrue  to  business  and  consumers  if some 
ambiguous or over-complex single  market legislation could be  ratio-
nalised.  Construction products and financial  services  pose two  of the 
biggest headaches. Others are probably still 'at large' but so far uniden-
tified. 
The problems of  taxation have already been referred to above. 
Other challenges to the single market are newer. They must be met if 
we are to keep the single market up to the mark for the European and 
world economies of  the 21st century. 
Let's  take new technologies first.  As we have seen, the needs of the 
Information Society will be ignored at the EU's peril.  But as  national 
authorities seek to establish rules for information technology-based ser-
vices,  they may inadvertently re-fragment the single market. The left 
hand must let the right hand know what it is  doing.  More work is 
needed to coordinate the legislative measures that will determine how 
the new networks can operate or how the principle of  'mutual recogni-
tion' of  national rules and services could be extended to these emerging 
markets.  Biotechnology is another key technology affecting the devel-
opment of  a wide range of  new products in the fields of  medicine, agri-
cultural  products  and  foodstuffs.  Without  common  science-based 
legislation compatible with the single market, European research and 
exploitation of  its results will be discouraged- to the advantage of  com-
petitors. 
The services sector contains about 70 per cent of  the EU's jobs, but it 
is also the area where the single market legislation has in places worked 
least effectively. Additional action may be needed to overcome obstacles 
to the cross-border provision of  services or establishment. For example, 
as  we  have  seen  in Chapter 5,  financial  services  has  some way  to go 
before it is possible to speak of  a single market. This is partly due to the 
failure  of some member states  to implement the  relevant  Directives, 
especially in insurance, and to do so correctly and on time. But the scope 
of  the law needs to be extended to provide a single authorisation proce-
dure for  insurance intermediaries. In other cases  there are  difficulties 
with the interpretation of the legislation which hampers cross-border 
provision of  services or establishment; for example, national rules have 
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sometimes been used ostensibly to protect the 'general good' but the 
result has  been an unnecessary and unworkable burden for  operators 
from  other member states.  The Commission has  already declared its 
intention to remedy such loopholes in the legislation. 
On the other hand, services is also the area with most potential for 
extending the single market. The liberalisation of  the gas market, build-
ing on the progress made so far to open up the electricity market, will 
be necessary in order to achieve the single energy market. 
The objective of environmental protection,  laudable  in itself,  has 
given  rise  to  some  new barriers.  Uncoordinated technical legislation 
aimed at protecting the environment and consumers is frequently seen 
by business as  a complication in the single market and a reason for a 
greater degree of  harmonisation of  the rules. In some cases, the problem 
may be linked to shortcomings in existing EU legislation as, for exam-
ple, in waste recovery, where there is little restriction on the type of  mea-
sures that member states can adopt. In others, Community rules have 
been overtaken by additional, more stringent, specifications at national 
level. Such differentiation has a significant impact on smaller companies 
seeking to enter new markets. Although some of  these measures can be 
justified by Treaty provisions, they may sometimes be out of  proportion 
to their objectives. Invocation of  the subsidiarity principle and recourse 
to Article 1  OOa( 4) to justify the maintenance of  national environmental 
protection measures also worries some sectors, particularly chemicals, 
although to date recourse to Article 100a(4) has been limited to a hand-
ful of  cases with limited trade effects. 
In this and other areas, a Community framework may in many cases 
be the best guarantee that action taken has maximum impact and strikes 
the right balance between the single market and appropriate objectives. 
COMPLEMENTARY ACTION AT COMMUNITY 
LEVEL 
A common legal framework alone is  not enough to deliver a properly 
working single market. Other policies will have  to come into play to 
breath life into the body that has been created. Two of  the most impor-
tant are to give the single market a single currency to work with and to 
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extend it eastward as  central and east European countries negotiate to 
join the Union. 
A SINGLE CURRENCY 
Research for this review has supported, and in some cases strengthened, 
the case for economic and monetary union (EMU). One constant is the 
transaction cost of  moving money in and out of  Europe's multiple cur-
rencies.  In absolute terms, it has  risen,  from Ecus 33.1 bn in 1986 to 
Ecus 58.1bn in 1995.
2  But this is  no greater a share of GDP in 1995 
(0.96 per cent) than it was in 1986 (0.93 per cent). However, the rela-
tively disappointing impact that the single market has had in terms of 
bringing national price levels together (see Chapter 6) is probably partly 
due to the way prices differences across Europe are obscured by being 
expressed  in different currencies.  The clear expression  of prices  in a 
single currency would expose the price mark-ups made by companies in 
some markets, while at the same time whetting the appetite of con-
sumers to go hunting for cross-border bargains. The arrival of  the Euro 
would consolidate and increase the efficiency of  the single market. 
Exchange rate fluctuations, which succeeded the period of  monetary 
calm in 1987-92, have shaken the single market but in so doing have 
also strengthened the case for Emu. The overall judgement of  the Com-
mission, confirmed by other international institutions, is  that the cur-
rency turmoil of 1992-93 may have led,  by  1995, to a slowdown in 
growth of the order of 0.25-0.5 of a percentage point.3  The further 
monetary fluctuations that occurred in the spring of 1995 are estimated 
to have had an even bigger effect on growth, perhaps reducing overall 
output in the EU in 1995-96 by as much as up to 2 percentage points. 
This second bout of  currency disruption came just as the EU economy 
seemed to be recovering from recession and therefore shook investors' 
plans all the more. 
The effect  of these  fluctuations  on national  economies  has  been 
varied and sometimes unpredictable. Not all countries whose currencies 
have appreciated since  1992-93 have,  in fact,  seen their international 
competitiveness  or  trade  balance  suffer.  Nonetheless,  this  monetary 
instability has brought calls by some countries to be allowed to increase 
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subsidies and safeguard measures to protect themselves from what they 
see as a threat from partners' devaluations. The introduction of  a single 
currency would obviously remove any justification for such protection-
ism, and act as the 'guarantor' of  the single market. 
OTHER COMMUNITY POLICIES 
As we have also seen, the single market is a fulcrum which can be used 
to create jobs. This can be given added momentum if  the Community 
supports  national  training and active  labour  policies,  for  example, 
through the European Social Fund. Competition policy may need to be 
reconsidered so as to fine-tune and streamline the Community's guide-
lines on state aids. Tax policy has recently been the subject of  a recent 
Commission report on the need for a coherent overall Community tax 
policy, taking into account the views of  the representatives of  European 
Finance Ministers. Together with action on enterprise policy aimed at 
helping  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  through  the 
Multi-annual  SME  Programme,  consumer  policy,  Trans-European 
Networks, and the progressive development of Community Research, 
Development and Technology policy (which contributes the scientific 
knowledge necessary for the implementation of  the single market in a 
number of fields)  this adds up to a fair-sized list of support measures 
for the single market. 
Further down the road lies enlargement of  the Union, and with it, of 
the single market. Central and European countries have already begun 
trying to align their legislation with that of  the single market. This will 
be far from easy. As we have seen from this review, the single market is 
a market in motion, and therefore to some extent, applicants to join the 
Union are chasing a moving target. On the other hand, the early adop-
tion of single market measures can help the acceding countries to get 
into a position from which they can quickly exploit the advantages of 
the single market after their accession. The Union has already commit-
ted staff to giving them technical assistance for this task, as well as the 
more difficult one of acquiring the know-how to put the rules into 
practice. 
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THE SINGLE MARKET AND TOMORROW'S 
EUROPE 
So  where does all  this leave  us?  The single market remains politically 
centre-stage as  a key instrument through which the priorities of the 
Union can be delivered. Nothing else approaching its dimensions or its 
. dynamism has yet come onto the scene to steal the show. 
Jobs  remain  a major challenge.  Already  there  are  signs  that even 
during a severe recession the single market is making a positive contri-
bution to overall employment levels  in the Union. A more favourable 
economic climate augurs well for better results in the future. 
The Community is  also  facing  the challenge of increasingly rapid 
globalisation - many of the world's  markets are  becoming one huge 
trading centre. The single market is by far the most extensive and suc-
cessful example of  eliminating barriers between national markets. If  the 
momentum is sustained, both in maintaining the market framework in 
tip-top running order and a business community which is in step with 
it, the Community will be well placed to influence and exploit the wider 
opportunities which globalisation will offer. The extension of  the single 
market to other services will accelerate this trend, as will the effects of 
the full entry into force of  legislation already in place. 
The achievement of  Emu will contribute to the efficient operation of 
the single market by eliminating transactions costs of  almost 1 per cent 
of  GOP and the exchange risks currently involved in cross-border pay-
ments. It will also make the wasteful allocation of resources needed to 
manage these problems a thing of the past. By promoting convergence 
and a more homogeneous economic environment,  the single  market 
will contribute to the right conditions for the success of  Emu. 
The EU's commitment to developing its relationship with the central 
and eastern European countries (through the Europe Agreements and 
through the negotiations for  enlargement)  places  the takeover of the 
'acquis'  (the  body of legislation,  policies  and understandings  which 
underpins  the single  market)  squarely on the agenda.  How this will 
work in practice will be strongly influenced by how much these coun-
tries perceive it as comprehensive and fully operational, based not only 
on a complete and coherent legal  framework but on the institutions, 
structures and practices to support it. 
144 Looking To  The Future 
As the European Union approaches the beginning of  a new century, 
we can look forward to ever closer economic integration, for which the 
single market will be the most important means of unity and coopera-
tion, and to increasingly more fruitful relations with its trading partners 
in the wider world. 
Notes 
UNICE statement, 8 July 1996. 
2  Currency costs. 
3  Monetary Fluctuations and the Single Market, Commission statement, 31/10/95. 
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The Structure of  Research 
In response to the Council Resolution to report in 1996 on the effec-
tiveness and impact of  the Single Market Programme (SMP) the Com-
mission launched a series of independent research studies to assess  the 
impact of  the SMP on both specific business sectors and across the econ-
omy as  a whole.  To  ensure  the independence and objectivity of the 
work, the background research was  carried out by contracted parties, 
operating only subject to quality control by Commission services.  In 
addition, a panel of independent academic experts was  appointed to 
ensure that sound methods of  analysis were employed. The structure of 
the study programme is outlined below. 
The research programme was designed to elicit information on what in 
fact had happened in the market place as a result of  the implementation of 
the SMP rather than to validate previous research into the effects of the 
single market. It should therefore not be seen as a 'Cecchini Mark 2' report. 
The research consists of 38 studies, accompanied by a wide-ranging 
business survey. 
To measure the effectiveness of  the SMP a common methodological 
approach  was  established.  A  'bottom-up'  approach  was  followed  to 
assess the difference that the single market legislation has made to spe-
cific chosen economic sectors covering both manufacturing and service 
industries. This was  complemented by a cross-sectoral analysis  at the 
macro  level  in  order to measure  the single  market impact on trade, 
investment, competition, and aggregate and regional levels and to assess 
the effectiveness of  the dismantling of  barriers to the free movement of 
capital, goods and services. 
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Half  of  these 38 studies are sectoral while the rest adopt a 'horizontal' 
approach to the measurement of the impact of the single market. It 
would have been impossible to carry out individual studies on all sectors 
of  the economy and choices had to be made on the basis of  the economic 
significance of the sector and relevance to the operation of the single 
market. The combination of  examination at both the sectoral and hor-
izontal level should mean that no aspect of  the single market impact has 
been overlooked 
From the information gathered at the micro and macro levels a pic-
ture emerges of  how the SMP has translated into broader effects in the 
Community and national  economies,  shedding light on the mecha-
nisms through which SMP effects have permeated economic activity. 
The research does not simply focus on the consequences ofliberalisation 
and harmonisation measures but inevitably throws the spotlight on to 
other Community and national policies which influence the business 
dynamics and adjustment mechanisms liberalised by the single market. 
Foremost amongst these policies are monetary integration, the regional 
impact of  the single market, competitiveness and employment, compe-
tition, the environment and the promotion of  consumer interests. 
However,  the results  derived from  the research  undertaken in the 
framework of  this exercise need to be qualified. Measuring what in effect 
is the impact of  the legislative programme on the basis of  economic cri-
teria is not as straightforward as it might appear.  Assumptions had to be 
made regarding: 
•  what the economy would really look like in the absence of  the single 
market in order to draw meaningful comparisons; 
•  how the late transposition or implementation of  single market mea-
sures may have affected the response economic operators; and 
•  how the interaction of the SMP with other factors that have influ-
enced  the  economy  in  the  same  period  may  have  amplified  or 
dampened the single market effect. 
This research amounts to the first extensive ex-post analysis of  what has 
been happening to the European economy as  a result of the SMP.  In 
terms of economic impact the conclusion is positive and encouraging. 
The Community needs to build on its success and iron out the remain-
ing practical  difficulties  that  inhibit  the  full  potential  of the  single 
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market from  being exploited.  The debate  that will  ensue  from  this 
research  programme  and  the  accompanying  Commission  report  are 
timely and should inform  the debate about priorities  for  the future 
development of  the single market. 
The research was funded by the European Commission and coordi-
nated under the direction of Mario Monti by the following Steering 
Committee: 
Directorate-General1nternal Market and Financial Services' (DG XVJ 
John Mogg, Thierry Stoll, John Farnell, Alexandros Spachis 
Directorate-General 'Economic and Financial Affairs' (DG II) 
Giovanni Ravasio, Jan Schmidt, Pierre Buigues 
Directorate-General1ndustry' (DG III) 
Stefano Micossi, Michel Ayral, Peter Smith 
The studies were conducted by independent consultants (see the Single 
Market Review Series in Appendix C). 
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Results of  Eurostat 
Business Survey 
OPINION OF EUROPEAN ENTERPRISES ON THE 
IMPACT OF THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME 
Some 13,500 enterprises answered a survey conducted during the first half 
of  1995.  The survey was designed to find out their opinions on the various 
types  of  measures  adopted in  implementing the  single  market and their 
impact on sales, competition and  firms' strategies. 
For 60 per cent of  industrial enterprises, the elimination of  customs 
formalities and border delays have had a beneficial effect on their activ-
ities. The deregulation of  freight transport has been positive for less than 
half of the firms. The measures linked to the abolition of internal cus-
toms frontiers thus seem to have had a substantially positive effect for 
manufacturers.  The measures  aimed at eliminating technical barriers 
(the first four categories shown in Table 1 below), particularly those on 
the harmonisation of  technical regulations and the mutual recognition 
of standards, have also had a globally positive net impact (net effect = 
positive effect-negative effect). The transitional arrangements for VAT, 
on the other hand, seem to have created some problems for enterprises, 
and almost 15 per cent of  them noted negative effects from the changes 
in VAT  procedures for  intra-Community trade.  Similarly,  few  enter-
prises have benefited from the opening of  public procurement to com-
petitive  bidding,  probably  owing  to  the  small  number  of firms 
concerned and the delays which have accumulated in the implementa-
tion of  measures. 
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Type of measure  Percentage of enterprises reporting 
the effect of the European single 
Positive 
Harmonisation of  technical 
regulations and/or standards  31 
Mutual recognition of 
technical regulations and/or 
standards  32 
Conformity assessment 
procedures  23 
Simplified patenting 
procedures  13 
The opening up of  public 
procurement  9 
The elimination of  customs 
documentation  60 
Deregulation of  freight 
transport  43 
The elimination of  delays at 
frontiers  56 
The change in VAT 
procedures for intra EU sales  32 
The liberalisation of  capital 
movements  23 
Double-taxation agreements  17 
Table  1  Industrial enterprises 
Source:  Eurostat 
market as: 
No  Negative  No 
effect  opinion 
51  9  9 
49  7  12 
56  5  15 
64  2  21 
71  4  16 
30  5  5 
43  3  12 
35  2  7 
41  15  11 
61  2  14 
60  2  21 
Percentage of enterprises, weighted 
by the number of employees, 
reporting the effect of the 
European single market as: 
Positive  No  Negative  No 
effect  opinion 
40  45  8  8 
40  45  5  10 
27  55  4  13 
24  57  1  18 
13  68  5  13 
69  23  5  3 
50  38  2  10 
63  31  1  5 
32  37  21  11 
29  58  1  12 
25  55  1  19 
It will be noted that a significant percentage of  enterprises feel that the 
various types of Single Market measure have had no effect, or have no 
opinion. This is scarcely surprising, given the scope of  the survey and the 
very specific nature of  many of  the measures. 
Enterprises  in  the  services  sectors  (excluding  distributive  trades), 
more  of whose  international  trade  takes  place  via  foreign  outlets, 
acknowledged at the time of the survey that they had been less directly 
affected by the single market. Some services sector industries, such as the 
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hotel and restaurant trade, and real estate, have a large number of  small 
enterprises which generally operate on the local or domestic market. In 
addition, certain directives, particularly those on insurance, had only 
recently been implemented at the time of the survey and had not had 
the time to produce any significant effect. 
Despite this, the single market measures have had a widely positive 
effect on enterprises affected by the abolition of  frontiers (see Table 2). 
In particular, the measures aimed at facilitating cross-border trade and 
deregulating movements  of capital  have  had a  substantially positive 
effect. 
The percentage of enterprises in the services sector feeling that the 
Single Market has had no impact or having no opinion is higher than in 
manufacturing. 
Type of measure  Percentage of enterprises reporting  Percentage of enterprises, weighted 
the effect of the European single  by the number of employees, 
market as:  reporting the effect of the 
European single market as: 
Positive  No  Negative  No  Positive  No  Negative  No 
effect  opinion  effect  opinion 
Harmonisation of 
licensing/authorisation 
requirements  11  70  7  12  20  66  5  9 
Mutual recognition of 
licences/ authorisations  12  72  4  12  17  71  3  9 
Measures to facilitate 
cross border operations  22  65  3  10  30  60  4  6 
Measures to facilitate 
physical establishment in 
other EU states  9  78  1  12  17  74  1  8 
The opening up of  public 
procurement  9  73  4  15  16  68  6  9 
The liberalisation of 
capital movements  16  72  1  10  25  66  1  8 
Double taxation 
agreements  11  69  2  18  18  67  1  14 
Table 2  Services enterprises (excluding distributive trades) 
Source:  Eurostat 
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These  results  are  confirmed  by  the  overall  opmtons  (see  Table  3) 
expressed by enterprises as  a general assessment of the single market. 
Only 2 industrial enterprises in 10 felt that the single market had not 
achieved its principal objective, that is, eliminating the barriers to intra-
Community trade. Manufacturing enterprises, and a  fortiori those in the 
services sector, nevertheless agreed that it was too early yet to be talking 
of  a genuine single market, and that further measures were needed. 
Percentage of  enterprises agreeing or disagreeing with the following statements 
on the single market 
Statement  Industry  Services (excluding 
distributive trades) 
Agree  No  Dis- Agree  No 
opinion  agree  opinion 
The single market programme has 
been successful in eliminating obstacles 
to EU trade in your sector  41  39  20  22 
The single market programme has 
been successful in creating a genuine 
internal market in your sector  23  43  35  6 
Additional measures are needed to 
eliminate obstacles to EU trade  27  61  12  18 
Additional measures are needed in this 
sector to create a genuine internal market  25  61  14  17 
The single market programme has been 
a success for your firm  33  40  27  16 
The single market programme has been 
a success for your sector in your country  25  44  31  16 
The single market programme has been 
a success for your sector in the European  29  51  20  15 
Union 
Table 3  General opinions on the single market programme 
Source:  Eurostat 
65 
67 
75 
76 
63 
62 
71 
Dis-
agree 
13 
26 
7 
7 
21 
22 
14 
One of the aims of eliminating the barriers to trade was  to promote 
greater competition on the market.  In the industrial sector,  it is  the 
increase in the number of  competitors from other Member States which 
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is most keenly felt (see Table 4). As far as price competition is concerned, 
almost one firm in two recognises that it has met stiffer competition 
from other domestic firms or from those elsewhere in the Community. 
In the services sector the competition is essentially domestic. Competi-
tion from non-European enterprises is generally less perceptible. 
Percentage of  enterprises feeling that in recent years the level of  competition has 
Statement  Manufacturing  Services (excluding 
distributive trades) 
increased  stayed  decreased  increased  stayed  decreased 
the 
same 
Number of  competitors 
Domestically owned enterprises  25  64  11  30 
Other EU owned enterprises  39  59  2  21 
Non-EU owned enterprises  25  74  2  9 
Price competition 
Domestically owned enterprises  44  51  4  37 
Other EU owned enterprises  41  55  4  16 
Non-EU owned enterprises  29  67  4  9 
Product competition 
Domestically owned enterprises  33  64  3  27 
Other EU owned enterprises  29  69  2  14 
Non-EU owned enterprises  18  79  3  8 
Table 4  Opinions on the trend in the level of  competition 
Source:  Eurostat 
the 
same 
63  7 
77  2 
88  2 
60  3 
81  3 
87  3 
69  4 
83  3 
89  3 
If  we look at the impact of the single market on sales in the manufac-
turing sector, it can be seen that around 3 enterprises in 10  r~cognise 
that the single market has stimulated their sales in other Member States. 
It  is the medium-sized enterprises in the manufacturing sector, as well as 
the major corporations, which have benefited in particular from this 
growth. 
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Percentage of  enterprises aware of  an impact of  the single market on their 
intra-Community sales 
Services sector (excluding 
Manufacturing sectors  distributive trades) 
Number of persons  Positive  No  Negative  Don't  Positive  No  Negative  Don't 
employed in enterprise  impact  impact  impact  know  impact  impact  impact  know 
20 - 49 (manufacturing)  25  63  4  7  12  76  2  9 
5 - 49 (services) 
50- 199  32  58  4  6  16  76  1  6 
200-499  34  58  4  4  16  78  0  6 
500-999  27  63  7  3  19  73  1  7 
More than 1,000  33  59  3  4  25  69  1  4 
Total  28  61  4  6  12  76  2  9 
Table 5  Opinion of  enterprises on the impact of  the single market on 
their sales in the EU 
Source:  Eurostat 
More detailed sectoral analysis of the impact of the single market (see 
Table 6) reveals that not all markets have the same degree of  openness to 
foreign  trade, and that some enterprises have benefited more directly 
from measures of  a more specifically sectoral nature. The high-technol-
ogy sectors, such as electrical and electronic machinery and equipment, 
and those such as  food,  beverages and tobacco which have  benefited 
from very specific measures, have a relatively positive perception of  the 
single market. Those, on the other hand, which traditionally operate on 
a domestic basis, such as construction, hotels and restaurants, and the 
enterprise services and real estate sectors, have no strong views on the 
matter. 
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Percentage of  enterprises agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that the 
single market has been a success for their sector in the EU 
Sector•  Agree  No  Disagree  Sector 
opinion 
Food, beverages &  30  51  19  Transport equipment 
tobacco (DA)  (OM) 
Textiles, leather &  31  47  22  Construction (F) 
furniture 
(DB+DC+DN) 
Wood, paper &  19  59  22  Distributive trades 
printing/publishing  (G) 
(DD+DE) 
Chemicals, rubber  27  52  20  Hotels & restaurants 
& plastics (DG+DH)  (H) 
Non-metallic  30  56  14  Transport, storage & 
mineral products  communication (I) 
(DI) 
Metal & metal  24  57  19  Financial 
products (D  J)  intermediation 0) 
Machinery &  32  45  23  Real estate, renting 
equipment (OK)  & business activities 
(K) 
Electrical & optical  41  40  19 
machinery (DL) 
Table 6  Opinions of  the various sectors of  activity 
Source:.  Eurostat 
' letters in brackets refer to NACE Rev.  1 
Agree 
25 
13 
16 
15 
21 
27 
10 
No  Disagree 
opinion 
59  16 
60  27 
68  15 
75  10 
60  19 
57  17 
75  15 
Size has a fairly significant influence on the opinions of  both industrial 
and service enterprises in the majority of  answers to the questions on the 
impact of  the single market. The larger the enterprise, the more likely it 
is to have transnational dealings and the more favourable its opinion of 
these measures (see Table 7). Small enterprises, on the other hand, tend 
to operate more on a regional or national basis, and seem to have been 
more aware of competition on their markets, with a consequently less 
enthusiastic view of  the single market's success. 
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Percentage of  enterprises agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that the 
single market programme has been a success for their company 
Services sector (excluding 
Manufacturing  distributive trades) 
Number employed by  Agree  No  Disagree  Weight  Agree  No  Disagree  Weight 
the enterprise  opinion 
(I)  opinion 
(I} 
20 - 49 (manufacturing)  30  42  28  60  16  63  21  91.9 
5 - 49 (services) 
50- 199  36  37  27  30  18  61  21  5.8 
200-499  40  35  25  7  17  61  22  1.5 
500-999  38  38  24  2  21  54  25  0.5 
More than 1  ,000  46  31  23  1  35  46  19  0.3 
Total  33  40  27  100  16  63  21  100.0 
(1) Proportion of  enterprises in each class in the European total 
Table 7  Effect of  size on answers 
Source:  Eurostat 
Finally,  analysis of the impact by Member State shows that Member 
States' opinions vary widely (Table 8). Generally the single market has 
been more profitable to enterprises in the outlying Member States (in 
particular Greece and Ireland) and to those in Italy and Germany. 
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Percentage of  enterprises agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that the 
single market programme has been a success for their company 
Manufacturing 
Member State  Agree  No  Disagree  Weight 
opinion  %111 
Belgie/Belgique  13  66  22  2 
Danmark  33  41  27  2 
BR Deutschland  4I  40  18  20 
Ellada  42  39  I9  I 
Espana  38  23  40  10 
France  20  41  38  I6 
Ireland  46  38  15  1 
It  alia  54  23  23  22" 
Luxembourg  2I  42  37  0 
Nederland  17  64  19  4 
Portugal  12  54  34  6 
Unite.d Kingdom  16  59  25  16 
Total  33  40  27  100 
(1) Proportion of  enterprises in each class in the European total. 
(2) Not available. See 'Scope of  the survey' in Methodology. 
Table 8  National variations in opinions 
Source:.  Eurostat 
Agree 
13 
27 
NA<21 
49 
26 
8 
22 
45 
35 
6 
1 
9 
I6 
METHODOLOGY 
Services (excluding 
distributive trades) 
No  Disagree 
opinion 
76  10 
54  20 
NA<21  NA121 
46  5 
31  43 
61  31 
64  I4 
38  I7 
51  14 
72  23 
54  44 
79  12 
63  21 
Weight 
%(11 
4 
2 
NA12) 
2 
13 
I4 
1 
11 
0 
8 
I 
41 
IOO 
The survey on the single market was carried out in 1995 on a sample of 
approximately 24,000 randomly selected enterprises representative of 
the European Union's production structure in terms of  sector of  activity, 
size and Member State of  residence. The survey was carried out by mail 
and the  response  rate was  approximately 56 per cent,  representing a 
usable  sample of about  13,500 enterprises. An additional small-scale 
telephone survey of  non-respondents in Germany revealed that, on the 
whole,  the opinions of non-respondents were very similar to those of 
respondents. Data were processed by Eurostat and weighted to reflect 
the structure of  the population of  European enterprises. 
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The operation was coordinated by Eurostat, and data collection was 
carried out by the following  bodies:  INS*  (Belgium),  Statistics Den-
mark*, IFO (Germany), National Statistical Service of Greece*,  Min-
istry of Industry and Energy  (Spain),  ESRI  in cooperation with the 
CSO* (Ireland), ISTAT* (Italy), INSEE* (France), NEI in cooperation 
with Statistics Netherlands*, INE* (Portugal), the NSO* (United King-
dom), Statec*  (Luxembourg).  It was  financed by the European Com-
mtsston. 
Scope of  the survey : all enterprises employing more than 20 persons 
in manufacturing and more than 5 persons in services. 
In  manufacturing,  all  activities  are  covered  except  the  extractive 
industries and water and electricity production, ie Section D of  NACE 
Rev.  1.  The sector  identified  as  'distributive  trades'  corresponds  to 
wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and household 
goods, ie section G of NACE Rev.  1. The sector identified as  'services 
excluding  distributive  trades'  corresponds  to  hotels  and  restaurants, 
transport  and communications,  financial  intermediation,  real  estate, 
leasing and enterprise services, ie Sections H  to K of NACE Rev.  1. It 
should be noted that enterprises in the construction industry (Section F 
ofNace Rev.  1) in Greece and in services excluding distributive trades in 
Germany could not be surveyed. Such enterprises are therefore not rep-
resented in the European averages given above. 
The questionnaire: comprised 61 questions for manufacturing enter-
prises and 44 questions for service enterprises. In addition to the sub-
jects discussed above, it also covered the impact on costs, productivity, 
profitability and employment, and enterprise strategy. 
The percentages given  in the tables are  rounded off:  it is  therefore 
possible that the total of the percentages in a given row may be 99 per 
cent or 101  per cent owing to rounding errors. 
For further information: a more detailed publication Results of  the 
Business Survey forms part of  the Single Market Review series (for a com-
plete list of  study titles, see Appendix C). 
*National Statistical Institutes 
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6 
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Subseries 
Volume:  1 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
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AppendixC 
The Single Market 
Review Series
1 
I - Impact on manufacturing 
Food, drink and tobacco processing machinery ('Food 
& drink machinery') - DR!  Europe Ltd 
Pharmaceutical products ('Pharmaceuticals') - REMIT 
Textiles and clothing ('Textiles') - CEGOS SA 
Construction site equipment ('Construction') - W.S. 
Atkins 
Chemicals ('Chemicals')- KPMG 
Motor vehicles ('Vehicles') - Ernst &  Young 
Processed foodstuffs ('Foodstuffs')- Bureau Europeen de 
Recherches ('BER') 
Telecommunications equipment ('Telecom. equipment') 
- Analysys Ltd 
II - Impact on services 
Insurance ('Insurance') - CEGOS SA 
Air transport ('Air transport') - Cranfield University 
Credit institutions and banking ('Banking') - Economic 
Research Europe Ltd 
Distribution ('Distribution')- Coopers & Lybrand 
Road freight transport ('Road freight')- NEA 
Telecommunications: liberalized services ('Telecom. 
services') - Bossard Consultants SA 
Advertising (~dvertising') - Bocconi University 
Audio-visual services and production (~udio-visual') -
KPMG 
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10 
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Subseries 
Volume: 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Subseries 
Volume: 1 
2 
3 
4 
Subseries 
Volume: 1 
2 
3 
4 
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Single information market ('Information') - Analysys Ltd 
Single energy market ('Energy') - London Economies 
Transport networks ('Transport') - Trasporti e Territorio 
III - Dismanding of  barriers 
Technical barriers to trade ('Technical barriers')- WS. 
Atkins 
Public procurement ('Procurement') - Eurostrategy 
Consultants 
Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers ('Customs & 
frontiers')- Price Waterhouse 
Industrial property rights ('Industrial property') - C]A 
Consultants Ltd 
Capital market liberalization ('Capital markets') -
National Institute for Economic &  Social Research 
(NIESR) 
Currency management costs ('Currency costs') - IFO-
lnstitut 
IV- Impact on trade and investment 
Foreign direct investment ('FDI')- Economists Advisory 
Group Ltd ('EAG') 
Trade patterns inside the single market ('Trade patterns') 
- CEPII 
Trade creation and trade diversion ('Trade 
creation/  diversion') - Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) 
External access to European markets ('External access')-
University of  Sussex & South bank University 
V- Impact on competition and scale effects 
Price competition and price convergence ('Price 
convergence')- DR!  Europe Ltd 
Intangible investments ('Intangibles') - RCS Conseil 
Competition issues ('Competition') - London Economics 
Economies of  scale ('Scale economies')- Economists 
Advisory Group Ltd ('EAG') 
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VI - Aggregate and regional impact 
Regional growth and convergence ('Regional growth') -
Cambridge Econometrics 
The cases of  Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
('Greece, Spain, Ireland &  Portugal') - ESRI 
Trade, labour and capital flows:  the less developed 
regions ('Trade &  capital flows') - CERES 
Employment, trade and labour costs in manufacturing 
('Employment &  manufacturing') - Cambridge 
Econometrics 
Aggregate results of  the single market programme 
('Aggregate results') - National Technical University of 
Athens 
1  38 studies co-published by Kogan  Page and the Office for  Official  Publications of the 
European Communities 
Results of  the business survey ('Business survey') - Eurostat 
161 SINGLE MARKET REVIEW 
In  January  1997  Kogan  Page,  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Commission, will commence publication of the long-awaited 39 
volume Single Market Review, the first authoritative picture of the 
effect  of  economic  union  on  European  industry  and  its 
competitiveness. 
These volumes provide a detailed overview of all aspects of the 
Single Market, giving essential information to all those, worldwide, 
who are interested or involved in its development, as well as an 
invaluable insight to specific industry sectors for investors, analysts 
and corporate strategists. Written by leading subject experts and 
co-ordinated by specialists from the Commission, there is no leader 
in British Industry who can afford to ignore them! 
For further information on any of the following titles, or to place 
an order, please contact Emma Gilkes at Kogan Page on 44 (0) 171 
278 0433 (tel) or 44 (0) 171 837 6348 (fax), quoting MON 1 
Please use this form in conjunction with your official purchase 
order  or enclose  your  full  ordering  details  including  delivery 
address on a separate piece of paper. 
Payment can be made in two ways. Please tick the appropriate box: 
D  I enclose a cheque (made payable to Kogan Page) for £ ........ . 
D  I authorise you to debit my credit card account for £ ............. . 
My Access/Visa/Amex/Diner's Card number is: 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Expiry date:  ..................... . 
Card Holder's name: .......................................................... . 
Address: 
Kogan Page Ltd., 1  20 Pentonvllle Road, 
London, N 1 9JN, England A complete set of  all 39 volumes  £1650  Industrial Property Rights 
CJA Consultants  £40 
Series 1: Impact on Manufacturing  Capital Market Liberalization 
Food, Drink and Tobacco  NIESR  £40 
Processing Industry  Currency Management Costs 
DR/ Europe Ltd.  ·£40  IFO-lnstitut  £55 
Pharmaceutical Products 
REMIT  Consultants  £40  Series IV: Impact on Trade and 
Textiles and Clothing  Investment 
CEGOSSA  £45  Foreign Direct Investment 
Construction Site Equipment  Economics Advisory Group Ltd.  £50 
W.S. Atkins liFO  £40  Trade Patterns inside the Single 
Chemicals 
KPMG  £45  Market 
Motor Vehicles 
CEPII & CIREM with FIES  £45 
Ernst & Young  £50  Trade Creation and Trade 
Processed foodstuffs  Diversion 
BER with Wye College  £50  CEPR  £45 
Telecommunications Equipment  External Access to European 
Analysys  £40  Markets 
University of  Sussex  £45 
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Coopers & Lybrand  £45 
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London School of  Economics  £55 
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Bossard Consultants  £40 
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Analysys Ltd.  £40  ESRI  £50 
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